Aviation in Peace and War

Early Thoughts on Flight.

The story of the growth of aviation may be likened to that of the discovery and opening up of a new continent. A myth arises, whence no one can tell, of the existence of a new land across the seas. Eventually this land is found without any realization of the importance of the discovery. Then comes the period of colonization and increasing knowledge. But the interior remains unexplored. So, in the case of aviation, man was long convinced, for no scientific reason, that flight was possible. With the first ascent by balloon came the imagined mastery of the air; later, the invention of flight that can be controlled at will. To-day we are still in the stage of colonization. The future resources of the air remain hidden from our view.

The Daedalean myth and the ancient conception of the winged angelic host show how the human mind has long been fascinated by the idea of flight, but the first design of an apparatus to lift man into the air, a parachute-like contrivance, was only reached at the end of the fifteenth century in one of Leonardo da Vinci's manuscripts. About the same time lived the first of the long line of daring practical aviators, without whom success would never have been achieved, one John Damian, a physician of the Court of James IV of Scotland, who "took in hand to fly with wings, and to that effect caused make a pair of wings of feathers, which being fastened upon him, he flew off the castle wall of Stirling, but shortly he fell to the ground and brake his thigh-bone."

Nearly 250 years later the aeronaut had not made much progress, for we read of the Marquis de Bacqueville in 1742 attaching to his arms and legs planes of his own design and launching himself from his house in the attempt to fly across the Seine, into which, regrettably, he fell.

Meanwhile the seventeenth-century philosophers had been theorizing. In 1638 John Wilkins, the founder of the Royal Society, published a book entitled Daedalus, or Mechanical Motions. A few years later John Glanville wrote in Scepsis Scientifica "to them that come after us it may be as ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest regions, as now a pair of boots to ride a journey," the sceptic proving a truer prophet than the enthusiast. By 1680 Giovanni Borelli had reached the conclusion, in his book De Volatu, that it was impossible that man should ever achieve flight by his own strength. Nor was he more likely to do so in the first aerial ship, designed in 1670 by Francesco Lana, which was to be buoyed up in the air by being suspended from four globes, made of thin copper sheeting, each of them about 25 feet in diameter. From these globes the air was to be exhausted, so that each, being lighter than the atmosphere, would support the weight of two or three men. A hundred years elapsed before Dr. Joseph Black of the University of Edinburgh made the first practical suggestion, that a balloon inflated with hydrogen would rise.

The Invention of the Balloon.

It was in 1783 that Montgolfier conceived the idea of utilizing the lifting power of hot air and invited the Assembly of Vivarais to watch an exhibition of his invention, when a balloon, 10 feet in circumference, rose to a height of 6,000 feet in under ten minutes. This was followed by a demonstration before Louis XVI at Versailles, when a balloon carrying a sheep, a cock, and a duck, rose 1,500 feet and descended safely. And on November 21st of the same year Pilatre de Rozier, accompanied by the Marquis d'Arlande, made the first human ascent, in the "Reveillon," travelling 5 miles over Paris in twenty minutes.

England, it is not surprising to learn, was behind with the invention, but on November 25th, 1783, Count Francesco Zambeccari sent up from Moorfields a small oilskin hydrogen balloon which fell at Petworth; and in August of 1784 James Tytler ascended at Edinburgh in a fire balloon, thus achieving the first ascent in Great Britain. In the same year Lunardi came to London and ballooning became the rage. It was an Englishman, Dr. Jefferies, who accompanied Blanchard in the first cross-Channel flight on January 7th, 1785. Fashionable society soon turned to pursuits other than watching balloon ascents, however, and the joys of the air were confined to a few adventurous spirits, such as Green and Holland, who first substituted coal gas for hydrogen and in 1836 made a voyage of 500 miles from Vauxhall Gardens to Weilburg in Nassau, and James Glaisher, who in the middle of the century began to make meteorological observations from balloons, claiming on one occasion, in 1862, to have reached the great height of 7 miles.

First Experiments in Gliders and Aeroplanes.

The world seemed content to have achieved the balloon, but there were a few men who realized that the air had not been conquered, and who believed that success could only be attained by the scientific study and practice of gliding. Prominent among these, Sir George Cayley, in 1809, published a paper on the Navigation of the Air, and forecasted the modern aeroplane, and the action of the air on wings. In 1848 Henson and Stringfellow, the latter being the inventive genius, designed and produced a small model aeroplane-the first power-driven machine which actually flew. It is now in the Smithsonian Institute at Washington. Of greater practical value were the gliding experiments by Otto Lilienthal, of Berlin, and Percy Pilcher, an Englishman, at the end of the last century. Both these men met their death in the cause of aviation. Another step forward was made by Laurence Hargrave, an Australian, who invented the box and soaring kite and eighteen machines which flew.

From the theoretical point of view, Professor Langley, an American, reached in his Experiments in Aerodynamics the important conclusion that weight could best be countered by speed. From theory Langley turned to practice and in 1896 designed a steam-driven machine which flew three-quarters of a mile without an operator. Seven years later, at the end of 1903, he produced a new machine fitted with a 52 horse-power engine weighing less than 5 lb. per horse-power; but this machine was severely damaged ten days before Wilbur Wright made his first flight in a controlled power-driven aeroplane.

The Wright Brothers and their Successors in Europe.

