Aviation in Peace and War

arks on War

that though its growth was infinitesimal compared with that which came with the impetus of war, the air service

aft, air photography, bomb dropping, armament or the development of air fighting. As with the Army and Navy, war quickened and expanded all the attributes of air operations in a way which could not have been foreseen before the struggle occurre

s a war with a great European power could not last more than a few months. Another reason was that those of us who had been at the Staff College during the few years before the war, or who had recently served on the General Staff at the War Office, believed that the weight of the German attack would be made through Belgium, where, owing to the enclosed nature of the country, cavalry would be at a disadvantage, and we realized therefore, and urged, the great effect which the air would have from the commencement of operations-a view which was not widely held, especially among senior officers in the Army. We also felt the necessity of using our maximum air strength from the outset, so as to prove its supreme importance as quickly and practically as possible. It required the Retreat from Mons before even G.H.Q. as a whole would accept the fact, though Colonel Macdonogh, the head of the intelligence section, was our firm ally. The iron of confidence, both to used and user, had to be welded with the first great blows on the anvil of war. For these reasons it was vital that every available trained pilot and suitable machine should be employed with the Army, even at t

ciency as the R.F.C. may have shown in the field is, in

and pilots were generally many too few to attempt more than the absolute essentials, and calls were often made upon them which were beyond their strength to meet. An ironic contrast to this was supplied, however, at the evacuation of the Darda

empts were made to extend its scope by the use of wireless for artillery co-operation, and by air photography, both of which developed rapidly. Headway was also being made with bombing. Then machines carryin

lassed and in 1916 our air superiority became marked. The Royal Flying Corps was by that time organized into Brigades and Wings, one Wing operating with each Army for fighting and distant reco

air effort in the war, to deal almost entirely with the Western F

s means. The distance from the hub of affairs, a line of supply about 6,000 miles in length, sickness and the climatic and geographical conditions rendered maintenance very difficult. Sand and dust driven in clouds by high winds greatly shortened the working life of engines. The heat during the summer caused the rapid deterioration of machines, while long oversea flights entailed loss from forced landings. There are many aspects of the deepest interest to be brought out when a complete history of the Campaign in Gallipoli comes to be written. It is true that the Allies would have lost all if they had been defeated in the west, and that the call of the Armies for more and more men and munitions for that theatre was insistent; it is equally true, however, that i

brigade was formed with Wings in Macedonia, Sinai and a training Wing, which by 1918 had become a training brigade, in Egypt. The work of the Wing sent to

tely protected and concealed. Enemy retreating columns were so effectively machine gunned and bombed by offensive machines that in all three cases the

ly carried out by the Royal Naval Air Service with seaplanes, which in 1915 were brought up to the strength of two squadrons and replaced by aeroplanes under the orders of the military forc

ent to Italy after the Italian retreat from the Isonzo and took a prominent part in the final Austrian defeat; a Royal Air Force contingent was sent to Russia to operat

were amalgamated and the Royal Air Force came into existence, and during the

ives a vivid idea of air ac

attacking suitable targets from the height of a few dozen feet. Passing backwards and forwards went the reconnaissance machines and the bombers, and along the who

th our armies in the field, but also the formation of the Independent Air Force and the carryin

the war some 22,000 graduated as efficient for active service. At the beginning of the war pilots were sent overseas with only 11 hours' flying experience. This was much too little and there is no doubt that increased training would have ensured fewer cas

November, 1918, it was still in its infancy. Before many years the abil

of aircraft, the evolution of machines and progress in tactics

ilization of the Corps some days before it was actually declared. Thanks to this step and to the work done at our Concentration Camp at Netheravon in June, 1914, the

ion with

naiss

ter the French, and on landing in France the first words I heard said by a Frenchman were: "Oui, l'armée anglaise arrive mais on a manqué le premier plan." It was not until after the arrival of G.H.Q. at Amiens on August 14th that, although late, it was decided that the advanced line should be taken up. The Royal Flying Corps moved by air and road to an existing aerodrome outside the antiq

h to Senlis, on the 31st to Juilly, on September 2nd to Serris, on the 3rd to Touquin, on the 4th to Melun, where we were thankful at last to get

d is the terrible sadness of the flocks of refugees, of the poor people we left beh

hn French, "It was the timely warning aircraft gave which chiefly enabled me to make speedy dispositions to avert danger and disaster. There can be no doubt indeed that even then the presence and co-operation of aircraft saved the ver

y, when von Kluck's turning movement to the south-east against the French left was accurately reported and Marshal Joffre was enabled to make his dispositions accordingly. "The precision, exactitude and regularity of the news brought in," he said

