The Life of Yakoob Beg

rture from Khokand, the Russians, chiefly owing to the prostration resulting from the Crimean War, did not press on with the energy that their first advance on the

uarter for some time, and the old traffic, or such of it as continued, with China had to be conducted along the less direct route through Siberia. For six years, the Russians tolerated the uncertain state of affairs in Ili, where the Tungani and the Tarantchis disputed between themselves as to which should be the ruling party; but their dissatisfaction was scarcely concealed at the substitution of a native government for that of China. When, therefore, Yakoob Beg, having conquered the country south of the Tian Shan, seemed to threaten the provinces north of that barrier, it is not surprising that the Russians availed themselves of excuses for forestalling him, and for placing their commercial relations on an equally good footing as they had been in the past with the inhabitants of Ili, by a forced occupation of that territory. But the Russians were resolved to give as little umbrage as possible to the Chinese. Ili was formally acknowledged to be Chinese territory, and the Czar voluntarily promised, through his representative at Pekin, to restore it as soon as the Emperor of China was able to despatch a sufficient force to preserve order therein. This tact secured the permanent goodwill of the Chinese, and Russia obtained, in several important trade concessions, a very gratifying reward for her skilful diplomacy. Her friendly action to the Celestials was also heightened in its effect by a piece of unfortunate policy on our part. The Panthays had erected in Yunnan a Mahomedan power, which seemed to have broken off completely from Pekin, and report brought such tales to our frontier of the power and goodwill of the Sultan of the Panthays ruling in Ta-li-foo, that in an ill-advised moment we entered into negotiations with this potentate. The Chinese authorities very naturally took umbrage at this tacit support of a rebellious vassal, and all our subsequent efforts have been unable to remove the suspicions produced by our vacillating attitude on that occasion. The Russians still further preserved the appearance of friendship for China by their refusal, maintained during several years, to acknowledge the government set up in Kashgar by Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg. This action was however the less worthy of approval, because at that period the Russians had no immediate concern in Kashgaria. Their sole interest lay in the course of events in Jungaria, with which they were intimately connected by trade and political associations, stretching back for almost a century. Undoubtedly Jungaria was much affected by commotions in Kashgaria, and we accordingly see, when the march of events in the latter province assumed an aspect menacing to the fut

that uprising was combined it never occurred, for both Bokhara and Khokand fell an easy prey in detail to the armies of the Czar. The punishment of Khiva was reserved for a future occasion, and indeed of all the confederates Khiva was the only one which obtained any successes in the field. The most palpable result of that campaign was the acquisition of Samarcand by Russia, and for a time all opposition seemed to be stamped out. No sooner, however, had the main Russian army returned to Tashkent than a large force invested the small garrison left in Samarcand, and the whole country rose in arms again. The Russian garrison held tightly on to its post, and, although in comparison to its strength its loss was most severe, the town was preserved until the arrival of General Kaufmann with reinforcements. Bokhara then sued for peace, which, after some delay, was concluded with the unfortunate Ameer Mozaffur Eddin. By that treaty the Russians obtained the right to place military cantonments at Kermina, Charjui, and Karshi. Kermina is situated about fifty miles east of the town of Bokhara, on the road from Katti Kurgan and Samarcand; Karshi about sixty miles south of Katti Kurgan, and half way to the Oxus; while Charjui is on the Oxus and some eighty miles west of Bokhara. Of all these the last is the most important, for thence a direct caravan route leads to Merv and Meshed. Once more, in 1870–71, Bokhara entered the field, but the enterprise collapsed through the unconcerted measures of the allies and the weakness of Khokand. During these five eventful years of rebellion amongst the races of Western Turkestan, Yakoob Beg preserved his neutrality. If the assertion is correct that he had played an underhand part in the formation of the league against Russia, assuredly he endeavoured to make his actions contradict his diplomacy. Not a Kashgarian soldier participated in the efforts made so repeatedly by Bokhara and Khokand to shake off the bonds of Russian vassalage. Like Shere Ali of Cabul, he devoted his attention exclusively to the affairs of his immediate province, and wars in the extreme east of his dominions against co-religionists were a preferable alternative to the risks attending a jehad against the most formidable enemy of Islam! Russia had indeed little to complain of in Yakoob Beg's interference in their possessions. His instigation of premature rebellions, or, if he did not instigate them, the approval extended to them by some of his chief ministers, was the very kindest act he could have conferred on the ruling power of Turkestan, for Russia never has had anything to fear from any isolated risings among the people of this part of Central Asia. Nothing less than an unanimous and concerted rising in Western Turkestan, a