The Wright brothers directed their whole attention to aviation in 1899. By 1902, as the result of many experiments, they had invented a glider with a horizontal vane in front, a vertical vane behind, and a device for "warping" the wings. Their longest glide was 622? feet. This was followed by the construction of a machine weighing 600 lb., including the operator and an 8 horse-power engine, which on December 17th, 1903, realized the dreams of centuries.

After an increasing number of experiments, a machine built in 1905 flew 24? miles at a speed of 38 miles an hour. It is interesting to recall that the new invention was refused once by the United States and three times by the British Government.

It was not until September 13th, 1906, that Ellehammer, a Danish engineer, made the first free flight in Europe, his machine flying 42 metres at a height of a metre and a half. About the same time reports of the Wrights' successes began to reach Europe and were quickly appreciated by the French.

Space forbids that I should enter into the achievements of the early French aviators, among whom the names of Ferber, Bleriot and Farman will always rank high in the story of human faith, courage and determination. It is a record of rapid advance. Farman made a circuit flight of 1 kilometre in 1908, and flew from Chalons to Rheims, a distance of 27 kilometres, in twenty minutes. Bleriot crossed the Channel in a monoplane of his own design in forty minutes. French designers improved the control system, and French machines became famous. The records of the Rheims meeting of 1909 serve to illustrate the progress made during the first phase of aviation. Latham won the altitude prize by flying to a height of over 500 feet. Farman the prize for the flight of longest duration by remaining more than three hours in the air, and the passenger carrying prize by carrying two passengers round a 10-kilometre course in 10? minutes. The Gnome rotary engine was first used with success at this meeting.

Before turning to the pioneer efforts in England and the pre-war organization of our air forces, some account of the development of the lighter-than-air dirigible is desirable.

The First Airships.

The earliest conception of an airship is to be found in General Meusnier's design in 1784 for an egg-shaped balloon driven by three screw propellers, worked, of course, by hand. The chief interest in his design, though it never materialized, lies in the fact that it provided for a double envelope and was the precursor of the ballonet. The first man-carrying airship was built by Henri Giffard in 1852. It had a capacity of 87,000 cu. feet, a length of 144 feet, a 3 horse-power engine, and a speed of 6 miles an hour. A gas engine was first used twenty years later in an Austrian dirigible, giving a speed of 3 miles an hour. About the same time much useful work was accomplished by Dupuy de Lome, whose dirigible, with a propeller driven by man power, gave a speed of 5? miles an hour. Twelve years later, in 1884, two French Army officers, Captain Kubs and Captain Renard, constructed the first successful power-driven lighter-than-air craft fitted with an 8? horse-power electric motor, which may be regarded as the progenitor of all subsequent non-rigid airships. In 1901 Santos Dumont flew round the Eiffel Tower, travelling 6? miles in 1? hours, and in 1903 the flight of the "Lebaudy," covering a distance of 40 miles at a speed of 20 miles an hour, led the French military authorities to take up the question of airships.

What the French initiated, the Germans, concentrating with characteristic thoroughness on the development of the rigid as opposed to the non-rigid airship, improved. In 1896 Wolfert's rigid airship attained a speed of 9 miles an hour and in 1900 the first Zeppelin was launched. Whatever we may think of the German methods of using their airships during the war, we cannot but admire the courage and determination of Count Zeppelin, who, in spite of many mishaps, succeeded in producing the finest airships in the world and inspiring the German people with a faith in the air which they have never lost. From 1905 onwards development was rapid. In 1907 Zeppelin voyaged in stages from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort, a distance of 200 miles in 7? hours. Popular enthusiasm is illustrated by the fact that within a few months the same airship made four hundred trips, carrying 8,551 passengers and covering 29,430 miles. Other airships showed similar records. Between 1909 and 1913 eighteen of the Parseval type were built, and 1912 saw the construction of the first Schutte-Lanz, designed expressly for naval and military purposes. If France at this period led the world in aeroplane design, Germany was undeniably ahead in airship development.

In Great Britain, in 1905, we had one very small airship, designed and constructed by Willows.

The Beginnings of Aviation in England.

Though the names of Pilcher, Dunne, Howard Wright, and Rolls testify to the fact that the science of aviation had its followers in England at the beginning of this century, flying came comparatively late, and the real interest of the movement centres round the early efforts of military aviation from 1912 onwards. Nevertheless this country could ill have dispensed with the experiments of that small and courageous band of aviators, among whom Dickson and Cody were prominent. By 1908 Cody had built an aeroplane and was making experimental flights at Aldershot. In 1907, A. V. Roe, working under great difficulties, constructed and flew his first machine, a triplane fitted with an 8-10 horse-power twin cylinder Jap bicycle engine, the first tractor type machine produced by any country, and a very important contribution to the science of flight. In 1910 and 1911 we find de Havilland, Frank Maclean and the Short Brothers, Ogilvie, Professor Huntingdon, Sopwith and the Bristol Company, starting on the design and construction of machines, of which the names have since become famous. At the same time certain centres of aviation came into existence, such as Brooklands, where I well remember beginning to fly in August, 1910, Hendon, Larkhill and Eastchurch, destined to be the centre of naval aviation. It is significant, however, of the slow progress made that by November 1st, 1910, only twenty-two pilot's certificates had been issued, and it was Conneau, a French naval officer, who in 1911 won the so-called "Circuit of Britain," i.e. a flight from Brooklands and back via Edinburgh, Glasgow, Exeter and Brighton. Cody and Valentine were the only British competitors to complete the full course.

