Forty-one years in India

roops at the various stations en route to Simla, at which place it had been arranged that the summer of 1857 was to be spent. The Commander-in-Chief in India at th

pted an appointment in India-the command of the Meerut division. He did not, however, remain long in that position, for he was soon given the command of the Madras Army, and a year and a hal

d Delhi, and although reports of an uneasy feeling amongst the Native troops in the Presidency division had reached him from time to time, it was not until he arrived at Umball

fle about to be introduced. A new cartridge had, therefore, to be made; but they must not listen to any foolish rumour as to its being designed to destroy their caste. He assured them, 'on the honour of a soldier like themselves,' that it had never been, and never could be, the policy of the British Government to coerce the religious feeling of either the military or the civil population of India,

ommander-in-Chief's goodness. They declared that he had removed their own objections, but that the story was universal

of the new cartridges were by no means imaginary, suspended their issue until a special

ative Infantry would check the spirit of insubordination, General Anson continued his journey to Simla, that beautiful place in the Himalaya

oped in from Umballa (the Head-Quarters station of the Sirhind division), distant eighty miles, bringing with him a copy of the telegraphic message which had b

more than doubtful, and that it seemed advisable that the three regiments of British Infantry stationed in the hills near Simla should be ordered at once to Umballa. So urgent did thi

l Fusiliers at Subathu to be ready to move. Expresses were sent at the same [time] to Ferozepore and Jullundur directing that a European guard should be placed in charge of the magazine at the former place, and a detachment of European Infantry thrown into the fort of Philour from the latter. The confidence reposed in the Nat

the force which, as he rightly judged, would have to be sent to Delhi. There was no hesitation on General Anson's part, or delay in issuing the necessary orders.3 The 2nd Bengal Fusiliers were directed to march to Umballa, and an Artillery officer was sent express to Philour with instructions for a third-class siege-train to be got ready, and for reserve Artillery and Infantry am

early on the 14th May, within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the first news of the outbreak, and reached Umballa the following m

The 75th Foot and 1st Bengal Fusiliers had just marched in with only thirty and seventy rounds of ammunition per man, respectively, and (from want of carriage) without tents or baggage. The Commissariat and Medical Departments were totally unprepared to meet the require

, and the city had been taken possession of by the Native garriso

mselves; the surrounding district was in the most

ops had hitherto kept the Native regiments from open mutiny, it

curred, and at Lahore it had been found n

emed more than probable that the spirit of rebellion had broken

efused to march to Philour, while a detachment of the same corps at Kasauli plundered the treasury, rendering it necessary to send ba

s, with their children, to seek a temporary asylum with the Raja of Kiunthal.6 Hay himself managed to keep Simla quiet, and the men of the Nasiri battalion coming to their senses,

thought not; and in this opinion he was supported by the senior officers at Umballa, with whom the question was anxiously discussed at a conference held at Sir Henry Barnard's house on the 16th May.7 It was nevertheless determined to push on to Delhi, and General Hewitt was asked what force he could spare from Meerut to co-operate with the Umballa column. He was warned that time was an object, and that the 23rd May was the date

ab. He asked the Commander-in-Chief to give a general sanction to the arrangements, and concluded with these words: "I consider this to be the greatest crisis which has ever occurred in India. Our European forc

mount of carriage could not be provided in less than sixteen or twenty days; and that the three Native corps at Umballa could not be depended upon. He asked Sir John whether he considered 'it would be prudent to risk the small European force we have here in an enterprise against Delhi,' and he wrote: 'My own view of the state of things now is, by carefully collecting our resources, having got rid of the bad materials which we cannot trust, and having supplied their places with others of

to him that mutineers could hold and defend it; his belief was 'that, with good management on the part of the civil officers, it would open its gates on the approach of our troops.' He admitted that 'on military principles, in the present state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Delhi until the Meerut force is prepared to act.' But he protested against European soldi

o get the Commander-in-Chief to think as he did, the resolute Chief Commissioner forgot that Clive-not with 1,200 men, but with 3,000 disciplined troops-had to deal in the open field with an enemy little better than a rabble; whereas Anson ha

correct. The Governor-General held the same opinion, and strongly urged it upon Anson, who loyally responded, and duri

Kasauli; a place of refuge was made for the non-combatants at the church, round which an entrenchment was thrown; a garrison, about 500 strong, was formed of the sick and weakly men of the s

Maharaja of Patiala, at once sought an interview with him. He was beginning to explain to the Maharaja the difficulties of the situation, when he was interrupted by His Highness, who said he was aware of all that had happened; on which Forsyth asked if it was true that emissaries from the King of Delhi had come to Patiala. The Maharaja pointed to some men seated at a little distance, saying, 'There they are.' Forsyth then asked for a word in private. As soon as they were alone, he addressed the Maharaja thus: 'Maharaja sahib, answer me one question: A

an Chiefs remained perfectly loyal, and performed the important se

him. On the 21st he received a message from the Governor-General informing him that European troops were coming from Madras, Bombay, and Ceylon. He also heard of the arriva

oot, and Colonel Jones of the 60th Rifles; and one brigade from Meerut, under the command of Brigadier Archdale Wilson. The two former were to be concentrated at Kurnal by the 30th May, and were th

o encounter, full justice has not been done him. Anson has been undeservedly blamed for vacillation and want of promptitude. He was told to 'make short work of Delhi,' but before Delhi could be taken more men had perished than his whole force at that time amounted to. The advice to march upon Delhi was sound, but had it been rashly followed disaster would have been the inevitable result. Had

ommand of the Field Force devolved