The Sovereignty of the Sea

eek. The geographical situation of the country-everywhere surrounded by the waves, separated on the one side from the Continent by a narrow stra

came the duty of safeguarding shipping and commerce; and with regard to those fundamental interests, the language used by our rulers centuries ago was the same as that which is used by our statesmen to-day. The sea must be "kept." That has been the maxim and watchword of national policy throughout the ages, and the recognition of 2 its truth was by no means confined to rulers and statesmen. The people at large have always been as convinced and as resolved that the supremacy or dominion on the sea should be maintained as were those in whose hands was placed the guidance of the affairs of the state. Again and again, when owing to mismanagement of t

and was duly recognised as such, apart from an actual predominance of naval power at the time, just as the sovereignty of a state exists on land, though in both cases its maintenance may depend upon the sword. In this sense, the sovereignty of the sea signified the same sole power of jurisdiction and rule as obtained on land, and also, in its extreme form, an exclusive property in the sea as part of the territory of the realm,-very much indeed like the rights that are now admitted by the law of nations to appertain to the so-called territorial waters of a state. Many things and many interests were thus 3 embraced in the term besides the question of naval ascendency. There were jurisdictions of various kinds and for various purposes. There was the imp

ters was variously stated. Very commonly it extended to sixty or one hundred miles from the land, and thus included all the bordering sea within which navigation was practically confined. Sometimes the principle governing the ownership of rivers was transferred in theory to the sea, the possession of the opposite shores by the same state being held to enti

r to prohibit their passage altogether. The neighbouring cities and commonwealths were soon compelled to agree to her claim, which was eventually recognised by the other Powers of Europe and by the Pope. The right of Venice to the dominion of the Adriatic, arising in this way by force, became firmly established by custom and treaty; and even after she had fallen from her greatness and was hardly able to sustain her claim by the sword, it wa

eland, Greenland, and Spitzbergen on the other, were claimed by Norway and later by Denmark, on the principle referred to above, that possession was held of the opposite shores. The Scandinavian claims to maritime dominion are probably indeed the most important in history. They led to several wars; they were the caus

med a similar right in the Atlantic south of Morocco and in the Indian Ocean. It was those preposterous pretensions to the dominion of the immense waters of the globe that caused the great juridical controversies regarding mare clausum and mare liberum, from which modern international law took its rise. The task of Grotius in demolishing them by argument w

e the safety of their coasts or commerce; in other cases it enabled them to levy tribute on foreign shipping traversing the appropriated waters, and thus to increase their revenues; or it allowed them to preserve the fisheries for the excl

among themselves for mutual protection, and to maintain by force the security of navigation in the common interest. Independent princes at first made use of the armed fleets of those voluntary associations, and later, as their power grew stronger and better organised, they took over the duty of policing the neighbouring seas under an admiralty jurisdiction of their own, which enforced the maritime laws and customs, such as the Laws of Oleron, that had been gradually developed among the merchant associations. In the thirteenth century this duty of exercising supreme admiralty jurisdiction on the neighbouring sea came to be regarded as a prerogative of sovereign power,3 and it was only a short step further to the assertion of an exclusive dominion. It was natural that this assumption

the English sovereignty of the sea; and it is to be noted that, in later times at least, the vessel had not only to strike, but had also to "lie by the lee." Considering the prevalence of piracy and the jurisdiction exercised by the state for its suppression, as above described, and in view likewise of the special measures taken by John to encourage and safeguard foreign commerce, the most reasonable explanation of the origin of the custom is that the demand for the sail to be lowered-and the largest vessels then had but one mast and a single sail-was to enable the king's officers, who were there to maintain the security of navigation, to ascertain the true nature of the vessel which they challenged, whether it was a peaceful trader or a pirate. In all ages piratical vessels have been generally swift, and, if we judge from later times, the ships used in the navy were generally slow: the command to a vessel

