The Political History of England - Vol. X.

ements from England, conveyed by Lord Howe, and by Clinton and his troops, so that in August he had with him some 25,000 men, English and German. Washington's army

t it necessary to keep a numerous garrison in New York to meet a direct attack on the place, and detached only some 9,000 men under Putnam to Long Island. They were for the most part posted so as to hold a belt of wooded hills lying between their lines and the royal army. During the night of the 26th Howe outflanked them and brought his main body to a position on their rear. The next day an attack was made on their front; they were caught between two divisions of the king's troops and were defeated. Howe put their loss at 3,300, which is certainly an overestimate, though he made nearly 1,100 prisoners, among them the gen

ORK T

f sixty-six of the enemy's guns. If Howe's movements had been more prompt he might have cut off a large number of the enemy; he is said to have wasted time by lingering over luncheon at the house of the mother of Lindley Murray, the grammar-writer, who detained him by her crafty hospitality. Washington drew off his troops to Haarlem heights, in the northern part of the island. The next day there was some skirmishing in which the Americans held their ground. The loyalists of New York had been shamefully treated by the dominant faction, and the British were received with jo

elf with extraordinary energy to collecting and building vessels. Ships sent out from England were taken to pieces, carried overland to St. John's and put together again, little gunboats and transports were built, and by the beginning of October a larger and better fleet than that of the Americans was afloat on the lake. It engaged the enemy's fleet, under Arnold, off Valcour island, on the 11th and again on the 13th, and utterly destroyed it; only three of their vessels escaped.[116] Carleton occupied Crown Point, but as the season was so far advanced did not attack Ticonderoga, or stay long enough to put Crown Point in a defensib

TON'S R

s narrow position on Haarlem heights, gained White Plains before him, and fortified his camp. Howe attacked him on the 28th with the object of outflanking him. Although part of his army by a frontal attack drove the American right from a strong position, this success was fruitless as well as costly. The insurgents' centre was weak, and if he had attacked it in force he might have crushed them completely. He made no further attempt in that direction, and Washington retreated to a good position behind Croton river. Howe returned to New York. There, however, he dealt the Am

t on the eastern bank. Howe, who had joined Cornwallis, decided that no more could be done and placed the army in winter quarters. He divided it into small detachments, and for the sake of protecting and encouraging the loyalists, extended his line of communication for eighty miles. The fortunes of the insurgents were at low ebb. Not only were the loyalists strong in New Jersey, but crowds of the rebel party, many of them men of high standing, took advantage of the amnesty which Howe was empowered to offer. The Delaware would soon be frozen over, and, if the British crossed it, Washington had not a sufficient force to hinder them from marching on Philadelphia. The town was p

could make no resistance; about 200 escaped and 918 were taken prisoners. Of the Americans only two were killed and six wounded. Cornwallis, who was on the point of embarking for England, hastened back to the Jersey army. Washington avoided a general engagement, defeated two regiments employed in an operation for the defence of Princeton, and before the middle of January, 1777, compelled the British by a series of well-conducted movements to evacuate West Jersey and withdraw to Brunswick and Amboy, where they went into quarters. The king's troops, British and German, committed many excesses, plundering friends and foes alike; and

CESSION FROM

revise the acts by which the Americans considered themselves aggrieved, the minority in the commons sank to 47. Depressed by the exhibition of their weakness, the Rockingham section ceased to attend parliament except on the occasion of private bills in which they were interested. Petulance and a false notion of dignity led them to negle

part against England until the French navy was in good order. He declared that our losses were far greater and our successes far smaller than they were represented by government, and inveighed against the inhumanity with which he asserted the war was conducted on our side. He attacked the solicitor-general, who in answering him pointed out that if, as he asserted, France was secretly intriguing against us the bill was specially necessary. In a personal encounter Wedderburn was a dangerous antagonist, and Fox met more than his match. Dunning urged an amendment to prevent any abuse of the a

nd of 1,800 seamen. The navy in time of war was recruited by impressment, a system which, though recognised by common law, entailed much hardship. Seamen were kidnapped, often after a bloody struggle, and if caught inland were sent to the ports ironed like criminals. Men who had been at sea for years were liable, as soon as their ships neared home, to be taken out of them, put into a press tender and sent to sea again. Merchant ships were stripped of their best men, and were left to be brought into port by the master and a few lads. The press gangs looked for trained seamen, though when a war lasted for some years they took what they could get; landsmen were impressed, and the press was sometimes abused as a means of getting rid of a personal enemy, a

