The Campaign of Sedan

the evening of the 12th of August, transferred to Marshal Bazaine the burden which he could no longer bear. Whatever may have been his other aptitudes, he was

Army over the Moselle. Four days earlier that might have been done without a shot being fired, because even if the German horse had come up to look on they must have been idle spectators as their infantry comrades were far in the rear. The fatal error was committed when the Emperor did not overrule all opposition, and, adhering with unswerving firmness to his first thought, neither halt, ponder, nor rest until the Moselle flowed between him and his foes. The military position on the morning of the 7th dictated that step; his adversaries believed or surmised that he would take it, because it was the right step to take. Nor can we doubt that, as Commander-in-Chief, Louis Napoleon, who had a little of "le flair militaire," saw at once the proper course, but that, as Emperor, he dared not, on reflection, run the risk. It was a false calculation, even from a political standpoint, because, so long as he was in the field with, or at the head of an Army, his republican and monarchical enemies would not have moved, and time would have been gained. By retiring promptly over the Moselle, and leaving Metz to defend itself, he might have been defeated in battle or man?uvred back upon Paris; but there would have been no Sed

h Propose

not unparalleled, that the calamity was attributed to the Germans-they must, it was said, have destroyed the sluices near Marsal and have allowed the lake water of that region free access to the Moselle-as if they did not wish to cross the river themselves! Be the cause what it might, there was the obstruction; so that the first information received by the Marshal was that the retreat, which he had been ordered to execute, could not begin until the next day, except by Canrobert's 6th Corps, which was near permanent bridges. Consequently, the Army remained another day on the right bank. The Corps were in position between forts Queleu and St. Julien, Frossard on the right, Decaen in the centre, and De Ladmirault on the left, the Guard being in rear of the centre behind Borny, where Marshal Bazaine had set up his head-quarters. Practically the line was a curve extending from the Seille to the banks of Moselle below Metz; and the defensive obstacles were a watercourse with steep banks, patches of dense woods, two chateaus, or country houses, which were readily made defensible, and of course the villages and farms scattered over the pleasant fi

n; the French because they wished to glide off unassailed, the Germans because their Commander-in-Chief desired to secure a solid footing for the Second Army on the left bank of the Moselle before the French retired. Watched as these were by keen-sighted [p 150] horsemen, they could not stir without being seen; and so soon as the state of the Moselle permitted a movement to the rear, the fact was reported to the German chiefs. A Hussar party notified, about eleven, that Frossard's outposts were falling back; a little later that the tents were down; and then that columns of all arms were retiring. So it was in the centre and on the left; Decaen's Corps remained, but two divisions of De Ladmirault's Corps, it was noted, were no longer on the ground they had held in the morning. General von

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of Colomb

a rivulet which flowed northward along the whole front of the French position, receiving on its way brooks which trickle down the hollows in the hills to the eastward. The heights east of the stream were bare of wood, and the most prominent objects were the village and church tower of St. Barbe on the crown of a rounded hill to the north-east. From this elevated hamlet another brook rose, and found its way along the bed of a gully to Lauvalliers, where all the watercourses united, and, under the name of La Vallières, ran thence to the Moselle. The French troops, four divisions of Decaen's Corps, were posted in the woods, and on the heights above the first-mentioned rivulet from the neighbourhood of Ars-Laquenexy to the point where all the streamlets joined. The outposts were in Mercy le Haut, sometimes called Mercy les Metz, in the woods facing Ars-Laquenexy, in the Chateau D'Aubigny and Montoy, beyond the brook, in Colombey, a village on the south bank, and in Nouilly, a large village in the St. Barbe rav

lz Das

o a halt, or even thrust them back. The batteries attached to the brigade came at once into action and persisted, though they were hard hit by the French. But the advance of Von Golz was not to be arrested, and the impetus of his first movement forward carried part of the brigade over the ravine and watercourse, and into the village and inclosures of Colombey. That point, however, was the limit of his progress, for the French developed strong lines of s

ms and approached the fight. General von Zastrow, however, did not quite approve of the temerity of his subordinate; but seeing that the Corps was committed to an engagement, he permitted General von Glümer to use the twenty-sixth brigade on the right and General von Woyna to employ the twenty-eighth on the left while he held the twenty-seventh in reserve. In like manner, the French turned fiercely on their adversaries. Canrobert and Frossard were over the Moselle, but Decaen's four divisions were speedily arrayed; the Guard behind them fell in and marched Bri

the wooded hill above. The 2nd Division directed upon Montoy, Lauvalliers and the mills at the confluence of the streams, fell on with alacrity; but the resistance was so keen that although they soon wrested the eastern, they suffered great loss and were once promptly repulsed by the defenders, when attempting to master the western bank. Yet, aided by the fire of batteries concentrated south of the St. Barbe ravine, these persistent troops ultimately crowned the ascent, and established the front of battle on the French side of the brook throughout its length. From one point, however, the French could not be dislodged. There was a cross road leading from Colombey to Bellecroix. It was a hollow way, bordered by trees two or three deep, and having in front, by way of salient, a little fir wood. This position effectually frustrated [p 155] every effort of the Germans ei

