An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching

GHT TO PROCURE AN

of the early Church and of Christ Himself. Thus Haney says: 'It is necessary to keep the ideas of Christianity and the Church separate, for few will deny that Christianity as a religion is quite distinct from the various institutions or Churches which profess it....' And he goes on to point out that, whereas Christianity recommended community of property, the Church permitted private property and inequality.[1] Strictly speaking, the reconciliation of the medi?val teaching with that of the primitive Church might be sa

1: Op. cit

siècles.' The fact that St. Thomas Aquinas, the great exponent of Catholic teaching in the Middle Ages, defends in unambiguous language the institution of private property offers no difficulties to the socialist historian of Christianity. He replies simply that St. Thomas wrote in an age when the Church was the Church of the rich as well as of the poor; that it had to modify its doctrines to ease the consciences of its rich members; and that, ever since the conversion of Constantine, the primitive Christian teaching on property had been progressively corrupted by motives of expediency, until the time of the Summa, when it had ceased to resemble in any way the teaching of the Apostles.[1] We must therefore fi

ards the question of wealth and property. She was communistic when she had nothing. She blessed poverty in order to fill her own coffers. And when the coffers were full she took rank among the owners of land a

itical Economy,' Dublin Rev

d parted them to all men, as every man had need.'[1] 'And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. Neither was th

e 1: ii.

2: iv. 3

rous.... Still there was no systematic communism, no theory of the necessity of it.' Colour is lent to this interpretation by the fact that similar words and phrases were used to emphasise the prevalence of charity and benevolence in later communities of Christians, amongst whom, as we know from other sources, the right of private property was fully admitted. Thus Tertullian wrote:[3] 'One in mind and soul, we do not hesitate to share our earthly goods with one another. All things are common among us but our wives.' This passage, if it were taken alone, would be quite as strong and unambiguous as those from the Acts; but fortunately, a few lines higher up, Tertullian had described how the Church was supported, wherei

rt. ad Hist. Eccle

eory of the Ante-Nicene Father

te 3: A

nnaire de Théologie

muna

m at all, as apart from great liberality and benevolence. Assuming, however, that the Acts should

it not thine own,' said St. Peter, rebuking Ananias, 'and after it was sold was it not in thine own power?'[1] This distinction is particularly important in view of the fact that it is precisely that insisted on by St. Thomas Aquinas. There is no reason to suppose

my (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 246; Cat

session of private property was essential. 'What Christ recommended,' says Sudre,[1] 'was voluntary abnegation or almsgiving. But the giving of goods without any hope of compensation, the spontaneous deprivation of oneself, could not exist except under a system of private property ... they were one of the ways of exercising such rights.' Moreover, as the same author points out, private property was fully recognised under the Jewish dispensation, and Christ would therefore have made use of explicit language if he had intended to alter the ol

istoire du Com

e 2: Mat

,' by Dr. Hogan, Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. xxv. p. 334. Even Huet discounts t

ed and approved in his appeals for funds for the Church at Jerusalem.[1] Can it be that, as Roscher says,[2] the experiment in communism had produced a chronic state of poverty in the Church at Jerusalem? Certain it is the experiment was never repeated in any of the other apostoli

g. Rom. xv. 26,

itical Economy,

op. cit.; Salvador

ii. p. 221. See

s, taken out of their context, and not interpreted with any regard to the circumstances in which they were written. 'The mistake,' as Devas says,[1] 'of representing the early Christian Fathers of the Church as rank socialists is frequently made by those who are friendly to modern socialism; the reason for it is that either they have taken passages of orthodox writers apart from their context, and without due

