The Truth of Christianity

vidence in

of caring for all His creatures; and we have abundant evidence that

nsignifica

owing that even if insignifican

portance, due to h

ed inhabitants

Existence

that it is vast in amount, wholly unmerited

. Its explanation seems to be that God's designing evil does not me

his is essential to free will; and wicked me

Concl

ludes Beneficence

pecially whether He seems to take any interest in man's welfare. And we will first examine the evidence in favour of this; then the two arguments on the ot

vidence in

rce, able to act or not as it likes. The idea seems inconceivable. If, then, man possesses such a force, which we have already admitted, it cannot have come from any natural forces, nor can it have made itself, so it must have been derived from some previous free force, and this, again, from a previous one, and so on till we finally arrive at a Free Force, which was not derived from any other, but which existed eternally.

of the beings in question. Take, for instance, the human eye, which we considered in Chapter II. Everyone will admit that this conduces very greatly to man's happiness; and therefore the conclusion that God, when He designed the eye, did so with the object of benefiting man seems irresistible. Nor is this altered by the fact that th

t this is quite untenable. They were plainly designed to enable the animal to secure its food, and are perhaps necessary for that purpose, and they all tend to the welfare of their possessor, and sometimes also to that of their victim, as it hastens death. There is no

nsignifica

significant he is in comparison with his Maker. This is no new difficulty,[4] but modern science has increased its force by showing that our earth is only one among the planets which go round the sun, while

s. 8.

om the marks of design) takes an interest in its inhabitants, should be also the Ruler of the distant stars? And when so stated, the unity of nature compels us to say that it is not only likely, but practically certain. However, we will di

Counter-

, there is at most only a slight additional improbability, if any at all, that He should take an interest in their welfare. And this is especially the case when we remember that man is not only the highest and noblest being on this planet,

reatness does not exist in despising that which is small; and it may be a very part of God's infinite greatness that nothing should be too small for Him to care about, just as nothing is too large. And while a Being, Who can govern the universe, and attend to its millions of stars,

stance, is attracted to the ground, because, and only because, each particle of it is so attracted. In the same way if God takes an interest in the human race (and, as j

it, why should He not care about it? Yet, as said in Chapter II., a world like ours cannot have been made without both knowledge, and foreknowledge, on the part of its Maker. And though we might at first be inclined to lim

d animals. For each man is a separate spirit, a personal being distinct from all else in the world. And since he possesses a free will, his character is also distinct; for this depends to a large extent on how he uses his free will, what he says, and what he do

from this it follows that each man is not only unique, but irreplaceable. No other can be made like him. Therefore, as we each have something special about us, God may take a special interest in each of us. Doubtless such an idea seems very wonderful; but no one who has any knowledge of the marvels of nature will think it, on that account, incredibl

escope has shown us that our world is like a mere drop in the ocean, the microscope has shown us a new world in each drop; and t

ithout apparently any limit. And this makes it more than ever likely that the God, Who has shown such marvellous skill in the various organs of a man's body, should care for the man himself, the personal and moral being, wh

that all its parts are closely connected together. And certainly the idea that the God, Who rules these stars, should take an interest in us men, is no harder to believe t

s real im

earing on the argument. For we now know that our earth has existed for thousands of centuries, gradually evolving higher and higher forms

r being on the earth, for the causes which have produced his evolution thus far, can carry it no further. When, for instance, man acquired an erect position, there was an end to any further improvement in that respect. When he took

ments. Man is thus not only the highest being that ever has been evolved, but, as far as we can judge, the highest being that ever will be evolved on this earth. So the vast scheme of evolution, inconceivable alike in magnitude, in duration, and in comp

the chief object which God-the Author of Nature-had in view all the time, it seems to increase his i

creased that of his mind, for it is his mind that has discovered them. And every fresh discovery man makes can only exalt him still higher for making it; so that the mind of man now shows him to be a far nobler being than could possibly have been imagined some centuries ag

t a great being could act in opposition to the will of the Almighty? But then; if his acting wrong proves his greatness, still more does his acting right. Indeed (if we were not so far from it ourselves) we should

ame way (to quote a well-known analogy) a king will value his child more than his palace: for the simple reason that the child is more like himself. Thus persons are always more valuable than things. And they are incomparably more valuable, for they have nothing in common by which they can be compared. We cannot class an

ed inhabitants

ited, and does not this weaken the argument a good deal, and show that Go

ral laws, such as those of gravity, light, and heat, are the same throughout the entire universe. And this makes it probable that the laws of life are also the same; so that if living beings exist on other planets, we should expect them to be somewhat similar to the living beings here; and to have been evolved in a somewhat similar manner. And thi

ge this may seem to us, it entirely agrees with God's methods in nature, where what seems to be needless waste is the universal rule. So this is not an insuperable difficulty. The question, however, may well be left open, for even if other plane