In May 1911 a demonstration was organized by the owners of the Hendon Aerodrome to which a large number of Cabinet Ministers, members of parliament, and army and navy officers were invited. The War Office co-operated by arranging for a small force of horse, foot and guns to be secretly disposed in a specified area some miles distant and by detailing two officers, of whom I was one, to test what could be done to find and report them by air. I remember that I had a special map prepared, the first used in this, and I think any country, for the aeroplane reconnaissance of troops. After a sufficiently exciting trip, and with the troops successfully marked on the map, Hubert, my French pilot, and I, returned and made our report to General Murray, the Director of Military Training. It was a very interesting flight; the weather good; our height about 1,500 feet; the machine a 50 horse-power Gnome "box-kite" Henri Farman, which at one period of our 35 mile an hour return journey elected to point itself skywards for an unpleasant second or two and fly "cabré"; I can see Hubert now anxiously forcing his front elevator downwards and shouting to me to lean forward in order to help to bring the nose to a more comfortable bearing!

Many pages could be filled with the difficulties and exploits of the first British aviators, but enough has been said to show that, compared with that of aeroplanes in France and of airships in Germany, development in this country started late, progressed slowly and excited little public interest. The work of the pioneers was, however, not in vain, since it opened the eyes of our military authorities to the value of aviation and led to the formation of that small but highly efficient flying corps which during the war expanded into an organization without rival. Let us now turn to the inception of the air forces of the Crown and the position with regard to these and to air tactics at the outbreak of war.

The Inception and Development of Aircraft as Part of the Forces of the Crown.

Nations have tended to regard flight as a prerogative of war. A balloon school was formed in the early days of the French revolutionary wars; the French victory at Fleurus in 1794 was ascribed to balloon reconnaissance; balloons were used by the Federal Army in the American Civil War, and during the Siege of Paris Gambetta effected his escape by balloon in 1871.

The Balloon Factory.

In England experiments were begun at Woolwich Arsenal in 1878, and in 1883 a Balloon Factory, a Dep?t and a School of Instruction were established at Chatham. The expedition to Bechuanaland in 1884, under the command of Sir Charles Warren, was accompanied by a detachment of three balloons, and the following year balloons co-operated with the Sudan Expeditionary Force, when Major Elsdale carried out some photographic experiments from the air.

In 1890 a balloon section was introduced into the Army as a unit of the Royal Engineers, and not long afterwards, the Balloon Factory was established at South Farnborough, where in 1912 it was transformed into the Royal Aircraft Factory. Four balloon sections took part in the South African War and were used during the Siege of Ladysmith, at Magersfontein and Paardeburg. Colonel Lynch, who served in the Boer Army, stated at a lecture delivered in Paris after the war that "the Boers took a dislike to balloons. All other instruments of war were at their command; they had artillery superior for the most part to, and better served than, that of the English; they had telegraphic and heliographic apparatus; but the balloons were the symbol of a scientific superiority of the English which seriously disquieted them."

I went through a course in ballooning during leave from West Africa in 1904 and remember that partly owing to the energy of Colonel Capper, partly to the impetus given by the South African War, and partly to the growing interest in all things aeronautical throughout the civilized world, it was noticeable that the activities of the Balloon Factory were increasing in many directions. Although the spherical balloon had been improved, its disabilities were recognized and experiments were made with elongated balloons, man-flying kites, air photography, signalling devices, observation of artillery fire, mechanical apparatus for hauling down balloons, and petrol motors. A grant for a dirigible balloon was obtained in 1903, though it was not until 1907, the year in which Cody began the construction of his aeroplane at Farnborough, and Charles Rolls his experiments, that the airship "Nulli Secundus" made her first flight. She was about 120 feet long and 30 feet in diameter, and was driven by a 40 horse-power engine at a speed of 30 miles an hour. On October 5th this airship flew to London in an hour and a half, circled round St. Paul's, man?uvred over Buckingham Palace, and descended at the Crystal Palace. In the same year, be it remembered, a Zeppelin had made a trip of 200 miles from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort. The "Nulli Secundus" was followed in 1910 by the "Beta" and the "Gamma."

Meanwhile an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had been appointed, and the National Physical Laboratory had organized a department at Teddington for the investigation of aeronautical problems in co-operation with the Balloon Factory.

The Air Battalion.

In 1911 the authorities could no longer close their eyes, especially at a time when rumours of war were rife, to the rapid development of heavier-than-air craft on the Continent. So far, as we have seen, the aeroplane had been regarded in England as little more than the plaything of a few adventurous but foolhardy spirits. A certain amount of experience in piloting and handling aeroplanes had been gained by a handful of Army officers, but the machines used either belonged to the officers themselves, to civilians, or to aviation firms. I was at that time a general staff officer in the Directorate of Military Operations under General Wilson, now Field Marshal and late Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and was the only officer in the War Office who had learned to fly. It appeared very important that a study of the military possibilities of aviation should be made. The prime r?le of cavalry, reconnaissance, seemed to have passed from it. In addition to my normal duties, I visited France, Germany and Italy, collected information on foreign activities, wrote reports, and tried to create a knowledge of the possible effect of future military aeronautics and to urge the formation of a flying corps.