OF THE C

necures, and on other useless places of profit. One of the king's turnspits was a member of the house of commons, and paid ￡5 a year to a humble deputy, and no fewer than twenty-three separate tables were kept up, eleven for the nurses. For such abuses George was only partially responsible. Though he lived with a frugality which was almost meanness, he was in dire distress for money; the wages of his menial servants were six quarters in arrear, and he owed his coal-merchant ￡6,000.[120] After much discussion the money was voted, and the civil list was increased to ￡900,000 a year. In presenting the bill to the king the speaker, Sir Fletcher Norton, dwelt on the magnificence of the gift, and added that the commons were confident that he would apply wisely what they had granted liber

N OF CA

h and suggested alternative schemes; but his first project was chosen by the king, and he was ordered to carry it out. The projected campaign, if successful, would have been disastrous to the Americans. Its success depended on Howe's co-operation. An invasion by distinct armies, such as Burgoyne proposed, with bases far apart and acting on converging lines, can only be undertaken with safety when intercommunication is secure and co-operation assured. Otherwise one of the invading armies is liable to be crushed before it can receive help from another, specially when, as was the case here, the enemy can act on lines interior to those on which the invaders move. Burgoyne fell into the error, common throughout the war, of trusting too much to loyalis

ot leave him in his rear and push on to Philadelphia. Time was passing, yet Howe was still set on prosecuting his design on Philadelphia. Finally he embarked an army of 14,000 men at Sandy Hook, and instead of remaining to be in readiness to co-operate with Burgoyne, left Clinton with 8,500 men to garrison New York and "act as circumstances may direct," and on July 23 sailed for the Delaware, where he considered he would be sufficiently near to New York to act with Burgoyne, if necessary, and yet could carry out his own main design. The naval officers were unwilling to risk disembarkation in the Delaware, and Howe, determined not to give up his design, sailed for Chesapeake

OBJECT

e Schuylkill river where it would be at his mercy. He attacked at daybreak on October 4 under cover of a fog. The head of the British position was insufficiently guarded and the 40th regiment was driven back. At this critical moment its commander, Musgrave, and a party of his men stopped the enemy's advance by seizing a house which stood in their way and holding it against them until the army had time to form. His gallant conduct saved the army. The Americans fought well until, misled by the fog, one of their brigades fired on another. This threw them into disorder, which was increased b

mmunication was established between the army and the fleet. Washington retreated to Valley Forge, about twenty-five miles from Philadelphia, and there put his army into quarters. During the winter his troops suffered terribly from lack of clothing and provisions. By Christmas nearly 3,000 were unfit for d

the American towns, and it opened communication between the northern and southern provinces, though so long as an insurgent army existed in Pennsylvania, an invader could not safely take advantage of its position. British officers marvelled that Howe did not attack Washington while his army was in so miserable a state. His inactivity cannot be defended satisfactorily. He was looking forward to be relieved of his command; he was disgusted by the inadequate response made by the government to his repeated demands for large reinforcements; he informed Germain that without 10,000 more troops the war wo

were carried up Lake Champlain and landed at Crown Point, where he made a speech to his Indian allies, commanding them to observe the customs of civilised warfare and to behave with humanity. He was to find that such orders could not be enforced. On July 6, almost as soon as he arrived at Ticonderoga, the Americans hastily abandoned it, leaving their guns behind them. They were promptly pursued and suffered heavy losses. The fugitives joined Schuyler, the commander of the ar

IN DIFF

o wait there, for his means of transport were not sufficient to bring his stores from Fort George. Garrisons had to be found for Ticonderoga and for posts of communication, and this diminished his army. Meanwhile the enemy was increasing in force. While at Ticonderoga he published a foolish proclamation reminding those who persisted in rebellion that he had it in his power to let loose the Indians upon them. Nothing would have induced him to commit so hideous a crime, and his proclamation only served to enrage the Americans and swell the number of their troops. The Indians were offended by his efforts to restrain them, and deserted him; they were no loss, for they caused more trouble than th

ing's troops point," he wrote, "militia to the number of three or four thousand assemble in a few hours". He might have retreated to Fort Edward, where he would have had communication with Lake George; but he held that he was bound by his orders to advance, and on September 15, after collecting provisions for about a month, he conveyed his force to the western bank of the Hudson and cut himself off from communication with the lakes. Besides artillery, he had then with him only 5,000 men under arms.[126] On the 19th his force was partially engaged by Arnold at Freeman's Farm. The British held their ground but lost over 500 men, and Gates, the American commander, with 11,000 men,