G.H.Q., where the map was filled in in accordance with the report. G.H.Q. could then ask questions and obtain any further information which the observer could give, while R.F.C. Headquarters could ascertain what

y difficult to get the information put on the map for prompt consideration. For instance, at Dammartin on the evening of September 1st, when it was though

ut by other machines operating from Headquarters. Later on, this system was established as a part of our permanent organization, squadrons being allotted to, and

the forest of Compiègne had to be flown over at about 200 feet. The B.E. could not make the distance without refilling, and although only a short halt was made at Amiens for the purpose, it was too late to fly direct to Antwerp. Instead, a landing was made in a very sticky field under light plough, which was selected from the air about 4 miles north of Bruges, to which town I rode on a borrowed bicycle. At Bruges there was great consternation and uncertainty as to the position at Antwerp, but the Commander kindly placed a large open car and its very energetic driver at my disposal to try and get through. After many difficulties we managed to find our way into Antwerp by about midnight, and I was received by the Belgi

ssance officer I have ever known, who was killed later, used to fly his B.E.2 without observer over the greater part of Belgium two or three times a week and alwa

warfare, pure reconnaissance, though still the basis of air work, tended to become a matter of routine, while

ogra

itions behind the enemy's lines with very imperfect results. Its great value as an aid to observation in trench warfare was, however, very apparent, fresh brains were brought to the task, Moore-Brabazon, Campbell and Dr. Swan, and by the end of the year better success was obtained, though positions even then had to be filled in by the observer with red ink. Experiments at home during 1915 led to a great improve

t in enemy anti-aircraft guns drove our machines to carry out their work at altitudes increasing up to 20,000 and even 2

om lamp. The first photographs were taken by Butler in April, 1915, from a H. Farman machine at necessarily low alti

handmaid of survey and mapping. It was, in fact, the only means of mapping or correcting the maps of co

essity of an initial framework of fixed points and of contouring. The subject is considered so important that an "Air Survey Committee," consisting of representatives of the Air Ministry, the Geographical section of the War Office, the Ordnance Survey, th

ele

reconnaissance. Besides its immense value in increasing the effect of the batteries, it had the indirect advantage of more closely binding the ties of mutual understanding between the air and ground troops, a point which fortunately seems to have been misunderstoo

few wireless machines were available, this was effected by wireless or signal lamps. In his dispatch on the Battle of Loos, Sir John French wrote: "The work o

, seventy hostile batteries were located, twenty-nine being silenced. Counter-battery work was so effective before the offensive which opened on the Ypres fro

they would not be necessary, but the reverse was found to be the case, as even with the distinctive marks which were adopted our machines were often fir

mb

e case of the larger varieties, tied to their bodies, and these were dropped over the side of the machine as opportunity occurred. At the Marne, for instance, small petrol bombs set fire to a transport park and scattered a mixed column of infantry and transport. I think I am right in saying that

d on August 27th and operated with the Royal Naval Division from Antwerp. They were subsequently withdrawn to Dunkirk to form the nucleus of an aircraft centre fro

inst a German town, one machine reaching Dusseldorf, when it descend

objectives being the gun emplacements at Middelkerke and Blankenburghe, the submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Bruges, the minefield and doc

s to sink the heavy wire anti-submarine net, which had been stretched on bu

y junctions at Menin, Courtrai and Douai were attacked. One officer of No. 5 Squadron, carrying one 100 lb. bomb, arrived over Menin at 3,500 feet, descended to 120 feet, and dropped his bomb on the railway line. The first V.C. of the Royal Flying Corps was obtained at the

nications, cut off reinforcements, and the like, while at the Somme bombing was carried out by formations of Wings. In October, 1917, 113 tons, and for a period of six days in March, 1918, 95 tons, of explosives were dropped. This illustrates the enormous progress

increasing in intensity up to the end of the war; and raids into Germany recommenced. Early in 1918 these raids included the bombing of Maintz, Stuttgart, Coblen

ct Pa

as first extensively practised at the Battle of the Somme, though experiments in this direction ha

from the possibility of coming under the fire of their own artillery, to report on enemy positions, to transmit messages from the troops engaged to the headquarters of their units, to attack ground formations, and to co