In 1911 the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers, consisting of Headquarters, No. 1 Company (Airships) and No. 2 Company (Aeroplanes), was formed and superseded the Balloon School. The creation of No. 2 Company, stationed at Larkhill, marked the first formation of a British military unit composed entirely of heavier-than-air aircraft. The same year witnessed the inception of the B.E., F.E. and S.E. type machines in the Balloon Factory, but the total of our machines, both for naval and military requirements, amounted to something less than twelve aeroplanes and two small airships; and the mishaps suffered by the military machines on their flight from Larkhill to Cambridge, to take part in Army Man?uvres, were significant of their unreliability.

The Royal Flying Corps.

In view, therefore, of the reports received of the progress abroad, the Air Battalion was clearly insufficient to meet the demands which might be made upon it in the event of war; and at the end of 1911 the Prime Minister instructed a standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider the future development of air navigation for naval and military purposes. As a result of their deliberations the Committee recommended the creation of a British Air Service to be regarded as one and designated the Royal Flying Corps; the division of the Corps into a Naval Wing, a Military Wing, and a Central Flying School; the maintenance of the closest possible collaboration between the Corps, the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the Aircraft (late Balloon) Factory; and the appointment of a permanent Consultative Committee, named the Air Committee, to deal with all aeronautical questions affecting both the Admiralty and the War Office.

Consequent upon these recommendations, a Technical Sub-Committee was formed, consisting of Brig.-General Henderson, Major MacInnes of the directorate of Military Training at the War Office, a splendid officer, who died during the war, and myself, to draft the new scheme. The objects kept in view in framing our peace organization were to suit it to war conditions, as far as they could be foreseen, to base it on an efficient self-contained unit, and, while allowing for the wide differences between naval and military requirements, to ensure the maximum co-operation between the two branches of the Service. Success beyond expectation was achieved in the first two objects, but, as will be seen, the naval and military branches tended for unforeseen but good reasons to diverge, until they joined hands again in 1918 as the Royal Air Force. The bases of the military organization were, a headquarters, the squadron, and the flying dep?t. These proved their value during the war and have remained the units of our air forces to this day. The Military Wing was to form a single and complete organization and contain a headquarters, seven aeroplane squadrons, each to consist of twelve active machines and six in reserve, one airship and kite squadron, and a flying dep?t. All pilots, whether of the Naval or the Military Wing, were eventually to graduate at the Central Flying School, whence they could join either the Naval Wing at Eastchurch or one of the Military Squadrons. In time of war each branch of the Service was to form a reserve for the other if required.

The Military Wing.

In accordance with this scheme I received instructions to organize, recruit, train and command the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps. The functions of the Military Wing were quite clear: it was to meet the air requirements of the Expeditionary Force primarily for reconnaissance purposes, but its organization was framed so that it could easily be expanded and the scope of its duties widened. Headquarters were established at Farnborough on May 13th, 1912: Barrington-Kennett, an officer of the Grenadier Guards who had been attached to the Air Battalion, was appointed, and made the best of all possible adjutants; and the nucleus of the Corps, consisting at first of the cadres of an airship squadron under Edward Maitland, of two aeroplane squadrons under Burke and Brooke-Popham, and a flying dep?t (later the aircraft park) under Carden, who was a little later greatly assisted in the complex matter of technical stores by Beatty, came into existence. At the same time the construction of the Central Flying School was started at Upavon, under Captain G. Payne, R.N. With regard to the other squadrons provided for, the nucleus of No. 4 Squadron was formed the same year, and that of No. 5 Squadron the following year, of Nos. 6 and 7 Squadrons in 1914, while No. 8 Squadron was not started until after the outbreak of war.

Records of the progress and growth of the Corps were left at Farnborough when the Headquarters and four squadrons went to France in August, 1914, and have been lost. This is particularly unfortunate because without them it will be difficult for the historian of the Corps adequately to describe the beginnings and to assess the value of the work then carried out.

The task of forming the new service, which was to do much to assist the Army in saving England, was begun. The time was very short. A great energy had to be brought to the work. As with all things new, it had to contend with apathy and opposition on all sides. There was no precedent to help. The organization of the Corps to its smallest detail of technical stores, supply and transport had to be thought out. The type of machine required; the method of obtaining it from a struggling industry; its use and maintenance; the personnel, its training and equipment; these, and a thousand other aspects of the question, required the employment of a large staff of experts. But the experts did not exist and the duties were carried out almost entirely at Farnborough, where in addition time had to be found to compile the official training and other text books and regulations required for an entirely new arm.

In addition to the innumerable problems inherent in the organization, growth and training of the Military Wing, the two years between its inception and the outbreak of war were strenuously applied to solving the problems of air tactics and strategy. Until the South African War the British Army had been drilled under the influence of stereotyped Prussian ideas. Perhaps the South African War led too far in an opposite direction, but it taught us one thing, which was to prove of such importance in 1914-the value of mobility; and we realized in aircraft the advent of the most mobile arm the world has yet seen.

All was new. A new Corps. A new element in which to work. New conditions in peace akin to those in war. And there had to be developed a new spirit, combining the discipline of the old Army, the technical skill of the Navy, and the initiative, energy and dash inseparable from flying. There were the inevitable accidents, but training had to be done. We existed for war and war alone would show whether we had thought and worked without respite aright. We had to prove our value to the other arms, many of the leaders of which, owing to a long period of peace, found difficulty in differentiating between the normal usages of peace and war and in understanding the right use of aircraft. Somehow or other time was found during 1912, 1913 and 1914 to write to reviews, to lecture at army and other centres of training, to attend Staff rides, and to endeavour in every way possible to learn how best to work in with the army commands and to teach those commands the usefulness and limitations of aircraft.