s dignity. We have seen that the Russians, failing in their diplomatic chicane, had recourse to threats, although the irony of fate prevented those threats ever being put into execution. But concurrently with these efforts on the part of the Russian government, others of a different kind were being made by individuals. The Russian merchants of Kuldja contained in their ranks several men whose enterprise and courage had been remarkable in the manipulation of trade with the Chinese and the Tungani. They were not easily deterred from any undertaking which promised them brilliant remuneration, even though the risk and uncertainty might be great. The pioneers of commerce were free from the fetters that hampered official movements. It was of little moment to them who ruled in Kashgaria so long as he extended his protection to their goods and their persons whilst they were within his territory. The Russian government viewed wi

e permitted to go on to Tashkent, to place before the governor of Turkestan certain proposals from his master for a complete understanding with Russia. Simultaneously with the despatch of Shadi Mirza by Yakoob Beg, a Russian officer, Captain Reinthal, was commissioned by General Kolpakovsky, the governor of Kuldja, to proceed to Kashgar and demand the surrender of some Kirghiz robbers, who, from within Yakoob Beg's dominion, had sallied forth to pillage Russian merchants. They had also seized several inhabitants of Khokand and the Naryn district; and the Russian government demanded the unconditional surrender of these individuals as her subjects. Captain Reinthal was instructed to make these two demands in a peremptory way, and to convince the new government that Russia would not permit any infraction of the spirit of the treaties concluded with the old government under the Chinese. Captain Reinthal was received in a sufficiently hospitable manner, but his movements were scrupulously restricted to the city. He did not, on this occasion, learn much of importance about the country, but he was impressed favourably by the appearance of such of the army as he saw. The Kirghiz robbers were captured by the order of Yakoob Beg, but he stoutly refused to surrender them. The Russian prisoners were also kept in honourable confinement as a guarantee for the safe return of Shadi Mirza. They were, however, permitted to return to Russian territory when it became known that Shadi Mirza was progressing favourably with his mission to Tashkent. Captain Reinthal accomplished little or nothing on this embassade, and had to report, on his return to his superior, the strange tidings that the new power was resolved to play an independent part in Asia, and to answer defiance with defiance, and threat with threat. This report must have seemed scarcely credible, but there is no doubt that Captain Reinthal advised, as the result of his experience, the adoption of a lenient and friendly policy towards the new-comer. This concession to a Central Asian despot was not agreeable at head-quarters, and the question was shelved for the time. Shadi Mirza, who had been detained at Vernoe, was at last permitted to continue his journey to Tashkent, where he found General Kaufmann absent in Europe. Instructions were then issued to send him on to St. Petersburg, where he arrived in the last days of 1868. He had several informal interviews with the governor of Turkestan, but he was not received by the Czar or a

s follows. From time immemorial, as has been seen in the sketch of the history of Kashgar, there have been two rival elements in Kashgaria-the Chinese and the Khokandian. The Chinese was triumphant in modern times for a little more than a century, while the Khokandian has, more or less, at all other times been paramount. But whenever a native dynasty had attained a certain degree of security therein, it was always threatened by the ambitious designs of the Khan of Khokand, who had generally contributed most towards its successful establishment. The Russian government resolved to avail themselves of this historical fact to pour into the ear of Khudayar Khan insidious counsels as to his claims as feudal lord over Eastern Turkestan. There once more, so they argued, had a Khokandian subject formed an independent and rival administration, and all his victories had been won by Khokandian sympathies, and by the good right arms of Khokandian subjects. And how had this soldier of fortune acted towards his own country when he had received everything from her that he needed? By offering an asylum to all those who had participated in the plots against Khudayar Khan himself, by encouraging sedition in the state itself against the Russians and their nominee, Khudayar, the legal ruler of the state. As if these crimes were not sufficiently serious, he had added thereto the insult of having refused to recognize in Khudayar his liege lord; and Khudayar's own personal fears were worked upon to yield that acquiescence to the Russian proposal that was necessary to secure its success. It was pointed out to him that a strong military power in Kashgar might give an impetus to the plots then fermenting in the active brain of Aftobatcha, the ambitious son of Mussulman Kuli, the prime minister and vizier of thirty years ago. The arguments were specious, and it cannot be doubted that they made some impression on Khudayar Khan. This much-to-be-pitied ruler, forced by the