Dublin Review

sil, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, St. Augustine, and St. Gregory the Great; and the utterances of St. Basil, St. Ambrose, and St. Jerome are similarly examined in 'The Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers,' by Dr. John A. Ryan. The patristic texts are also fully examined by Abbé Calippe

is held up as a work of more than ordinary devotion-in other words, a counsel of perfection; second, those where the practice of almsgiving is recommended in the rhetorical and persuasive language of the missioner-where the faithful are exhorted to exercise their charity to such

rs did in the time of the Apostles, when at the first beginnings the mind flourished with greater virtues, when the faith of believers burned with a warmth of faith yet new. Thus they sold houses and farms, and gladly and liberally presented to the Apostles the proceeds to be dispersed to the poor; selling and alienating their earthly estate, they transferred their lands thither where they might receive the fruits of an eternal possession, and there prepared houses where they might begin an eternal habitation. Such, then, was the abundance in labours as was the agreement in love, as we read in the Acts-"Neither said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things comm

e Opere et Ele

not merely of the miraculous signs, but of their own purpose, is manifest from the case of Ananias and Sapphira.' He further insists on the fact that the members of this community were animated by unusual fervour: 'From the exceeding ardour of the givers none was in want.' Furth

ntly clear from many passages in his works, e.g. Summa, I. ii. 108, 4; II. ii. 185, 6; II. ii. 186, 3; Summa cont

e. "He hath dispersed, he hath given to the poor; his righteousness endureth for ever."[2] It is therefore unjust that one should not be helped by his neighbour; when God hath wished the possession of the earth to be common to all men, and its fruits to minister to all; but avarice established possessory rights. It is therefore just that if you lay claim to anything as your private property, which is really conferred in common to the whole human race, that you should dispense something to the poor, so that you may not deny nourishment to those who have the right to share with you.' The following passage from Gregory the Gre

mm. on Ps. cxvi

e 2: Ps.

Lib. Reg. Pas

it appears quite plainly that it is the possible abuse of wealth, and the possible too great attachment to worldly goods, that are the principal dangers in the way of a rich man's salvation. The suggestion that in order to be saved a man must abandon all his property is strongly controverted. The following passage from St. Gregory Nazianzen[1] breathes the same spirit: 'One of us has oppressed the poor, and wrested from him his portion of land, and wrongly encroached upon his landmarks by fraud or violence, and joined house to house, and field to field, to rob his neighbour of something, and has been eager to have no neighbour, so as to dwell alone on the

1: Orat.

The Instruc

3: Ad Eccl

ers meant in these passages was that in the state of nature-the idealised Golden Age of the pagans, or the Garden of Eden of the Christians-there was no individual ownership of goods. The very moment, however, that man fell from that ideal state, communism became impossible, simply on account of the change that had taken place in man's own nature. To this extent it is true to say that the Fathers regarded property with disapproval; it was one

s peculiar to our religion. "It was not even allowed to mark out or to divide the plain with a boundary: men sought all things in common,"[2] since God had given the earth in common to all, that they might pass their life in common, not that mad and raging avarice might claim all things for itself, and that riches produced for all might not be wanting to any. And this saying of the p

lk, now streams of

d in Latium ... not only did the people who had a superfluity fail to bestow a share upon others, but they even seized the property of others, drawing everything to their private gain; and the things which formerly even individuals laboured to obtain for the common use of all were now conveyed to the powers of a few. For that they might sub

ical and Early Christi

operty, its Duties and

2: Georg

: Ovid, Met

ctantius, Div.

ht. 'By what right does every man possess what he possesses?' he asks.[1] 'Is it not by human right? For by divine right "the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof." The poor and the rich God made of one clay; the same earth supports alike the poor and the rich.

Tract in Joh.

can repeal; and it is therefore quite fair to argue that all the citizens of a community might agree to live a life of communism. That is simply an argument to prove that there is nothing immoral in communism, and does not prove in the very slightest degree that t

e life in which men lived together in peace and happiness, when there was no system of coercive government and no private property, and says that man passed out of this primitive condition as their first innocence disappeared, as they became avaricious and dissatisfied with the common enjoyment of the good things of the world, and desired to hold them as their private possession.[3] Here we have the quasi-philosophical theory, from which the patristic conception is derived. When men were innocent there was no need for private property, or the other great conventional institutions of society, but as this innocence passed away, they found themselves compe

order of absolute charity, where men are wholly wrapt up in God, distinction and inequality of goods would be impossible. But the Fathers saw clearly that such a state of things was not realisable here below. What did th

y, Its Duties and Ri

2: De Of

: Seneca, E

de la Science politi

also Jarrett, Med

Who does not understand,' asks St. Augustine,[2] 'that it is not sinful to possess riches, but to love and place hope in them, and to prefer them to truth or justice?' Again, 'Why do you reproach us by saying that men renewed in baptism ought no longer to beget children or to possess fields and houses and money? Paul allows it.'[3] According to Ambrose,[4] 'Riches themselves are not wrongful. Indeed, "redemptio animae* viri divitiae* ejus," because he who gives to the p

Comm. on Ma

2: Contra

De Mor. Eccl.