n taking cover by flying behind woods, houses, etc., became increasingly important. The fact that 62,673 rounds of ammunition were fired from the air against enemy ground targets between Novembe

three in succession as they got into the air. Another interesting example of contact patrol work occurred in 1917 when a pilot flew his machine at a low altitude over the enemy trenches, and he and his observer attracted the attention of the Germans by fi

zette showed what the German

locusts and swamped the front. They also work on cunningly calculated methods. Their habit is to work in three layers-one quite high, one in the middle, and the third quite low

it. Thin sheets of steel were at once cut out and placed in the wickerwork seats of aeroplanes. This primitive prot

en our Intelligence Branch and agents in the territory occupied by the Germans. Agents, mostly French and

hti

was required. In August, 1914, the aeroplane's armament consisted simply of rifle, or carbine, and revolver, but our pilots nevertheless attacked hostile machines whenever the opportunity occurred. The first German machine to fly over us was at Maubeuge on August 22nd, 1914, and, though

e B.E. fired 40 rounds from his rifle and the German passenger replied with some rounds from his revolver. The B.E. crossed the bows of the German machin

only with a rifle, lashed to a strut of his machine, attacked ten Germans near Dun

ovember, 1914, there was a certain amount of fighting, as a rule the German when attacked made for his own lines and the protection of his anti-aircraft guns. This, though offensive carried to the extent of wastefulness of life is equally bad, wa

e. The first squadron, No. 24, composed purely of fighting machines, took its place on the Western Front in February, 1916, and gradually Wings were attached to Armies solely for fighting and the protection of Corps machines. During the long months of the Battle of the Somme, for instance, when, though the Royal Flying Corps dominated the air, the Germans put up a strenuous opposition, bombing machines were protected by fighting patrols in formation o

is successes to keen application to aerial gunnery; J. B. McCudden, the first man to bring four hostile machines down in a day; and Trollope, w

had got down to 3,000 feet he merrily waved to me as if to say, 'Well, how do you do?'... The circles which we made round one another were so narrow that their diame

rse to avoid bullets from the ground and this enabled Ri

The prevailing westerly wind which, while it assisted the enemy in his homeward flight, made it very difficu

Barker who, whilst destroying an enemy two-seater, was wounded from below by another German machine and fell some distance in a spin. Recovering, he found himself surrounded by fifteen Fokkers, two of which he attacked indecisively but shot down a third in flames. Whilst doing this he was again wounded, again fainted, again fell, again recovered control and again, being attacked by a large formation, shot down an enemy in flames. A bullet now shattered his left elbow and, fainting a thir

or German, it was the marked superiority of our pilots which gave us the greate

ion with

quipment of the R.N.A.S. were not so highly organized and were wanting in cohesion, but that the R.N.A.S. had advanced further than the Royal Flying Corps in specialized technical develop

e, Patrol an

h the detection and destruction of submarines; reconnaissances were carried out over the enemy's shores, and in 1918 there were forty-three flights of seaplanes, thirty flights of aeroplanes, together with flying boats and airships, operating from, and communicating with, an ever-increasing number of shore stations. Not only was anti-submarine work carried out in the vicinity of the coast, but organized

ved particularly useful for escort, in addition to patrol work, and twenty-seven small airships, known as the S.S. type, were co

econnaissance, Spot

0 yards and their services were rendered comparatively slight for this purpose. From 1916, however, they were towed by merchant auxiliaries and light cruisers to spot submarines, observers communicating with the patrol ship by means of telephone. One of the most wonderful sights I have ever seen was from the observer's basket of the kite-balloon let up from S.S. "Manica" in June, 1915. We were spotting for the guns of H.M.S. "Lord Nelson" bombarding Chanak. The sky and sea were a marvellous blue and visibi

the air and in 1918 126 were sighted and 93 attacked. Nor was the principle forgotten in countering the submarine menace that offence is the best defence, and among the many duties

ction of patrols and to counter the enemy's efforts at raids and sea reconnaissance, and the consider

problem of using carriers with the Fleet had not been seriously tackled before the war, and though experiments were strenuously carried out, and there were fourteen carrier ships in commission in 1918, and a seaplane carrier operated with the Battle Cruiser Squadron at Jutland, the use of ai

a rule fighting and reconnaissance aircraft had mainly to work from shore bases. To assist in this direction, units were sent overseas to be nearer their sphere of action, as, for instance, the R.N.A.S. squadrons stationed at Dunkirk which, besides general reconnaissance, helped the Navy to keep open the Straits of Dover,