se. But, not content with this blunt refusal to the offer made from Tashkent, he went on to minor matters and dealt with the question of Russian policy in specific language. The common enemy of him and all his co-religionists was not worthy of any consideration from him or his allies, the rulers of Khokand and Bokhara. "The Russians that have come here, into my state of Kashgar, look at these localities and become acquainted with the state of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for they are a treacherous and crooked-minded people." In such plain terms did Yakoob Beg speak of a power which could without any serious risk have crushed him at any moment. Yet in one sense his boldness was the height of prudence, and succeeded when perhaps a less decided attitude would have completely failed. The Russians were fairly deluded in their estimate of their new antagonist, and all means having been exhausted for inducing Yakoob Beg to abandon his indifferent attitude towards themselves, it began to be seriously discussed at Tashkent whether, if simply for the purpose of obtaining

on. On the other hand, Yakoob Beg's policy was consistent throughout and dignified. While studiously avoiding any aggressive measures, even under the excuse of defensive precautions, he was always firm in his refusal to recognize any of the semi-official overtures that were repeatedly made to induce him to show his hand. Instead of appearing in the light of a suppliant, as according to all precedent he should, he assumed the position of a dictator. "Acknowledge me as legally constituted ruler of Kashgaria, or else there is an end to all negotiation. Send a properly accredited ambassador to me, and he shall be honourably received. A representative of recognized rank shall then convey my token of friendship to your master. Refuse to grant me these just considerations, and my kingdom is closed to your merchants and officials without exception. Admission shall only be obtained over my own body and that of my devoted army." For the first time in the annals of Russian history an Asiatic ruler had tired ou

are guests sent me from heaven." The most complete freedom of action was accorded, for the first time, to all the members of the embassy, and two merchants who had accompanied it for the purpose of exploring the country received a safe-conduct to go on to Yarkand and Khoten. Yakoob Beg scarcely attempted to conceal his gratification at the presence of the Russians; possibly his pleasure chiefly arose from such an unmistakable admission of his skill as a diplomatist. But in every way facilities were afforded his visitors for seeing all objects of interest round Kashgar. Reviews were held in honour of the occasion, and as there happened to be a considerable number of troops in the vicinity, passing through to operate against the Tungani beyond Kucha, the show w

w and Forsyth. The last of these was the easiest to obtain, and the Athalik Ghazi considered all the Russian proposals with regard to trade in a very amicable spirit; but with regard to the second desideratum nothing but the vaguest generalities could all the tact and ingenuity of Kaulbars succeed in obtaining from his host. The first object was amply secured, in so far as geographical and scientific information was concerned; but the precautions taken by the Athalik Ghazi to deceive the Russians as to his power and hold on the country appear to have been successful. Baron Kaulbars certainly confirmed much that had previously rested

would demonstrate his desire to be on good terms with Russians in general. The other version, which, like many other circumstances, has only leaked out in the pages of Mr. Schuyler, is altogether more probable, and is not open to the same objections. According to this, it was Baron Kaulbars, who of course was aware of the saint's day, who demanded that the treaty should bear that date, and who, as soon as it was signed, sent off a message to General Kaufmann saying that the Athalik Ghazi, out of friendship to that general, had specially requested that the treaty should be signed on that day in honour of General Kaufmann's

ry demonstration of amity and respect. So certain did the Russian government appear that their relations with Kashgar would, if only for a short period, be satisfactory, that special care was taken to make a favourable impression on the Kashgarian envoy, and after a short residence in the capital of Turkestan, the nephew of Yakoob Beg, Hadji Torah, who had followed the train of the treat

