The Gatlings at Santiago

zed on the spur of the moment, to utilize material which would otherwise have been useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in all the campaign. It pa

ps were faced by it also; where the hottest fighting occurred this detachment went in and stayed; and at the surrender it was p

ble to cover so large a field, nor the ability to do justice to the courage, fortitude, and endurance so heroically disp

the short space of four days preceding July 1, 1898, and which without proper equipment, adequate instruction, or previous training, in the face of discouragements and sneers, and in spite of obstacles enough

, have unblushingly cribbed the labored efforts of foreign officers, and foisted these compilations of second-hand opinions upon the American Army as military text-books of authority and weight. These literary soldiers declared, following the lead of their foreign guides, that "The value of machine guns on the battle-field is doubtful," and that "Their

ble of learning, that the American Regular makes tactics as he needs them; that the rules of war established by pen soldiers do not form the basis of actual operations in the field; that theories must go to the wall b

ult country over which soldiers ever operated, and without maps or reconnaissance-in twenty days shut up and captured an

the function of artillery, and dispensing altogether, so far as any practical results were concerned, with that expensive and much overrated arm; t

nius applied to war. The first form of this weapon tried, the mitrailleuse, was not very successful. It failed, not on account of faults of construction, or imperfect mechanism, but because its proper tactical employment had not been thought out by the Frenc

he Cavalry of the world, famous everywhere for an esprit-du-corps which looks haughtily down on all other arms of the service, were too deeply absorbed in the merits of saber vs. revolver, and in the proper length of their spectacular plumes, to give a second thought to this new, untried, and t

, and adhered to the view that machine guns, in the very nature of things, could never be useful except in the defense of fortified positions; that they never could be brought up on the battlef

outline of the proper use of machine guns ever filed in any War Office in the world. This invention was designed to facilitate the use of the machine gun by making its advance with the skirmish line possible on the offensive, and was recommended by the whole staff of the Infantry an

a certain degree of originality and energy to get together a

of the proper tactical use of the machine gun arm, both on the offensive and defensive. These things are now bey

istory of tha