4: Epist.,

ue Archéologique

om the equality and brotherhood of man. Collectivism is absurd and immoral.'[1] Janet arrived at the same conclusion: 'In spite of the words of the Fathers, in spite of the advice given by Christ to the rich man to sell all his goods and give to the poor, in spite of the communism of the Apostles, can one say that Christianity condemned property? Certainly not. Christianity considered it a counsel of perfection for a m

ociale Christiana avanti

de la Science politi

te 3: P

te 4: P

thesis St. Thomas did not borrow from the Roman jurisconsults through the medium of St. Isidore more than their vocabulary, their formulas, their juridical distinctions; he also borrowed from Aristotle the arguments upon which the philosopher based his right of property. But the ground of his doctrine is undoubtedly of Christian origin. There is, between the Fathers and him, a perfect continuity.'[1] 'Community of goods,' he writes, 'is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common, and that nothing should be possessed as one's ow

Calippe, op. cit

atural law in the canon law, but certain titles of acquiring private property are also said to be natura

is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labour, and would leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens when there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everybody had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man i

1: II. i

ason why it should belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows.' Cajetan's commentary on this article clearly emphasises the distinction between fundamentum and titulus: 'In the ownership of goods two things are to be discussed. The first is why one thing should belong to one man and another thing to another. The second is why this particular field should belong to this man, that field to that man. With regard to the former inquiry, it may be said that the ownership of things is according to the law of nations, but with regard to the second, it may be said to result from the positive law, because in former times one thing was appropriated by one man and another thing by another.' It must not be supposed, however, from what we have just said, that there are no natural titles to property. Labour, for instance, is a title flowing from the natural law, as also is occupancy, and in certain circumstances, prescriptio

1: II. i

ty was part of the teaching of many sects which were condemned as heretical-for instance, the Albigens

th of the right to own property entailed as a consequence the duty of making good use of it; and a clear distinction was drawn between the power 'of procuring and dispensing' property and the power of using it. We have dealt with

ARDING THE ACQUISITIO

tively, the other negatively. And if they are understood in their positive sense they mean that the law of nature dictates that all things are common to all men; if in their negative sense, that the law of nature did not establish private ownership of possessions. And in either sense the proposition is true if correctly understood. In the first place, if they are taken in their positive sense, a man who is in a position of extreme necessity may take whatever he can find to succour himself or another in the same condition, nor is he bound in such a case to restitution, because by natural law he has but made use of his own. And in the negative sense they are equally true, because the law of nature did not institute one thing the property of one person, and another thing of another person.' The principle of community of user flows logically from the very nature of property itself as defined by Aquinas, who taught that the supreme justification of private property was that it was the most advantageous method of securing for the community the benefits of material riches. While the owner of property has therefore an absolute right to the goods he possesses,

ont le premier éveille l'idée d'une constante sollicitude, et dont le second évoque l'

ralia quae* homini divinitus conferuntur, ejus quidem sunt quantum ad proprietatem; sed quantum ad usum non sol

ssen, op. cit.,

étaires ont des devoirs; ils ont des devoirs parce que Dieu qui a créé la terre ne l'a pas créée pour eux seuls, mais pour tous' (Semaine Sociale de France, 1909, p

teenth centuries in the case of their own estates, see Ardant, Papes et Paysans, a work

e use of man,' we read in the section dealing with this subject, 'are ordered to some necessity of this life as an end. And therefore temperance accepts the necessity of this life as a rule or measure of the things one uses, so that, to wit, they should be used according as the necessity of this life requires.'[1] St. Thomas explains, moreover, that 'necessa

