Beauty

fy the basis or foundation of our judgments respectin

into here), this matter was long ago settled by David Hume; and I have nothing new to say upon the subject (there is probably enough of novelty in other

s of Hume and Burke respectively. While this will put the reader in possession of all that I think neces

is a metaphor whimsically borrowed from the lowest of our senses, and is applied to our exer

he characters of beauty, should have led many philosophers to deny that there exist any certai

the beautiful. Ask of a toad what is beauty, pure beauty, the το καλον; he will answer you that it is his female, with two large round eyes projecting from her little head, a large and flat throat, a yellow belly, and a brown back. Ask the devil, and he will tell you that the beautiful is a

a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. Some particular forms or qualities from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated

. If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the

tes Burke, after some p

that are conversant about external objects, ar

ations of their organs are nearly or altogether the same in all men, so the manner

necessarily be allowed, that the pleasures and the pains which every object excites in one man,

sures or pains which belong to these several tastes; but then the power of dist

uses of pleasure, to enable them to bring all things offered to their se

is hardly any doubt but that he would prefer the butter or honey to this nauseous morsel, or to any other bitter drug to which he had not been accustomed; which proves tha

gs, naturally the most nauseous, become most gratefu

nd employed to express intellectual qualities, show that it is always felt and considered as a corruption, even by those who are most corrupted: for though there are many who prefer port wine t

e taste of some particular thing. This indeed cannot be disputed; but we may dispute, and with sufficient clearness too, concerning the things which are naturally pleasing or disagreeable to th

ny feel not the proper sentiment of beauty, is the want of that delicacy of i

time so exact, as to perceive every ingredient in the composition; this we call del

new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses. Now, the imagination is the most extensiv

ith the images, from the same principle on which the sense is pleased or displeased with the realities;

tation of gross and merely sensual pleasures, or so occupied in the low drudgery of avarice, or so heated in the chase of honors and distinction, that their minds, which had been used continually to the storms of these violent and tempestuous passions, can hardly be put in motion by the delicate

etween one person and another, nothing tends farther to increase and improve this talent, than pract

any work of importance, it will even be requisite that that very individual performance be mor

he taste (whatever it is) is improved exactly as we improve our know

ity, or greater attention to the object)-to illustrate this by the procedure of the senses in which the same difference is found, let us suppose a very smo

that these men, who are so agreed upon what is smooth, and in the pleasure thence, will disagree when they come to settle which table has the

tention and habit in such things will have the advantage. In the question about

the properties of the natural object, a pleasure is perceive

nt, as far as their knowledge of the

ion, and not on the strength or weakness of any natural faculty; and it is from this difference in k

he begins to look with contempt on what he admired at first; not that he admired it even then for its unlikeness to a man, but for that general though inaccurate resemblance which it bore to the human figure. What he admired at different times in these so different figures, is strictly the same; and though his knowledge is improved, his taste is not altered. Hitherto his mistake was from a want of knowledge in art, and this arose from his

ume makes the foll

their proportion to each other ... a man is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object p

eserve his mind free from all prejudice and allow nothing to enter into hi

th cases; and in this respect, as well as in many others, reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of this latter faculty. In all the nobler productions of genius, there is a mutual relation and correspondence of parts; nor can either the beauties or blemishes be perceived by him whose th

this, Burke adds so

ions, but extend themselves to the manners, the characters, the actions, and designs of men, their relations, their virtu

r and well-directed exercise, which alone can make it strong and ready. Beside that ignorance, inattention, prejudice, rashness, levity, obstinacy, in short, all those passions, and all those vices which pervert the judgment in other matters,

mpetent knowledge in them. But though a degree of sensibility is requisite to form a good judgment, yet a good judgment does not necessarily arise from a quick sensibility of pleasure; it frequently happens that a very poor judge, merely by force of a greater complexiona

in every part, and the gloss of novelty fresh upon all the objects that surround us, how livel

his appetite is to keen to suffer his taste to be delicate.... One of this character can

ul enough to perceive the defects. But as arts advance toward their perfection, the science of criticism advances with equal p

the imagination and the passions) are as invariable as the former (the senses), and are to be known and re

: the finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded. Where he is not aided by practice, his verdict is attended with confusion and hesitation. Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the high

, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, an

all individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in general, however difficult to be pa

robation, with which they receive any productions of genius, and renders it generally predominant. Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious perception of beauty, who yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke which is pointed out to them.

iates some appar

ariation, which are not sufficient indeed to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often serve to produce a difference in the deg

rning the conduct of life and moderation of the passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favorite author; Horace at forty; and perhaps Tacitus at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, endeavor to en

can never reasonably be the object of dispute, becau

h pictures and characters that resemble objects which are found in our own

of manners; but a common audience can never divest themselves so far of their

the standard of taste, as well as of the agreement which subsists among the best writers o