of the sea; but beyond the jurisdiction in question, which doubtless was exercised in the Straits of Dover and perhaps in the Channel when the coasts on each side were in the possession of the crown, there is a lack of evidence to prove that any claim of the kind was made. In those times the kings of England were not infrequently styled Lords of the Sea, but this appears to have been either because of the existence of this "sovereign lordship" in the neighbouring waters, or, more usually, because they held at the time the actual command and mastery of the seas in a military sense. There were long periods when nothing was heard of any pretension by England to a special sovereignty of the sea, and, in point of fact, the characteristic features of appropriation were always absent. No tribute was levied on foreign shipping passing through the Channel or the narrow seas, even when both coas

ational affairs. The doctrine may be said to have been introduced by this dynasty and to have expired with it. One of the first acts of James I. was to cause to be laid down on charts the precise limits of the bays or "chambers" along the English coast, within which all hostile actions of belligerents were prohibited. This sensible proceeding, which had reference to the continuance of the war between the United Provinces and Spain (from which James had himself withdrawn), is not to be regarded as in any sense an assertion of maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction beyond what was customary; and it does not appear that any other pr

he British coast was one of the principal sources of their wealth and power; by means of it indeed, according to their own accounts, they were able to maintain their vast commerce and shipping. The action of James may be looked upon as the first blow in the great contest between the English and the Dutch for maritime and commercial supremacy, which was prolonged throughout the seventeenth century; and the ready acceptance of the new policy by the English people was owing to the fact that the conditions had been gradually preparing for it in the preceding reign, while the two nations were still bound together in alliance against Catholic Spain. With the new development of commercial enterprise the English found the Dutch their competitors in trade in all parts of the globe to which th

his neighbours "to stand upon their guard" whenever he thought fit; and it could not be doubted that those who would encroach upon him by sea would do it by land also when they saw their time. But the pretensions of Charles went far beyond this. He had caused the records in the Tower to be searched for evidence of the ancient supremacy exercised by the crown in the Sea of England, and when they were found they were interpreted in the widest possible sense. Charles assumed the r?le of the Plantagenets with a good deal added. The bounds of the Sea of England were extended to the coasts of the Continent, and over all the intervening water the king was to enforce an absolute sovereignty. No foreign fleets or men-of-war were to be a

so memorable in English history, roaming about the Channel in their vain attempts to compel the French men-of-war to strike their flags, and in the North Sea forcing the king's licenses on the poor Dutch herring fishermen. The Earl of N

lish naval commanders, who vied with one another in enforcing the ceremony, not merely in the Channel or near the English coast, but in the roads and off the ports on the Continent; and the records relating to their achievements in this respect were treasured up in the archives of the Admiralty, to be used again and again in later diplomatic negotiations as to the rights of England to the sovereignty of the

monwealth, on the other hand, assigned as much importance to the striking of the flag as Charles had ever done, considering that it touched their dignity as well as their sovereignty in the seas, and the instructions they issued to the naval commanders were practically the same as those that had been given to the ship-money fleets. Even the godly Barebones' Parliament of 1653, which looked upon the Dutch as a carnal and worldly people, held it necessary that the seas should be secured and preserved as peaceable as the land, as a preparation for the coming of Christ and the personal reign. The traditional sentiment of the English nation respecting supremacy at sea had never been stronger; their jealousy of the commercial pre-eminence of the Dutch was never keener. In the prolonged negotiations that preceded the conclusion of peace, Cromwell, who, until he became Lord Protector, acted as spokesman for the Council, put the questions relating to the dominion of the sea in the foreground. The draft articles which he submitted to the Dutch for their acceptance, while permitting their merchant vessels t

hould then return the salute; and he stipulated that the striking of the flag or any agreement about it must not be looked upon as an acknowledgment of England's so-called sovereignty of the sea; the Dutch, he said, "would rather die" than admit it. One of the points which was in obscurity was whether a whole fleet or squadron of the States was to strike to any single ship of the king's, even if it was a frigate or a ketch, which did not customarily carry the royal flag in the main-top, or only to an admiral's ship or one carrying the royal flag. De Witt let it be known in the clearest manner that in his opinion it was intolerable that an English frigate or ketch could claim to force a whole Dutch fleet to strike to it. A few years later, when Charles wished to give effect to his secret compact with Louis XIV. by waging war against the United Provinces, it was necessary to hoodwink the English people as to this flagrant breach of treaty 15 obligations. He therefore contrived, as the means of picking a quarrel with the Dutch, a dispute about the honour of the flag, and he sent, not a frigate, but his yacht, the Merlin, to force the whole Dutch fleet to strike to it, and thus

