An Introduction to Philosophy

SCIENCE, AND R

the new world of objects surrounding its small body, it sees things much as they do themselves. They are ready to admit that it does not know much ab

d as having size and shape and position in space. And he aims a still severer blow at our respect for the infant when he goes on to inform us that the little creature is as ignorant of itself as it is of things; that in its small world of as yet unorganized

space, material things. Among these things there is one of peculiar interest, and which we have not placed upon a par with the rest, our own body, which sees, tastes, touches, other things. We cannot remember a time when we did not know that with this body are somehow bound up many

of other people. When we now think of "ourselves" and of "other people," we think of each of the objects referred to as possessi

distinction does not stand out. The child may be the completest of egoists, it may be absorbed in itself and all that directly concerns this particular self, and yet it may make

n does consciously recognize that the world in which he finds himself is a world that contains minds as well as bodi

is bruised, he feels pain; when he wills to raise his hand, his body carries out the mental decree. Other men act very much as he does; they walk and they talk, they laugh and they cry, they work and they play, just as he does. In sh

the little patch of color sensation which I experience when I turn my eyes toward the window should seem to introduce me at once to a world of material objects lying in space, clearly defined in magnitude, distance, and direction; that an experience no more complex should be the key which should unlock for me the secret s

by the aid of science and of philosophical reflection, must begin his labors on this foundation which is common to us all. How

finite, inaccurate, and unsystematic. It is a sufficient guide for common life, but its deficiencies ma

ace in his knowledge of things, yet his way of looking at the mind and the world remains in general much

who interests himself in plants? There in the real material world before him are the same plants that he observed somewhat carelessly before. He must collect his i

he sort, and other men have but little; and yet it is usually not difficult for the man who knows much to make the man who knows little understand, at least, what he is talking about. He is busying himself with things—the same things that interest the plain man, and of

ngs consists of things that can be seen and touched. Many of these seem to fill space continuously. They may be divided, but the parts into which they may be divided are conceived as fragments of the things, and as of the same general nature as the wholes of which they are pa

ppearances, of phenomena, of manifestations, under which the real things, themselves imperceptible, make their presence evident to o

hings is not, after all, so very different in kind from the world to which the plain man is accustomed. He can understand witho

aked eye a mere speck without perceptible parts is found under the microscope to be an insect with its full complement of members. Moreover, he has often observed that objects which appear continuous when seen from a distance are evidently far from continuous when seen close at hand. As we walk toward a tree we can see the indefinite mass of color break u

erties. Have we not always known that things in combination are apt to have different properties fro

discuss the larger objects and groups of objects to which we are accustomed. We are still concerned with things which exist in space and move about in space; and even if these things are small and are not very famil

atical reasonings would be absolutely useless to us if they could not be applied to the world of things; but in mathematical reasonings we abstract fr

o has become an accomplished mathematician can use numbers much better; but if we are capable of following intelligently the intricate series of operations that he carries out on the paper before us, a

it,—for example, when twelve units are thought as one dozen,—the mathematician has a right to say: I leave all that to the psychologist or to the metaphysician; every one knows in a

mere surface. A door so thin as to have only one side would be repudiated by every man of sense as a monstrosity. When the geometrician defines for us the point, the line, the surface, and the solid, and when he sets befo

gives us a fuller and a more exact account than was before within our reach of the space r

Is it real? Is it a thing, or a quality of a thing, or merely a relation between things? And how can any man think space, when the ideas through which he must think it are supp

eding to the proof of his propositions? It is generally admitted that, if such questions are to

l as of material things. Every one admits that the psychologist knows minds better. May we say that his knowledge of minds differs from that of the plain man about as th

s an independent science. Formerly it was regarded as part of the duty of the philosopher to treat of the mind and its knowledge; but the psychologist who pretends to be no more than

t it is quite to be expected that there should be some dispute, especially at first, as to what does or does not properly fall within the limits of a given science. Where these limits shall be placed is, after all, a matter of conveni

th bodies. But it is meant that, as the other sciences improve upon the knowledge of the plain man without wholly recasting it, as they accept the world in which he finds himself and merely attempt to give us a better account of it, so the psychologist may accept the world of matter and of minds recognized by common thought, and may devote himself to the study of minds, without attempting to solve a class

pts it as a fact that each mind knows its own states directly, and knows everything else by inference from those states, receiving messages from the outer world along one set of nerves and reacting along another set. He conceives of minds as wholly depe

things and the external things they represent, and we believe that our knowledge of things comes to us through the avenues of the senses. Must we not open our eyes to see, and unstop our ears to hear? We all know that we do not perceive other minds directly, but must infer their contents from w

reflections. The assumptions which he makes seem to them not unreasonable; and, as for his methods of investigation, there is no one of them which they have not already employed themselves in a more or less blundering way. They have had recourse to introspection, i.e. they have noticed the phenomena of their own minds; they have

man, the world of material things in space and time and of minds related to those material things. But when it is a question of introducing the student to the reflections of the philosophers the case is very different. We seem to be enticing him into a new and a strange world, and

uested him to do. If he wishes to do so, he can be on the spot at the proper moment. He may never have asked himself in his whole life what

not real, and yet he may be quite unable to tell us what, in general, it means for a thing to be real. Some things are real and some are n

plain man must admit that he has the most hazy of notions touching the nature of his mind. He seems to be more doubtful concerning the nature of the m

nd that, this place and that, this time and that. He can think out a plan and carry it into execution

prehension of just what it is and of what elements it may be made up. The plain man does much of his thinking as we all tie our shoes and button our buttons. It would be diff

ily. For example, he speaks of space and time, cause and effect, substance and qualities, matter and mind, reality and unreality. He certainly is in a position to add to our knowledge of the things covered by these terms. But we should never overlook the fact that the new knowledge which he gives us is a knowledge of the same kind as that which we had before. H

more accurate; he does not analyze certain fundamental conceptions,

r and of minds, but rather to make us more clearly conscious of what that knowledge really is. Philosophical reflection takes up and tries to a

there are few who feel impelled to go over the whole edifice of their knowledge and examine it with a critical eye from its turrets to its foundations. In a sense, we may say that philosophical thought is not natural, for he who is examining the assumptions upon which all our ordinary though

d of minds. This is true. But this does not mean that, as a result of a careful reflective analysis, some errors which may creep into the thought

ent themselves to those who try to subject to a careful scrutiny our knowledge of the external world. It is well to begin with this, for, even in our

ING THE EXTERNAL W