As Ruskin wrote:

"Man is the engine whose motive power is the soul and the largest quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay, or under pressure, or by the help of any kind of fuel which may be supplied by the cauldron. It will be done only when the will or spirit of the creature is brought to its own greatest strength by its own proper fuel, namely the affection."

I was intensely proud of my command and often thought of the time when, as I had been promised, I should, in the event of war, command it in the field. We worked at white heat believing that war was coming soon; believing that our efforts would have a real effect on the result; and determined that the new arm should rank second to none among the forces of the Crown. Esprit de Corps was of vital importance, but as officers and non-commissioned officers were drawn from every branch and every regiment of the army this was no easy matter and was only achieved by the splendid example and precept of such men as Herbert, Becke, Longcroft, Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett. We selected our motto: "Per Ardua ad Astra." It was in this atmosphere that the Military Wing grew in peace. It was in this atmosphere that the soul was formed which later under the great strain of war impelled our pilots forward cheerfully to face every duty and every danger in the true spirit of manliness and fearless confidence.

As in framing the original scheme on paper, so in giving it life it was our aim to organize the Corps, so that, whatever its future strength, it would be sound and efficient, and its continuity of growth effected without even temporary dislocation or waste. The tactical unit of the Military Wing-the squadron, consisting of three flights, each of four machines with two in reserve-had the advantage that it was of sufficient size to act independently, while it was not too unwieldy for a single command. It was equally suitable for independent or co-operative action, and the full complement of seven squadrons would, in addition to a reserve, furnish one squadron for each division of an Army Expeditionary force of the size then contemplated, though no definite allotment of aeroplanes to the lower commands was at first intended. The French and Germans, on the other hand, were building up their organizations with smaller units, with the result that they found even greater difficulties than ourselves in obtaining sufficient experienced officers to command them. It is probable that the consequent lack of concentration, knowledge and determination to stick to sound principles of action was one of the causes underlying the non-success of the German air service in the opening phases of the war.

According to the system employed squadrons were formed, organized, equipped, and a certain amount of preliminary training carried out, at Farnborough, when on completion the squadron moved to one of the stations which I had established or was forming at Netheravon, Montrose, Gosport, Dover, and Orfordness, Netheravon being the largest. This dispersion of squadrons did not affect the entity and cohesion, under Wing headquarters at Farnborough, of the Corps as a whole. No. 3 Squadron, one of the original two referred to, removed to Netheravon from Larkhill in June.

Similarly, and in order to avoid congestion at Farnborough, to foster a spirit of self-support and to enable air operations to be carried out with troops in Scotland, No. 2 Squadron was sent to Montrose. Five of its machines flew all the way, and it became one of the principles of training that machines should fly whenever a move was ordered. Thus in 1913 six machines from this squadron were flown from Montrose to Limerick-a great feat then-to take part in the Irish Command man?uvres, the crossing of the Irish Channel being successfully carried out both ways by all machines. Another flight of an experimental nature was made by Longcroft, with myself as passenger, from Farnborough to Montrose in a single day with only one landing.

The unavoidable and never-relaxing strain inherent in the daily and hourly use of an instrument, in the design, maintenance and improvement of which we could only grope our way, was very great. In peace before the war, as later in the war, the only variation to strain lay in periods of increased strain.

At Headquarters, in addition to the normal duties of command and co-ordination, and the supply of all technical stores to squadrons, there was carried out all recruiting, and I also formed a specialized flight for the study of technical problems, such as the use of wireless from aircraft. The bulk of experimental work was originally undertaken by the Royal Aircraft Factory, under the Superintendent, Mr. O'Gorman, who always helped us in every way possible, but by 1913 I felt it necessary to enlarge the duties of the special flight and an Experimental Section was formed at Wing Headquarters at Farnborough with an officer, Musgrave, in charge. In addition, for each squadron an officer was appointed Squadron Officer for Experiments, thus ensuring the diffusion of information throughout the Corps, and affording the opportunity to each unit of carrying out the experiments best suited to the material and apparatus at its command. Similarly other individual officers were detailed in each squadron on a co-ordinated scheme, for such duties as Officer-in-charge of Stores, Workshops, Mechanical Transport, Meteorology, etc.

The formation at Farnborough of the Line of Communications R.F.C. Workshop or Flying Dep?t-later known as the Aircraft Park-completed the organization of the Military Wing.

I was very anxious as early as possible to prove the structure as a unified self-supporting, mobile and easily handled flying corps as far as it had gone, and in June, 1914, this was done by the concentration in camp at Netheravon of the entire Military Wing, comprising Headquarters and Headquarters Flight, the four completed squadrons and the nucleus of No. 6 Squadron, the Aircraft Park and a detachment of the Kite Section. Mobilization, a very difficult process when it came, would have been almost impossible had the concentration not taken place. The object of the camp was a month's combined training to test personnel, both in the air and on the ground, and the handling of aircraft and transport both by day and night. Endeavours were made to solve by means of lectures, discussions and committees the problems connected with mobilization, technical and military training, observation, wireless telegraphy, signals, night flying, photography, bomb-dropping, workshops, stores, meteorology, transport, shifting of camp and aerodrome, supply and maintenance of units in the field, etc.-in fact the whole organization essential to the efficiency and cohesion of a Flying Corps, under conditions as similar as possible to those expected on active service. Very valuable experience was obtained from the work carried out. The necessarily wide gaps in our knowledge were brought home in more concrete form. It was also evident that the force was very small. But within three months it was proved under the strain of war that the organization and training had been laid down on sound principles.