entered Mey retreated fast upon Nouilly; then General von Manteuffel, hastening the march of his brigades which were still on the way to the field [p 156] formed his line to the north-west, between Servigny, Nouilly, and the mills at the confluence of the brooks, with a reserve at Servigny. As the guns, like the troops, arrived successively, they were arrayed on the new line, and, before De Ladmirault could develop his flank attack effectively, the 1st Corps had ninety guns in position between Lauvalliers and Poix, which enabled them to bar any infantry advance upon St. Barbe. The effect of this disposition was to frustrate the aggressive designs of De Ladmirault, but he is entitled to the credit of having saved his exposed division, and also of having made the only movement during the day which

d Villers l'Orme, which proves that the adversary must have retired towards [p 157] Bellecroix and the banks of the Moselle. No doubt the Germans were wisely drawn back, at a late hour, and on that ground the French put in a claim to the victory. For General Steinmetz had ridden on to the field just as the contest was coming to an end. He was angry because a battle had been

of the

t reach the scene of actual fighting until dark. It is impossible to ascertain exactly, and difficult to estimate the numbers engaged; but one fact is manifest-that the German assailants were numerically inferior, especially during the first two hours; that the disproportion was only lessened between six and seven; and that, at no time, were the French fewer in number. Marshal Bazaine emphatically states, in his report to the Emperor, that he held his [p 158] position without employing the Guard, which is true, but it is not less true that the whole front of his line was driven in; and that he stood at the clos

w the confluence of the Meurthe and Moselle; the Guard had one division a little lower down at Dieulouard; the 10th Corps, entire, was at Pont à Mousson, with a brigade to the westward; the 3rd, the 9th, and the 12th, were facing the Moselle between Pont à Mousson and the left of the First Army, prepared either to frustrate a French advance up the right bank-a possible movement always present to the mind of Von Moltke-or cross the river. The 2nd Corp

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are, or at least were, in 1870, only two roads out of Metz available for the march of heavy columns of troops of all arms and large trains-the excellent highway to Gravelotte, which is a long defile, and the road through Woippy, turning the uplands on the north. All the intermediate lanes or cross-roads are rugged and narrow, and only one, that passing by Lessy, has or had any pretension to the character of an inferior village road. Guns and carts can move along and up them in Indian file, but not easily if numerous, and nowhere at a good pace. Thus, even, on the 14th, the Corps of Frossard and Canrobert, who both started late, found the Gravelotte road so encumbered by trains that they could only make their way

fractured epaulette, gracefully said, 'It will be nothing, an affair of a few days, and you have just broken the charm.'" Apparently, Napoleon still clung to the belief that the allies he had sought would come to his aid. "I await an answer from the Emperor of Austria and the King of Italy," he said; "compromise nothing by too much precipitation, and, above all things, avoid fresh reverses." He counted on on

soldatesque language of Marshal Canrobert, "carried off the leg of a battalion commander, and wounded two officers standing near a drummer." The lucky shot came from a patrol of German cavalry, which had ridden forward as far as the railway station, unopposed, and its commander, observing a camp at Longeville, had brought his guns into action, and proved,

ard, followed by Canrobert, had marched during the day as far as Rezonville, where both halted; and the Guard with the Emperor and Prince Imperial attained Gravelotte. General de Ladmirault [p 162] did not stir at all on the 15th, he put a strict construction on Bazaine's orders, and affected also to be uncertain whether he was to continue his retreat or not. But he had allowed Lorencez to press through the town and thrust himself into the Lessy defile, where his troops, unable to get on, had to pass the night. These disjointed and

s cross th

at, evidence sufficient to convince Von Moltke having come in, decisive steps were taken. All the Corps of the Second Army were directed upon or over the Moselle, the 1st Corps was moved to Courcelles-Chaussy; and the 7th was posted at Courcelles sur Nied to guard the railway line and the dep?ts; and the 8th was on its left, echeloned on the Lunéville road. At nightfall the [p 163] 3rd Corps had

y beyond t

e hills about Puxieux. These were French dragoons detached from De Forton's division, then en route for Mars la Tour, and they were reinforced from the main body as soon as the [p 164] vedettes had opened fire. The French, led by Prince Murat, ascended the hill, and soon after the Germans had brought a battery to bear Murat withdrew his men, followed by Von Redern. On crowning the ridge De Forton's division was plainly seen moving in the valley, or halting near Mars la Tour, supported by twelve guns. Von Redern, who did not think it prudent to attack, retired until a fold of the hills gave him protection. Here he was joined by two squadrons of hussars, which had approached Rezonville, captured nine prisoners, and when pursued had got deftly away. The sound of the cannon had attracted the rest of the brigade, and Von Redern again moved towards Mars la Tour, and again drew off without a fight. But by this time the cannonade had called up both Barby and Bredow, so that there were soon thirty-four squadrons and two batteries on the ground. The French General, De Forton, who be

r the Fla

rom Metz to Verdun by Fresne and Etain that we can reap the fruits of the victory obtained yesterday. The commander of the Second Army is intrusted with this operation which he will conduct according to his own judgment and with the means at his disposal, that is, all the Corps of his Army." It was further announced that the King would transfer his head-quarters to P

or Quits

be heard by all, "Gentlemen, we will remain, but keep the baggage packed." The troops, sad and depressed, continued to defile before the inn; no shout, no vivat was evoked by the sight of the sovereign and his son. Yet that night the Emperor had made up his mind. In the morning he summoned Bazaine, who found him in his carriage with the Prince Imperial and Prince Napoleon. The baggage had already gone on in the night, and the lancers and dragoons of the Guard, commanded by General de France, were in the saddle ready to serve as an escort. Bazaine rode to the side of the carriage, and the Emperor said, "I have resolved to leave for Verd