as inserted providing for the salute, but it had become merely a matter of form and precedent. The ceremony, in truth, had grown to be a political encumbrance, and after the

he waters of the King's Chambers as defined by James, and perhaps also at times the Straits of Dover and it may be the Channel, though precise evidence is lacking. In the seventeenth century, when the term the British Seas was commonly used, it is clear that the boundaries assigned to them were as vague and fluctuating as the sovereignty exercised over them. They expanded and contracted according to the naval power at the time and the condition of international affairs. Sometimes the whole sea up to the continental coasts was claimed as British; at other times the claim was restricted to the Channel or the Straits of Dover, and to a more or less narrow but undefined belt along the coast; not unfrequently it seemed to vanish altogether, at least as a thing to be regarded in international affairs. In the earlier records in which the sea is referred to in connection with English law or jurisdiction, it is evident that a certain part was held to appertain to the crown. In an article in the Black Book of the Admiralty which is ascribed to the reign of Henry I. (A.D. 1100-1135), reference is made to "the sea belonging to the k

them, was to be within the realm, under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and this doctrine was held, at least formally, as late as 1830.8 Rarely the "Three Seas" are mentioned,9 and less rarely

tish seas in which dominion was claimed. In the political poem, The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye, which was written about 1436 with the object of rousing the nation to the paramount duty of "keeping the sea," the narrow sea is spoken of as lying between Dover and Calais,10 as it is also in the records of the Privy Council for 1545, which mention the appointment of ships to "kepe the passage of

in and about "the narrow seas," they are referred to as being commonly called the four English Seas, and this was repeated in a proclamation of Charles I. in 1633. So also Lord Chief Justice Hale in his treatise, De Jure Maris, d

sovereignty was made by Selden in 1635. It did not fail on the side of modesty, for according to him the Sea of England was "that which flows between England and the opposite shores and ports."13 More particularly in the opening chapter of his second book he describes the British Sea (Oceanus Britannicus) as being divided into four parts according to the four quarters of the world. On the west lay the Vergivian Sea, also called the Deucaledonian Sea where it washes the coasts of Scotland, and in which Ireland is placed; on the east is the German Ocean, so called by Ptolemy because it lies opposite the German shore; on the south, between England and France, is the sea especially noted by Ptolemy as the British Sea, the Mare Britannicum; but in reality all the sea extending along the shores of France through t

occasions. There is evidence that neither the Admiralty nor the law officers of the crown were able to state what the boundaries of the British seas were, and sometimes the Trinity House was appealed to, with but little better result. In truth, it was part of the national policy to leave their boundaries undetermined. The free navigation of the North Sea and the Channel was of vital importance for many of the states of Europe, and three of them at least-the Netherlands, France, and Spain-had large interests in the fisheries on the British and Irish coasts. If this country had by a formal act of state assigned definite and wide boundaries to the British seas within which sovereignty was claimed, it would have led to frequent and hopeless wars or to constant humiliation. By leaving them vague and ambiguous the pretension to maritime sovereignty could be put forward and used as a political instrument when the navy was strong and occasion offered, and when the navy was weak the pretension 21 might fall into the background without the national honour being unduly tarnished.

to the vessels of one belligerent from attacks by the other. But all this is changed. Guns are now able to throw shells to a distance of fifteen miles and more, and the three-mile limit has become quite inadequate to secure the coasts of a neutral from damage from the guns of belligerents engaged in hostilities in the waters near their shores. The argument is 22 not uncommonly used that inasmuch as Great Britain is the predominant maritime Power, it is to her advantage that the territorial waters of all countries should be as narrow as possible. The wider the theatre the better chance for our navy, either in engaging the battle fleets of the enemy or in capturing his shipping. The importance of the change in the conditions referred to above is overlooked. There has been no great maritime war in Europe since the three-mile limit was adopted as the equivalent

e-mile limit is now obsolete in respect to belligerents and neutrals in time of war, so is it inadequate in all cases with regard to the protection and preservation of the sea fisheries. In the concluding chapters of this book it is shown that all recent inquiries by Parliament