Existence

l evil, and apply also to animals; while the latter is moral evil, and applies only to man. And as the world is full of pain, sorrow, and sin, one may naturally ask how could it have been designed and created by a God Who cares for the welfare of His creatures? Or, to put the objection

cal evil i

ry, which is wholly unmerited and perfectly useless; since, having no moral nature, t

, a mouse being caught by a cat, is obvious; but how far they really suffer is doubtful, as their feelings are probably far less sensitive than those of man; so it is quite misleading to think what we should feel like in similar circumstances. This is indeed evident when we reflect that suf

continue to eat, and apparently relish, a smaller crab, while being itself slowly devoured by a larger one; and this shows that the crab can

ictoria Institute, vo

ove example, that the mouse is not to live for ever, its being destroyed by a cat is at most a very short misery, and perhaps involving altogether less pain than if it died from disease or old age. Indeed few things could be worse than for old and weak an

t, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply.' And Wallace says:-'The popular idea of the struggle for existence entailing misery and pain on the animal world is the very reverse of the truth. Wh

. 6th edit., 1888, p. 96. A. R.

it. But then, the pleasure which they enjoy is also unmerited. The two must in all fairness be taken together, and as a matter of fact, animals seem to have a much greater amount of pleasure than of pain. Their life (except when ill-treated by man) is, as a r

this. It is indeed a kind of sentry, warning them of dangers, which might otherwise lead to their destruction. If for example, animals felt no pain from excessive heat, they might not escape when a forest was

sical ev

struggling lives, the painful diseases, the lingering deaths, not to mention accidents of all kinds, are but

the pain and misery which men endure is brought about by their own wickedness and folly, or by that of their fellow-men. The recent war-worse in extent, th

lind the possession of even one eye would have been thought a priceless blessing. Again, however great may be the sufferings of life, they cannot be as great as its joys, since nearly everyone

oided by God's continually interfering with these forces. But this would render all human life a hopeless confusion. While, at present, owing to these forces being invariable, a great deal of the evil which might otherwise result from them can be foreseen and avoided. If, however, men will not av

is any worse for a number of men to die like this, suddenly and together, than that they should all die in the usual way, slowly,

more than counter-balanced by human happiness; and that a certain amount seems not only useful, but in a world like ours inevitable

ed it, He need not have desired it, but may have desired something else, for the attainment of which, this suffering was a necessary condition. A

herefore this suffering implies no defect in God's design. It is a means, and, as far as we can judge, the only possible means for developing the highest and noblest character in man, such a character indeed as alone makes him worthy of admiration. Moreover, a man's character can only be formed by himself, it can

. Their object is to develop and perfect his character; and as this is a good object, and

ral evi

suming man to be a free being, it could not have been avoided, for freedom is always liable to abuse. Therefore, if God decided that man was to be free in some cases to act right or wrong, it necessarily follows that he may act wrong. No Omnipotence could possibly

wished that man, who is, as far as we know, His highest and noblest work, should be only a machine. Indeed, the superiority of free men who act right, though they might act wrong, to mere machines is obvious to everyone; and it may far outweigh the disadvant

d not care whether his children obeyed him or not. Why, then, should we think that God, Who has not only given us free will, but also a conscience by which to know what is right (i.e., what is His will), should yet be indifferent as to whether we do it or not? Ever

onclusion appears, moral evil, or at least its possibility, is essential to the universe, if it is to be worthy of its Creator, if, that is, it is to contain beings of the highest order-persons and no

icked men in the world, the answer is obvious. Wicked men are as necessary as any other form of evil to test a man's character, and to develop moral perfection. For just as physical e

or evil. These require not merely the possibility, but the actual existence of sin, and they would all be unattainable if we had nothing but physical evils to contend with, and there were only good men in the world. The case then stands thus. Evil men are essent

his freedom, but without foreordaining or compelling him to do either. In the same way, in human affairs it is possible in some cases, and to some extent, to foreknow what a man will do, but without in any

t, He may, in a certain sense, be said to foreordain it as wel

Concl

nt evidence that He actually does so. On the other hand, the so-called insignificance of man is more apparent than real, since his position at the end of evolution shows his great i

not be obtained in any other way. For the evils in this world need not be ends, but may be only means to ends; and, for all we know, they may be the very best means for obtaining the very best ends. Indeed, as before said, they seem to be not only the best, but the only possible means for devel

Indeed if God is not good, He has made a being, in this respect, nobler than Himself; since some men, in spite of their fau

ything he likes, but by training and developing his character. God is thus not only beneficent, but righteous also. And He therefore wishes man to be not only happy, but righteous also. And He therefore of necessity (as a man cannot be made righteous against his will) gives him free will, with the option of being unrighteous, and consequently unhappy.

ess, than 'infinite' would be. And it will be noticed that these three great attributes of God correspond to the three chief arguments for His existence. The first, or that from the universe requiring an adequate Cause, proves an All-Powerful Creator; the second, or that from its having been designed, proves that He