The Naval Wing.

As in the case of the Army, it was to airships that the Navy first turned its attention, and the birth of naval aviation may be said to date from July 21st, 1908, when Admiral Bacon submitted proposals for the construction of a rigid airship, the ill-fated "Mayfly" which was destroyed on her preliminary trials. The Admiralty thereupon decided to discontinue the construction of airships, the development of which was left to the Army until May, 1914, when it was decided that all airships-that is No. 1 Squadron of the Military Wing-should be taken over by the Naval Wing. This was partly the result of a report by two Naval Officers, who visited France, Austria and Germany, as was the purchase of two vessels of the Parseval and Astra Torres types, and a small non-rigid from Willows. The construction of a number of other airships was ordered, but for various reasons was delayed or never completed up to the outbreak of war.

Although at first sight the functions of the Naval Wing-coast defence and work with the Fleet-seemed hardly more difficult to perform than those of the Military Wing, in practice, as I was to find later from personal experience when in command of the R.N.A.S. at Gallipoli, they were more complicated, while the slowness of the Admiralty in evolving a clear scheme of employment and a definite objective made itself felt. Before the war the achievements of the Naval Wing were due rather to individual effort than to a definite policy of organized expansion. It was the pilot and the machine rather than the organization which developed.

As already stated, Eastchurch was chosen by the Short Brothers for their experiments in aeroplanes in 1909, but it was not until 1911 that the Admiralty bought two machines and established the first Naval Flying School at that place. The same year Commander O. Swann purchased from Messrs. A. V. Roe a 35 horse-power biplane and began to carry out experiments with different types of floats, as a result of which a twin-float seaplane was produced-the first to rise off the water in this country.

For some time seaplanes were in a very experimental stage and at best could only rise from, and alight on, calm water, though it is interesting to note that as far back as 1911 the employment of seaplanes for torpedo attack, which I think will be one of the most important developments of aircraft in the future, engaged the attention of the Navy, and a Sopwith seaplane carrying a 14-inch torpedo made its first flight at Calshot in 1913. For this reason, therefore, it appeared that principally aeroplanes and airships would have to be employed from shore bases for coast defence and that "carrier" ships would be necessary to enable seaplanes to work with the Fleet.

The first stations set up were Eastchurch, Isle of Grain, Calshot, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Cromarty and Kingsnorth, from which at the outbreak of war an organized coastal patrol was established.

From the outset the Naval Wing, assisted by its large percentage of skilled technical personnel, paid great attention to experimental work of all sorts. Thus in 1912 the detection of submarines by aircraft was taken up, in 1913 valuable results were obtained from bomb-dropping, and a large number of experiments in wireless, machine gunnery and fighting carried out. In addition, efforts were made to extend the power, range and capacity of engine and machine.

The second Naval problem, that of co-operation with the Fleet, involved the flight of aircraft from ships and the design of aircraft carriers. In 1911 an aeroplane for the first time took off successfully from the deck of a cruiser at anchor, and the following year an aeroplane flew from H.M.S. "Hibernia," while under weigh, but it was not until after the outbreak of war that alighting on decks was successfully accomplished. The first ship to be fitted up as a parent ship for seaplanes was the "Hermes" in 1913.

These specialized technical requirements and developments explain why the Naval Wing and the Royal Naval Air Service tended towards individualism rather than cohesion. While the Military Wing, or Royal Flying Corps, progressed further as an organized fighting force, the Royal Naval Air Service, amongst the 100 odd aeroplanes and seaplanes on charge which were mainly of the Short, Sopwith, Avro, Farman and Wright types, possessed in 1914 the more powerful engines and a number of aeroplanes fitted with wireless and machine guns, while their bomb-dropping arrangements were also in a more advanced stage of development.

An Air Department was formed at the Admiralty in 1912 to deal with all questions relating to naval aircraft. Naval officers were trained from the beginning at Eastchurch rather than at the Central Flying School, and in 1913 the appointment of an Inspecting Captain for Aircraft, with a Central Air Office at Sheerness as his headquarters, accentuated a growing tendency for the Naval Wing to work on independent lines.

The Naval Wing grew rapidly and in the middle of 1914 was reorganized as the Royal Naval Air Service, comprising the Air Department of the Admiralty, the Central Air Office, the Royal Naval Flying School, the Royal Naval Air Stations, and all aircraft, seaplane ships and balloons employed for naval purposes. This placed the naval air force on a self-supporting basis and the entity of the Royal Flying Corps as a whole, as originally provided for, was lost.

Tactics and the Machine.

The value of the application of flying to war requires little demonstration. The most important attributes of generalship are quick appreciation of a situation and quick decision. To the ordinary Commander the absence of information is paralysing. In the nineteenth century the mass of cavalry was the special instrument of information and to obtain it contact with the enemy's main forces had to be effected. It thus acted as a shield and also tried to provide the information necessary to enable the infantry to take the offensive.

Aviation, by the wide field of observation it commands, by the speed with which it can collect and transmit information, to a great extent lifts the fog of war and enables a general to act on knowledge where before he acted largely on deduction. Information once obtained, its mobile and far-reaching offensive power introduces the element of surprise, and permits of lightning strokes against the enemy's vital points.