fighters were required for the protection of our own aircraft, for preventing enemy aircraft reconnaissance, for a

mb

om bases in Belgium. One of the first successful raids was that against the Friedrichshaven Zeppelin works by three Avro machines, which flew 250 miles over enemy country on November 21st, 1914. Another noteworthy example was the attempted raid against Cuxhaven o

do At

ly up the narrow Gulf of Xeros and lay waiting to release our seaplanes in the still darkness of the early morning. The machines were lowered noiselessly into the water, and, their engines started, flew across the narrow neck of Bulair under fire from the old Turkish line; then, reaching the northern end of the Dardanelles at dawn, they descended low (one machine actually landed on the water and discharged its torpedo), sank their targets, and returned. In addition to the possibility of submarine attack, the Gulf of Xeros is so narrow that

advantage over us of a vast number of targets close to hand in our North Sea and Channel shipping, but fortunat

Def

anti-aircraft section of the Admiralty Air Department. Its resources, however, consisting of a few unsuitable and widely scattered aeroplanes, some 1 pdr. pom-poms with searchlights manned by a special corps, were

ng and Nig

rapidly expanded to a Wing, was formed; and the systematic training of night pilots, the standardization of night-flying equipment and armament, and the lighting of aerodromes, was taken in hand. A continuous aeroplane and searchlight barrage with night landing grounds was gradually formed between Dover and the Forth; the wireless signals employed to assist Zeppelins in finding their way were intercepted, thus enabling our rapidly improving fighting machines to pick up and attack raidin

drons were raised and the number of home defence squadrons was raised to fourteen service and eight night training squadrons; a Northern Home Defence Wing was formed at York; and the Home Defence Group became the 6th Brigade. The first night aeroplane raid occurred in September, and the systematic training of night-fighting pilots on scout machines was hurried on. Separate zones for aeroplanes, guns and searchlights-the latter provided with sound locators-forming an outer barrage, were instituted, and apron

de, to be sent to France. It was proposed to send four more such squadrons and thus form a first line of offensive defence which would react on hostile raids over England. Thus once again the old doctrine was gradually observed that offence is the only true defence, and that purely defensive measures, however efficient, by keeping men and material from the vital point, are ne

hine an

t organized effort to assist the evolution of service aeroplanes in this country and a brief comparison will be useful to show the per

ngine, and the last four French, fitted with French engines. The average horse-power was about 83, the average maximum speed 67, and the minimum 50 miles per hour; the climb to 1,000 feet was ef

Caudron, Morane, and Voisin-five were British and five were French and all were fitted with French engines. The average horse-power was

ere British and, except the de Havilland 9a, which had an American engine, were fitted with engines of British manufacture. The F. 2 A., and F. 5, were twin-engined, while one, the Handley Page V/1,500, was equipped with four engines. The average horse-power was per engine, 344, and per machine,

and W. 8, B.A.T., Westland, Fairey, Supermarine and Vickers Amphibians. No British machine had a foreign engine. The Vickers Vimy, Handley Page O/400 and W. 8, which had a passenger-carrying capacity of 15, were twin-engined. The average horse-power was per engine, 387, and per mach

ench, and we were very dependent upon France for the replacement of our heavy losses in material. By the end of the war the bulk of our material was of British design and construction, though there was still a certain number of British built engines of French design. One American engine-the L

s. Fortunately, our Aircraft Factory had evolved in the B.E. a machine of considerable stability which in

. With a view to enlarging the field of observation, staggered planes were introduced in the B.E.2c. This machine also proved that it was possible to calculate the degree of stability and thus paved the way for the design of aeroplanes with indifference to stability and increased man?uvrability for fighting purposes

rs" were therefore two-seater pushers, such as the "Short-horn" Maurice Farmans which, though not designed for fighting, and too slow to chase enemy aircraft, were the first to be fitted with Lewis guns, and F.E.'s, the first machine designed specifically for fighting, with the machine-gun operator in front of the pilot. These "pusher" fi

or at the side of the airscrew and actuated by a bowden wire, the most efficient, thoug

er fighters was steadily progressive. One of the first of these was the Sopwith "Pup," which had a speed of 106? miles an hour at 6,500 feet, climbed 10,000 feet in just over 14 minutes, and could attain a ceiling of 17,500 feet. In 1917 appeared the Sopwith "Camel," a typical example of this type