1: II. i

than is necessary for his own requirements, and does not give away anything to t

ue rem tanti habere quanti habenda est, sicut pluris est anima q

ations within which liberality should be practised are stated in the same article: 'As St. Basil and St. Ambrose say, God has given to many a superabundance of riches, in order that they might gain merit by their dispensing them well. Few things, however, suffice for one man; and therefore the li

1: II. i

2: Ibid.

to discuss whether making use of money might be an act of liberality, and replies that 'as money is by its very nature to be classed among useful goods, because all exterior things are destined for the use of man, therefore the proper act of liberality is the good use of money and other riches.'[2] Moreover, 'it belongs to a virtuous man not simply to use well the goods which form the matter of his actions, but also to prepare the means a

: II. ii. 1

2: Ibid.

mporalis; et ita perirent omnis ejus actus quia non habent amplius quid dare et consumere.... Hic autem acceptio et custodia sic modificari debet. Primo quidem oportet ut non sit injusta; secundo quod non sit de cupiditate vel avaritia suspecta

; first that it is to another, as justice also is; secondly, that it is about exterior things like justice, though in another way. And therefore liberality is laid down by some to be a part of justice as a virtue annexed to justice as an accessory to a principal.'[1] Again, 'although liberalit

: II. ii. 1

2: Ibid.

we said above, therefore certain that a wise and prudent saving of money for investment would be considered a course of conduct within the meaning of the word liberalitas, especially if the enterprise in which the money were invested wer

of the Church Fathers, p. 20, and see Goy

he character of things needful to an end. Hence human goodness in the matter of these goods must consist in the observance of a certain measure, as is done by a man seeking to have exterior riches in so far as they are necessary to his life according to his rank and condition. And therefore sin consists in exceeding this measure and trying to acquire or retain riches beyond the due limit; and this is the proper nature of avarice, which is defined to be an immoderate love of having.'[2] 'Avarice may involve immoderation regarding exterior things in two ways; in one way immediately as to the receiving or keeping of them when one acquires or keeps beyond the due amount; and in this respect it is directly a sin against one's neighbour, because in exterior things one ma

1: II. i

2: Ibid.

by, Aquinas Ethicu

attempt to acquire an amount of wealth disproportionate to the needs of one's station of life, one could not be considered avaricious. Thus a common soldier would be av

how fully the idea of status was accepted (Economic History, vol. i. pt. ii. p. 389). On the warfare waged by the C

n giving, but to fail in keeping or acquiring, while it belongs to the miser to come short in giving, but to superabound in getting and in keeping. Therefore it is clear that prodigality is the opposite of covetousness.'[1] A man, however, might commit both sins at the same time, by being unduly anxious to acquire wealth w

1: II. i

2: Ibid.

3: Ibid.

as excedit in datione vel consumptione vel custodia; et per illiberalitatem intelligimus habitum quo quis contra dietamen rectae rati

lining one to the performance of great works, or to the incurring of great expenses, when, where, and in the manner in which they are called for (fuerit opportunum), for example, building a church, assembling great armies for a threatened war, and giving splendid marriage feasts.' He explains that 'munificence stands in the same relation to liberality as bravery acquired by its exercise in danger of death in battle does to bravery simply and commonl

e 1: II.

e 2: Eth

ring the occasion of various sins of intemperance, also impoverished the community by wasting in reckless consumption wealth which might have been devoted to productive or charitable purposes. He who neglected the duty of munificence, either by refusing to make a great expenditure when it was called for (parvificentia) or by making one when it was unnecessary ([Greek: banousia]) was also deemed to have done wrong, because in the one case he valued his money too highly, and in the other not highly enough. In other wo

rfecti divitias abjicere totaliter, sed eis uti bene et reficiendo

from the wealth with which it was endowed. Dr. Cunningham may be quoted in support of this view. 'One of the gravest defects of the Roman Empire lay in the fact that its system left little scope for individual aims, and tended to check the energy of capitalists and labourers alike. But Christian teaching opened up an unending prospect before the individual personally, and encouraged him to activity and diligence by an eternal hope. Nor did such concentration of thought on a life beyond the grave necessarily divert attention from secular duties; Christianity did not disparage them, but set them in a new light, and brought out new motives for taking them seriously.... The acceptance of this higher view of the dignity of human life as immortal was f