at this alliance between two Mahomedan states which might both be considered hostile to their interests, and a very large party in military circles clamoured for an expedition to be sent at once against the insolent Mussulman. At one moment it seemed as if this bellicose party was to gain the day, for the testimony of all the officers and merchants who had visited Kashgar showed that each day Yakoob Beg was becoming more formidable. Prompt measures were pressed on the government of Tashkent, and General Kaufmann seemed half disposed to acquiesce in the proposal to inflict summary chastisement on the Athalik Ghazi. Fortunately for Kashgar, the Khan of Khiva had been an older offender in the eyes of the Russians, and the Home Government peremptorily forbade any steps being taken in the regions bordering on the Chinese Empire. It is sufficiently clear that the moderation of the home authorities was a wiser policy than the impulsive demands of certain officers in Tashkent; but it is not so evident why Yakoob Beg abstained from appearing in the r?le of the liberator of Khokand, at so opportune a moment as that afforded by the great expedition against Khiva in 1873. The treaty of Baron Kaulbars had stipulated for the free admission of Russian merchants into the state on the payment of a 2? per cent. ad valorem duty. Not only was there to be no further exaction, but good treatment was guaranteed to such Russian subjects as desired to travel in Kashgar, and who came provided with a passport, and permission t

kelihood they would endeavour to mix themselves up in the political divisions of Kashgar as they had in Bokhara and Khokand, he determined to impose some other check on their visits besides that insignificant 2? per cent. on goods that returned a profit of cent. per cent. He had given his plighted word, however, that merchants should receive fair treatment, and how could he find a loophole

reby to obtain it at a cheaper rate. The Athalik Ghazi expressed his regret at the occurrence, and would be most happy to refund whatever sum the Russian government considered their subject had lost by the transaction. A commission was appointed at Tashkent, to inquire into all the circumstances of the case, and after some discussion the demand of Mr. Pupyshef was reduced from 15,000 to 12,000 roubles. The Ameer acquiesced in the decision, but many months elapsed before Mr. Pupyshef received his money, and then it was again in a depreciated Chinese coinage. We are justified in assuming that this was all planned, and that the obstacles thrown in the path of Mr. Pupyshef were part and parcel of a systematic attempt to disgust Russian merchants with Kashgar. The Russian government, too, was afforded no clear case for complaint, as Yakoob Beg expressed his regret without reserve for the occurrence, all the responsibility of which he shifted on to the shoulders of some of "his officials whom he had ordered to be punished." He paid without a murmur the fair demands of Mr. Pupyshef, and if there was some delay in the refunding of the money, it must be attributed to the poverty of his exchequer, and not to any want of goodwill. The burden of his complaint was, "I am a poor prince; my country is impoverished by the wars that have occurred since the departure of the Chinese; and you will find little therein to repay you for your trouble and expense in entering it. Why therefore will you persist in coming to it? You can do neither yourselves nor my people any good by doing so, and you only cause me anxiety and trouble in preserving your countrymen from insult and injury, which you must admit I have ever done." There was an under-current of truth in this statement of the case, although it was not credited in Kuldja, where everything that went amiss was set down to the hostility of the Ameer. Yakoob Beg had, however, succeeded in throwing cold water on the enthusiastic preparations that were being made for exploiting Eastern Turkestan, and his mode of doing so had been quite original and characteristic. Few rulers would have foreseen that the best way to get rid of a troublesome visitor was to purchase what he had brought to sell to the people; and that the simple remedy of paying in a questionable currency would suffice to deter hundreds from following the example of Mr. Somof. Yakoob Beg, however, was not satisfied with leaving well alone. Having paid the claim of Mr. Pupyshef, it might have been supposed that he would maintain a discreet silence on his intentions in the future with regard to Russian merchants. He might have let the question, indeed, find, as it would have found, its own solution; but, in a weak moment, to place his own bona fides beyond suspicion, he desired the Russian government to send another merchant to