Before the war reconnaissance was regarded as the principal duty of the aircraft of the Military Wing. This was due to two reasons, first, the obvious one that aircraft possessed advantages shared by no other arm for obtaining information quickly and over wide areas and reporting to Headquarters, and second, that experiment had proved the difficulty of loading aeroplanes with offensive weapons, such as bombs or machine guns, without impairing speed and climb.

The following statement, which I drafted and which was issued by the General Staff before the Army Man?uvres of 1912, summarizes the position:-

"As regards strategical reconnaissance," it says, "a General is probably now justified in requiring a well-trained flyer, flying a modern aeroplane, to reconnoitre some 70 miles out and return 70 miles. This would be done at a speed of, say, 60 miles an hour in ordinary weather over ordinary country. Thus within four hours, allowing a wide margin, a report as to the approximate strength, formation and direction of movement of the enemy, if he is within a 70-mile radius, should be in the hands of the Commander."

To those imbued with a knowledge of military history this new method of ascertaining the enemy's movements might well seem revolutionary.

Let us take two instances illustrating what aircraft, with a radius of little over 100 miles, might have done in previous campaigns. For the operations which terminated in the capitulation of Ulm in 1805 Napoleon concentrated two army corps at Würzburg and five along the left bank of the Rhine between Mannheim and Strasburg, his main body of cavalry under Murat being at the latter place. The Austrian Army under Mack was behind the Iller between Ulm and Memmingen, and expected the French to advance through the defiles of the Black Forest, where Napoleon did actually make a feint with his cavalry. Napoleon, however, crossing the Rhine on September 26th, 1805, moved east, and it was not until October 2nd, when the French Army had reached the line Ansbach, Langenburg, Hall and Ludwigsburg, and his envelopment was far advanced, that Mack realized that the main French advance was coming from the north. Aeroplanes of the type we possessed in 1914 could have reconnoitred the whole of Napoleon's preliminary position, could have detected his line of advance, especially as it was concentrated on a very narrow front, and could have brought back the information to the Austrian Headquarters within a few hours.

Aircraft would have been of even greater value on August 16th, 1870, at the Battle of Rezonville, where neither the French nor the Germans were aware of the other's movements. On the 14th a battle had been fought east of Metz which had resulted in the French retreat. On the morning of the 16th Moltke thought the French had retired west by the Metz-Verdun road and those to the north of it, and consequently he directed his left wing due west towards the Meuse to head off the French, sending his right army towards Rezonville to harass their rearguard. The French retreat, however, had been slow and two corps were still at Rezonville, while three corps and the reserve cavalry were within easy reach, some 130,000 men in all. At 9 in the morning the German 3rd Corps, unaided and far from support, attacked a position within reach of the whole French Army, believing it had to deal with a rearguard only. Bazaine, on the other hand, thinking that he was faced by the German main army, remained on the defensive, and lost the opportunity of defeating in detail first the 3rd and then the 10th German Corps. A few aeroplanes operating on a radius of 30 miles would have disclosed between daybreak and 10 a.m. the true position to either commander. Neither the German nor the French cavalry, though both were engaged, obtained any reliable information.

The problem as to how far aircraft would reduce the value of cavalry was widely discussed before the war. It was seen that by day aircraft could obtain quicker and more accurate information, but that cavalry retained their power of night reconnaissance, of mobile offensive action and of pinning the enemy to his ground by fighting. This was found to be so during the retreat, when, in addition to the direct value of aircraft for long-distance reconnaissance, an indirect asset of great importance lay in the release of the cavalry for battle action in assistance of the infantry. The question has become more acute since the offensive action of aircraft against ground targets has developed, but although we must never forget the splendid work of the mounted arm during the Retreat from Mons, and in March, 1918, factors have arisen tending to make the use of cavalry a problem of extreme difficulty in European wars, and it is possible that, in addition to their reconnaissance functions, aircraft will supersede the shock tactics and delaying action of cavalry, though this may be modified if, the sabre being a thing of the past, cavalry are converted into mounted machine gunners.

Air tactics and training were, therefore, chiefly studied from the point of view of reconnaissance. In addition to the possibility of being shot at by other aircraft, an important consideration was vulnerability from the ground. Before the war reconnaissances were carried out at heights varying from 2,000 to 6,000 feet, but it was generally considered that the aeroplane was safe from fire from the ground at heights above 3,000 feet.

Serious difficulties affecting the mobility of aircraft were the means of providing a regular supply of fuel and the selection of landing grounds when moving camp, which had to be close enough behind the front line as not to entail waste of time in flying out and back over friendly territory. This was later brought home to us in a very acute form during the Retreat from Mons.

As machines improved, increasing attention was paid to bettering their power of reconnaissance by air photography, their value in co-operation with artillery by wireless equipment, their offensive action by bomb dropping and their offence and defence by armament.

