Food Guide for War Service at Home

fficient quantities is the most serious food problem of the Allied world. The continent of Europe, with her devastated fields, can

has escaped serious suffering, and the n

'S SUPPLY

acres have been taken by the enemy, or are in No Man's Land. Much of the land that has been fought over these past four years is now hopeless for farming, and

ries, tons of fertilizer are necessary. Fertilizers are an absolute necessity, and nitrates, one of the most important of them, can no longer be imported from Chile. The work-animals have been driven off by the enemy or slaughtered f

l production so that it has actually been doubled. Being free from the devastation of war at home, she has been able to convert the great lawns of her parks and country estates into grain-fields. English women of al

million Belgians daily stand in line waiting for food to be doled out to them. The United States must supply three-fourths of the wheat contained in their meagr

ELDS OF

, and Austria-Hungary was able to supply herself with wheat, but had none to export. Their war crops have been below normal, and even the

of their own raising came in peace-times from seven countries-Russia, Roumania, Australia, the

make up or nearly make up the deficiencies of western Europe. Russia and Roumania are now themselves on the verge of famine. Even before their own situati

Europe because of lack of ships. Australia has wheat stored from her last three crops. The Argentine had very poor cro

India, or even the Argentine. The trip from Australia is three times as long as from North America, so it takes only one-third as many ships to carry food to Europe from the United States as from Australia. The Argentine is twice as far from Europe as the United States, and therefore twice as many ships are needed to

THE UNI

ered the last harvest with our stocks of wheat and other cereals practically exhausted. Hence to feed the Allies until the 1918 harvest, we had to send wheat which we should ordinarily have eaten. All that we could send under normal conditions from July, 1917, to July, 1918, has usua

e possible, through the measures of economy and substitution established by the Food

an be no relaxation. We must build up a great national reserve in years of good harvest for the greater and greater dema

THE WHEA

to be increased and consumption decreased. The price has had to be kept down, for in a time of shortage prices always tend to go up. It is true that high prices furnish one method of

l wheat sales are made to the Army and Navy, to our allies, and to the neutrals. The price which it pays for these huge quantities sets the price for the entire country. The Food Administration also makes the movement of wheat from the farmer to the miller and

ence was 64 cents. In February, 1917, before the United States went into the war, flour sold at wholesale for $8.75 a barrel. In May, 1917, the war, with no food control, had driven the price up to $17. But in February, 1918, after six months of the Food Administration, it had gone down to $10.

rchases of the individual are all regulated to a greater exten

the price at $2.20. This has been high enough to encourage the farmer to increase his crop and not too high to be fair to the consumer. The Department of Agriculture, during the winter of 1917-18, had for its slo

are now a commonplace occurrence. Wheatless days are being observed in many hotels and homes. People all over the country have pledged themselves to do entirely without wheat until the 1918 harvest is available. About 100,000 barrels of flour were returned by individual