Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised)

itude to Aust

'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57] Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the negotiations, the cardinal po

on that the crisis could be localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in t

r, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador that

were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-H

inister, seems to have divined th

g attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to b

esting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed off

d it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influenc

e same day wrote that he agreed

personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is

Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do'.[65] Next day the German Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign surprise that Servian affairs could be of such interest to Russia'.[66] But in their White Book, in order to blacken

owers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications'.[68] The proposal was accepted with alacrity

not in his opinion be called together except at the request

n not unnaturally

resentatives of the four nations not directly interested should

the German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Si

as ready to be put into operation by any method that

r, events had by then gone so far that the ver

staving off the evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany. The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conc

might be afforded to Austria'.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation between them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficulty was rather the "conference" than the principle'.[75] But we may ask whether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward G

hat his Government had only the former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there were great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had been willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Aus

lized against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On bein

ld have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactl

tersburg, about the language used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador,

e of war' (Kriegszustand) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno annou

lty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest'.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count Pourtalês, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revo

azonof offered on July 30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate from her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this p

ation.[88] This was answered on the same day by a proclamation of Kriegsgefahr at Berli

afeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made 'even more difficult for Russia to accept by a

Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announ

ions-an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three empires ta