The value of a correct initiative and the aeroplane's r?le as an offensive weapon were fully appreciated and brought out in the Training Manual of the Royal Flying Corps which we compiled at Farnborough, and which was published early in 1914 by the War Office. It says:-

"It is probable that one phase of the struggle for the command of the air will resolve itself into a series of combats between individual aeroplanes, or pairs of aeroplanes. If the pilots of one side can succeed in obtaining victory in a succession of such combats, they will establish a moral ascendancy over the surviving pilots of the enemy, and be left free to carry out their duties of reconnaissance. The actual tactics must depend on the types of the aeroplanes engaged, the object of the pilot being to obtain for his passenger the free use of his own weapon while denying to the enemy the use of his. To disable the pilot of the opposing aeroplane will be the first object. In the case of fast reconnaissance aeroplanes it will often be advisable to avoid fighting, in order to carry out a mission or to deliver information; but it must be borne in mind that this will be sometimes impossible, and that, as in every other class of fighting, a fixed determination to attack and win will be the surest road to victory."

Speaking generally, the evolution of the machine, as apart from the engine, which hung behind, followed upon the evolution of air tactics. As soon as experience, often hard won at the cost of a valuable life, opened up new fields of activity for aircraft, the designer and constructor evolved new designs to meet the new requirements. It was no small achievement in this period to have solved the problem of inherent stability, both in theory and practice, so successfully, that from the aerodynamic standpoint our machines in 1914 compare favourably with those in use at the end of the war.

In dealing with the evolution of the machine during the three years prior to the war there are three landmarks: in the autumn of 1911 the few machines belonging to the Air Battalion failed to reach their destination for Army Man?uvres; in May, 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was formed and experiments with a view to meeting military requirements were for the first time energetically and methodically prosecuted; and in August, 1914, four squadrons flew to France with machines which had attained a high degree of stability and were not inferior to any of those possessed by other countries. When it is remembered in what a short time these machines were evolved, it is not surprising that attention had been chiefly confined to the problem of the 'plane and stability, the engine and speed and reliability. Wireless, bombing, photography, night flying and machine gunnery had been discussed and experimented with, but no progress was made comparable to that effected under war conditions.

Machines and engines before the war were chiefly French. It is interesting to note those with which No. 3 Squadron, one of the first to be formed, commenced its career in May, 1912. They consisted of one 50 horse-power Gnome Nieuport, one Deperdussin, which by the way was privately owned, one Gnome Bristol, two Gnome Bleriot monoplanes, one Avro and one Bristol box-kite biplane. By September, 1912, the Squadron possessed fourteen monoplanes, but in that month, owing to the number of accidents incurred by them, the use of monoplanes was temporarily forbidden, and it was not until April, 1913, that the Squadron was fully equipped with B.E. and Maurice Farman biplanes organized in flights.

These types formed the backbone of the Military Wing, which also included Codys, Breguets, Avros, and, later, Sopwiths. The B.E.2c was produced by the Royal Aircraft Factory in the autumn of 1913 and demonstrated its high degree of stability by flying from Aldershot to Froyle and from Froyle to Fleet, distances of 6? and 8 miles respectively, without the use of ailerons or elevators. The progress made is illustrated by the fact that at the Army Man?uvres of 1913 twelve machines covered 4,545 miles on reconnaissance and 3,210 miles on other flights, accurate observations being made from a height of 6,000 feet, without serious mishap.

In 1913 I recommended the gradual substitution of B.E.'s for Farmans on the ground of the all-round efficiency and superior fighting qualities of the former, and to secure the advantage of standardization, but it was objected by the War Office that the Farmans were the only machines that could mount weapons in front-an objection which was not met until firing through the airscrew was introduced-and that the slower Farmans offered greater advantages for observation, an idea which was long prevalent. As a result, a compromise was effected, and two squadrons were equipped with B.E.'s and two with homogeneous flights of Farmans, Bleriots and Avros.

At the outbreak of war the most successful machines possessed by the Military Wing were the B.E.2 tractor with a 70 horse-power Renault engine, a speed of 73 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000 feet in nine minutes; and a Henri Farman pusher with a speed of 60 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000 feet in fourteen minutes. A special study was being made in 1914 of the best methods of ensuring clear observation of the ground, and partly in this connection staggered planes were introduced, culminating in the B.E.2c's, which were not, however, available for service in any numbers until 1915.

To sum up, the technical development of aircraft has taken place, and will continue side by side with the evolution of the uses to which aircraft can be put. While due attention was paid to problems connected with the anticipated duties of aircraft ancillary to that of reconnaissance, owing to the short space of time between the formation of the Royal Flying Corps and the outbreak of war, to the difficulties connected with the engine, and to causes inseparable from peace conditions, development had been more or less confined to evolving a stable and reliable machine with a good field of view.

Conclusions.

The foregoing outline of the development of aviation from the earliest times up to the war-a story of human endeavour and achievement in the air with its attendant dangers and difficulties-is not without value in endeavouring to assess that which has since occurred.

At the beginning of the year 1912 the Royal Flying Corps did not exist. At the beginning of the Great War, in 1914, England found herself with an air service which, though much smaller than those of Germany or France, was so excellently manned and organized, trained and equipped, that it placed her at a bound in the front rank of aviation.

The machine was stable, but the engine still unequal to the tasks laid upon it. Civil Aviation practically did not exist.

I shall now describe the extension of air duties under war conditions; the increasing value of aircraft for general action and air tactics and their development and far-reaching effect as the right hand of strategy. This resulted in the expansion of our flying corps from a total of 1,844 officers and men, and seven squadrons with some 150 machines fit for war use, to a total of nearly 300,000 officers and men, and 201 squadrons and 22,000 machines in use at the end of the war, and in the evolution of the machine to a point where we can regard it, not only as a weapon of war, but as a new method of transport for commercial purposes in peace.

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