f Captain Kuropatkine, was one long course of fruitless efforts to force the hand of the Athalik Ghazi on this point. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, after the successful journey of Mr. Morozof, to see if any better arrangement could be attained, but, although the Ameer entertained him very hospitably, he fared no better than any of his predecessors. In that year, too, Yakoob Beg's position had become firmer in his own state. The Tungani had been driven back north of the Tian Shan beyond Turfan, and into the regions east of Lake Lob; the disaffection, too, in the cities of Kucha and Korla was also, to all appearance, dying out; but, above all, the vast ?gis of English protection had appeared to be thrown over the integrity of his state. However unjustified this supposition was by the treaty with Sir Douglas Forsyth, the Ameer made as much use as possible of his new-found ally; and the large section of Anglo-Indians, and authorities in this country on the affairs of Central Asia, who, either out of sympathy for the man, or from a belief in the identity of British interests with his cause, proclaimed the advisability of supporting him against Russian aggression, gave a colourable excuse to his declaration that England had extended for the first time in her Trans-Himalayan policy her protection to a native state lying north of her natural frontier. The Russian governments in Siberia and Turkestan, emphatically cautioned by their Foreign Office to give this country no cause for umbrage, were at first inclined to make that assertion an excuse for pushing their friendly relations with the Ameer; but their advances were not reciprocated, and as it became more clear that the importance of the Forsyth mission had been greatly exaggerated by the representations of the Ameer, the language of the Russian authorities became once more peremptory and menacing. In short, matters after more than two years' discussion had retrogressed to the condition they were in before the

f a camp than to the punctilio of a palace. Nor were there wanting more sinister motives still among some of the chief general officers who filled the subordinate posts in the service of the Czar's representative. Prominent among them was the youthful Scobelef, who, burning to distinguish himself, clamoured loudly for some expedition which, when accomplished successfully, would be recompensed with the Cross of St. George. Strong as General Kaufmann may really be in the good opinion of his superiors, he was unable to resist, if he were inclined, the demands pressed upon him by Scobelef and his father, and the more warlike portion of his forces. It is said, that in addition to these palpable reasons there were others touching the family rivalries of the Kaufmanns and Scobelefs, who appear to have been at feud with each other when younger men in the service of the palace, when Nicholas was Czar. To remove these differences, and to satisfy the demands of his other subordinates, General Kaufmann consented that an expedition should be arranged against Kashgar, and entrusted to the command of the younger Scobelef. Towards the end of 1874 the war-cloud was drawing ominously over the Athalik Ghazi, and to all observers it seemed as if it were about to break with destructive violence on his devoted head. Loudly was it asserted that nothing but British intervention would save him, and it was only too clear that England's policy would be guided by events. The Viceroy had certainly not advised that an active participation should be undertaken in this question. The failure, too, o

any surprise. The insurrectionary party, too, had put on the throne Nasruddin, the eldest son of the Khan, a youth who was supposed to be friendly to Russia, and who was not likely to prove in any way formidable, having become passionately addicted to vodka drinking. But behind this ostensible ruler there were others who aspired to greater eminence than the king-makers of a petty state like Khokand. Chief among these was Khudayar's brother-in-law, Abderrahman Aftobatcha, who was entrusted with the chief control of the military arrangements. This chief was the son of Mussulman Kuli, the Kipchak minister of Khudayar's earlier days. Either incredulous of the maintenance of a neutral attitude by Russia, or urged on by a patriotic impulse to free the enslaved portion of Khokand, these confederates issued a proclamation of war against General Kaufmann. The border districts rose in response to the proclamation, the communications between Tashkent and Hodjent were severed, and confusion for a time reigned supreme within the Russian possessions. The Khokandian forces hesitated to make any serious attack and wasted their time in useless depredations in the mountains. Had a prompt move been made on Tashkent, or even on Hodjent, the insurrection might have been successful. Bokhara

er had he seemed to justify this aspiration; and more than any other must he be held culpable when he permitted the moment that seemed most auspicious to slip by unutilized. Moreover, when this insurrection broke out in Khokand, he had made every preparation to defend himself against a Russian invasion. He saw the Russians compelled, by the very necessities of their position, to call off their forces to other quarters, and yet he abstained from striking a blow in defence of those interests which he had ever declared were most sacred to him. It is impossible to explain such apathy on so important an occasion as this was; and his refusal to strike in on the side of Aftobatcha must remain the greatest blot on an otherwise brilliant reputation. With the collapse of that effort, and the subsequent occupation of Ferghana, Russian attention seemed to become more occupied with the s