lity as a reconnaissance machine. In 1916 the "pusher" type was superseded by the Sopwith "1? Strutter" armed with a synchronized Vickers gun, which for its 130 horse-power was never surpassed. The pilot

n, until superseded by the B.E.2e. Towards the end of 1916 appeared the R.E.8 with a Vickers synchron

of bombs it could not carry an observer, and its moderate speed left it an easy prey to hostile fighters. Early in 1916 appeared the Martinsyde single-seater bomber with

ve night-bomber, of considerable carrying power but low performance-of the latter. By November 8th, 1918, two super-Handley Pages were ready to start to Berlin. They possessed a maximum range of 1,100 miles, a crew of seven, four 350 horse-power Rolls-Royce engines, arranged in p

20,000 feet. Very low flying for attack was, however, being rapidly developed, and would have proved of great effect in 1919. The aeroplane used for this purpose was the sing

, and development has synchronized with the evolution of lighter, more powerful and more reliable engines. One of the most difficult problems still confronting us is the production of a cheap, high-powered and reliable e

he Strategic

, and the components of our air forces varied in accordance with the development of reconnaissance, artillery co-operation, bombing and

n agreement as to the minimum tactical and grand tactical requirements of the Army and Navy. The British Army was not alone in asserting that there was no minimum and that it wanted every available airman, and agreed with the French that anything which it could temporarily spare should be lent to the French Army. It was argued that the Armies could as easily and better arrange for st

enemy aircraft by fighting machines. In 1918 it was decided that raids on the centres of German war industry would not only cripple the enemy's output of material essential to victory,

German munition factories was first raised in 1915 at one of the monthly meetings between the French and British Aviation departments; and in February, 1916, a small squadron of Sopwith "1? Strutters" was formed at Detling for the purpose of bombing Essen and Dusseldorf from

c force was later decided upon, and the "Independent" Air Force was brought into existence. It originally comprised two day-bomber and two night-bomber squadrons. During the summer additional squadrons were allotted to it, including D.H.9's and Handley Pages. Day-bombing squadrons had to fight their way to objectives in close formation, and the problems connec

ey and Longwy and the Saar Basin; the machine shops in the Westphalian district and the magneto works at Stuttgart; the

Basin, within 180 miles of Essen, and within 150 miles of Frankfurt. Another portion was based on Norfolk, where a group of super-Handley Page machines were established for the specific purpose of attacking Berlin, a distance of

Handley Pages attacked the Badische Aniline und Soda Fabrik of Mannheim; bombs were dropped from a height of 200 feet, direct hits being obtained in every case; and the machines then remained over the town, which they swept with machine-gun fire.

s, as a result of which, hostile attacks on Allied aerodromes became practically negligible. Theoretically, machines of the Independent Air Force should not have been utilized for attacking purely military

of demoralization which pervaded the

n being. One air raid after another. In my opinion this is no longer war but murder. Finally, in time, one becomes horribly cold, and one is daily, nay, hourly, prepared for the wo

ted, yet by the end of the war the strategic conception of air power was bearing fruit, and the Air Ministry had in hand measures for bombing which would have gone far to shatter German munitionment. The defence measures for

niza

e, remained the basis of our organization. For instance, the original eighteen machines of our squadron were increased to twenty-four for single-seater fighters and reduced to six in the case of the super-Handley Page bombers. The four squadrons originally operated directly under Headquarters, were soon allocated to Corps for tactical reconnaissance and artillery co-operation, while a unit remained at

and fighting patrols under Army Headquarters. Our air superiority at the Battle of the Somme in 1916 led us to expect German counter-measures in 1917, and our programme for the following winter contemplated a proportion of two fighting squadrons to each Corps Squadron. By 1917 there were five British Armies in France and

nd Military Air Services, to make recommendations on the types of machines required by each, and to co-ordinate the supply of material. The Air Board was an improvement, but not a remedy, and, therefore, in 1917 it was decided to form an Air Ministry responsible for war aviation in all its branches and to amalgamate the Naval and Military Air Services as the Royal Air Force. This was carried i

was possible to carry out, on a carefully co-ordinated plan, recruiting and training, to supply men and material, to organize air power according to the strategic situation in each of the various theatres of war, and to form the correct ratio between the air forces in the field and the reserves in training at home. The difficulty was that the amalgamation had to be carried out d