umma cont. Gen

e 2: Eth

3: Summa,

jetan, Comm. on

ern Civilisation,

La Bible et l'Economie politique; Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. 50, 3; Sertillanges, Socialisme et Christianisme, p. 53. It was neve

rom an external cause, and then we have to ransom the captive. After this life we give burial to the dead.[3] Aquinas then proceeds to explain in what circumstances the duty of almsgiving arises. 'Almsgiving is a matter of precept. Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept in so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver it must be noted that he must give of his surplus according to Luke xi. 4, "That which remaineth give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference not only to the giver, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression necessary to the person, taking the word person as expressive of dignity).... On the part of the recipient it is necessary that he should be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms; yet since it is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be succoured if we did not succour them. For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that is dying of hunger; if thou hast not fed him thou hast slain him." Accordingly we are bound to give a

1: II. i

2: Ibid.

: II. ii. 3

: II. ii. 3

5: Ibid.

rett, Medi?val S

De Eleemosy

: II. ii. 3

ommon good is to be preferred to one's own.' The second kind of necessaries are those things without which a man cannot live in keeping with his social station. St. Thomas recommends the giving of alms out of this part of one's estate, but points out that it is only a matter of counsel, and not of precept, and one must not give alms to such an extent as to impoverish oneself permanently. To this last provision, h

1: II. i

risk of grave inconvenience to himself; (2) a man is obliged to help another who, though not in extreme need, is yet in considerable distress, but not at the ris

Medi?val Soci

'[1] The duty of using one's goods for the benefit of one's neighbours was a fit matter for enforcement by the State, provided that the burdens imposed by legislation were equitable. 'Laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good-and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the law-giver-and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are lai

: Ibid., ar

e 2: I.

r that they may have the sole enjoyment of them, but that they may use and manage them as property belonging to mankind at large. Let them remember that when they give to the needy they only give them what belongs to them. If the duty of right use and management of property, whether worldly or spiritual, is neglected, if the rich think that they are the sole lords and masters of that which they possess, and do not treat the needy as their brethren, there must of necessity arise an inner shattering of the commonwealth. False teachers and deceivers of the people will then gain influence, as has happened in Bohemia, by preachi

in Janssen, op. ci

correct to say that the property of an individual was limited by the duty of using it for the common good. As Rambaud puts it: 'Les devoirs de charité, d'équité naturelle, et de simple convenance sociale peuvent affecter, ou mieux encore, commander un certain usage de la richesse; mais ce n'est pas le même chose que limiter la propriété.'[1] The c

Christian Socialists, that property is a 'social function' (ibid., p. 774). The right of property even carried with it the jus abutendi,

et sich diese Auffassung nicht blosz durch ihre religi?se Grundlage, sondern auch

not the place to inquire into the condition of ecclesiastical estates in the Middle Ages, but it is sufficient to say that they were usually the centres of charity,

Roscher, op

PROPERTY IN

exist in medi?val Europe. In dealing with the scholastic attitude towards slavery, we shall indicate, as we did with regard to its attitude towards property in general, the fundamental harmony between the teaching of the primitive and the medi?val Church on the subject. No apology is needed for this apparent digression

must obey his master, and the master must be gentle to his slave.[2] Thus, although there are no slaves in Christ, St. Paul and the Apostles do not deny that there may be on earth. I am far from reproaching the Apostles for not having proclaimed the immediate necessity of the emancipation of slaves. But I say that the question was discussed in precisely the same terms by the ancient philosophers of the same period. Seneca, it is true, proclaimed not the civil, but the moral equality of men; but St. Paul does not speak of anything more than their equality in Christ. Seneca instructs the master to treat the slave as he would like to be treated himself.[3] Is not this what St. Peter and St. Paul say when they recommended the master to be gentle and good? The superiority of Christianity over Stoicism in this question arises altogether from the very superiority of the Christian spirit....'[4] Th

Roscher, Politica

2: Eph., v

3: Ep. ad

Janet, op.