OF BURGO

at the surrender was such as became an officer and a gentleman. Congress shamefully broke the engagement. The captive troops were marched to Boston, but when the transports called for them, they were not allowed to embark. The paltry subterfuges by which congress defended its conduct only throw a specially odious light on its sacrifice of honour to policy. From the beginning of the war both sides made frequent complaints as to the treatment of prisoners, and both apparently with justice. Burgoyne's men were shamefully treated. He and his staff were allowed to return home in the spring of 1778; others were exchanged from time to time, but the mass of the army never came back

ry, and when he came back it was forgotten. It was a piece of gross carelessness, but an undue importance has been attached to it.[128] Howe was well aware of Burgoyne's expedition. On June 5 he had received a copy of a despatch from Germain which told him that Burgoyne was ordered to "force his way to Albany" and join him with the utmost speed.[129] Nevertheless, he persisted in pursuing his own plan. He must have hesitated whether to reach Philadelphia by land or water. When in June he at last made up hi

ch he might require, that his own expedition to Philadelphia would divert the enemy from Burgoyne, that he would be able to "account for" Washington, and that if Washington gave him the slip, he would be able to follow him up and prevent him from annoying Burgoyne.[130] These considerations may be supposed to have satisfied him that no direct co-operation with Burgoyne was required of him. Burgoyne had to encounter foes whom neither he nor Howe reckoned upon, and it was Howe's duty to be at hand to prevent their crushing him. Burgoyne made some mistakes in preparing for and prosecuting his camp

F THE SU

necessaries, stores were wasted. Money was scarce and public credit bad. Early in 1778 congress had 5,500,000 paper dollars in circulation, and the value of its paper dollar was from half to a quarter of the silver dollar. Above all, the Americans had no fleet, and were consequently unable to protect their sea-board. Their alliance with France and subsequently with Spain brought them, along with other help, the sea-power without which the issue of the struggle might well have been adverse to them. France and Spain hoped to recoup thems

onstitutional liberty, and the abolition of privilege of all kinds. They speculated as to the origins of political and social institutions and the laws of human progress. The works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were eagerly studied by the nobles and fine ladies of the court with whom philosophisme was fashionable. America they regarded as a land of freedom and primitive simplicity; and they hailed the crude assertions of the Declaration of Independence, issued by a body largely composed of slave-owners, that all men are created equal and with an inalienable right to liberty, as b

VENTION O

ht their prizes into them, and sailed from them again on fresh expeditions. Our ambassador, Lord Stormont, complained vigorously of these open breaches of neutrality, and at last the French government took some measures to stop them. The opposition in parliament constantly insisted that, if the war went on, France and Spain would certainly take part with the Americans. The government could no longer ignore, though it still strove to discredit, the danger of foreign intervention. The king's speech at the opening of parliament on October 20, 1777, took note of the naval preparations of the two powers and recommended an augmentation of the navy. Tidings of Burgoyne's disaster reached Europe on December 2. Vergennes at once inform

een driven to submission without any severe struggle. Conquest by land was decided on. Was Chatham right in declaring in May, 1777, that England could not conquer the Americans? Six months later a capable French officer serving in their army wrote to the French minister of war that, unless his country declared war against England, the Americans would fail to obtain independence; so little enthusiasm for the cause was there among them, so keenly did they feel the privations of the war.[132] In our war in South Africa of 1899-1902 the Boers showed themselves better soldiers than the Americans,

CONDUCT

estimated. In February, 1774, Gage thought four regiments would keep things quiet; in 1775 it was believed that 10,000 men would be enough; in January, 1776, Howe asked for 20,000, in November his estimate for the next year was 35,000. Germain promised to raise his army to that number, yet instead of 10,000 men he offered him only 7,800 rank and file. On March 26 he confessed that he could only send 2,900, and on April 19 that h

attack on the enemy's entrenchments which cost him over 1,000 men. Then he went to the opposite extreme of over-caution. It is needless to recapitulate the occasions on which either from over-caution or supineness he allowed great opportunities to slip, as notably on Long Island. He, indeed, in a greater degree than any

TNO

n, Campaign o

out 1,000 (op. cit., pp. 202-6); they were probably about double

rrative of Con

ampaign of 1776,

t. 14, 1776, Add. MS. 21,699

ion of Joseph

on, Works, iv.

e Trials,

. Hist., x

. 158; for Carleton's reply (May 20) and Germain's rejoinder

App. to Report, vi. (S

story of New Yo

v., 193 sqq., 239; Gallow

man, i., 3

n, Journal and Ord

; Germain to Howe, May 18, 177

f Shelburne,

ch 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697,

to Burgoyne, July 17, in Evidence Concerning the War (1779), pp. 77-78; Howe's Narrative,

6, 1777, Fonblanque's Burgoyne, p

mte de St. Germain, Nov. 1

ermain and Howe, Hist. MSS. Co

American revolutionary war, much valuable help h