915), p. 110; Franck, Réformateurs et Publicistes de l'Europe: Moyen age-Renaissance, p. 87. On the whol

timate and derived from human law. Is it not in the same sense that the Fathers condemned slavery as contrary to divine law, while respecting it as comformable to human law? The Fathers abound in texts contrary to slavery, but have we not seen a great number of texts contrary to property?'[2] The closeness of the analogy between the patristic treatment of slavery and of property appears forcibly in the following passage of Lactantius: 'God who created man willed that all should be equal. He has imposed on all the same condition of living; He has produced all in wisdom; He has promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if we have all the same Father, by an equal right we are all His children; no one is poor in the sight of God but he who is without justice, no one rich but he who is full of virtue.... Some one will say, Are there not among you some poor and others rich; some servants and others masters? Is there not some difference between individuals? There is none, nor is there any other cause why we mutually bestow on each other the name of brethren except that we believe ourselves to be equal. For since we measure all human things not by the body b

1: Op. cit

2: Ibid.

: Div. Inst

enes., serm. v. i.; Ep.

De Civ. Dei

ote 6:

ics. (2) Slavery is just as a consequence of sin. This is the new principle peculiar to St. Augustine. He has found a principle of slavery, which is neither natural inequality, nor war, nor agreement, but sin. Slavery is no more a transitory fact which we accept provisionally, so as not to pr

Janet, op.

eatment of the question of slavery. His utterances upon this subject are scattered through many portions of his work, but, taken together, they show that he was quite pr

ction to others as a penalty.'[2] In the following article St. Thomas distinguishes between political and despotic subordination, and shows that the former might have existed in a state of innocence. 'Mastership has a twofold meaning; first as opposed to servitude, in which case a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is commonly referred to any kind of subject; and in that sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men can be called a master. In the first meaning of mastership man would not have been rul

te 1: i

2: Ibid.

te 3: i

9. This is one of the chapters th

on to apply this distinction to the case of slavery. 'Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wise man, and to the latter to be helped by the former, as the philosopher states. Wherefore slavery which belongs to the law of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.'[3] It will be noted from this passage that St. Thomas partly admits, though not entirely, the opinion of Aristotle. In the De Regimine Principum he goes much further in the direction of adopting the full Aristotelian theory: 'Nature decrees that there should be grades in men as in other things. We see

1: II. i

2: Supra

3: II. ii

De Reg. Pri

k, 'in the name of St. Augustine, and in that of Aristotle; in the name of the latter by showing that there are two races of men, one born to command, and the other to obey; in the name of the former in affirming that slavery had its origin in original sin; that by sin man has forfeited his right to liberty. Further, we must admit slavery as an institution not on

Op. cit., vol

Franck, op

es thereto, e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary; thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense the possession of all things in com

: I. ii. 94

seem to him less just, namely, that which is founded on the right of war, and which obliges the conquered to become the slaves of the conquerors-to give up their liberty in exchange for their lives. Our author admits it is just in itself, because in his opinion it is useful to the defence of one's country; it excites warriors to courage by placing before their eyes the terrible consequences of cowardice.'[1] The teachings of St. Thomas and ?gidius were accepted by all the later scholastics.[2] Biel, whose opinion is always very valuable as being that of the las

Franck, op.

Franck, op.

enerale super qualuor libros Sententiarum, iv. x

to obey his superior according to the reason of the superiority; thus a soldier must obey his officer in those things which appertain to war; a slave his master in those things which appertain to the carrying out of his servile works.'[2] 'Slavery does not abolish the natural equality of man,' says a writer who is quoted by the Catholic Encyclop?dia as correctly stating the Catholic doctrine on the subject prior to the eighteenth century, 'hence by slavery one man is understood to become subject to the dominion of another to the extent that the master has a perfect right to the services which one man may justly perform for another.'[3] Biel, who lays down the justice of slavery so unambiguously, is no less clear in

cit., vol. iii. p. 93;

2: II. i

dil., Comp. Inst

Biel, op. cit

5: Op. cit

y modern relation between employer and employed. Such an interpretation is definitely disproved by a passage of the article on justice where Aquinas says that

ined to take a more liberal view of the scholastic doctrine on slave