The Army of the Cumberland

ce to Mur

ille and Nashville railroad; and on the same duty were the remaining two brigades of Fry's division. R. B. Mitchell was assigned to the command of Nashville with his division as the garrison. This left, under the immediate command of Thomas, the two divisions and the brigad

ivisions direct on the Nolinsville pike to Triune. Thomas was to advance his command of two divisions and a brigade on McCook's right by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, threatening Hardee's left, and on his falling back was then to cross over on country roads and occupy Nolinsville. Crittenden was ordered to move his command direct on the Murfreesboro pike. On the arrival of Thomas at Nolinsville, and being in a position to support, McCook was to attack Hardee

pickets of the enemy, within two miles of the Federal picket line. As these commands advanced, there was constant skirmishing until the heads of each of these columns reached Nolinsville. About one mile south of the town the enemy made a determined stand in a defile, and upon the hills through which the pike ran at this place, known as Knobb's Gap. This was a favorable position for the rebels, well guard

is infantry. On learning that Hardee was in position and had been in line of battle since the night before, McCook ordered a halt until the fog lifted. This it did about noon, when Johnson's division was pushed rapidly forward, followed by that of Sheridan. As the command approached Triune they found the enemy had burned the bridge acr

my had retired to Murfreesboro or Shelbyville. Willich went several miles on the Shelbyville road and found that the force in his front had turned to t

of battle was determined, McCook's skirmishers being then about five hundred yards from it. The resistance to Davis's advance was especially stubborn, and the losses of the day footed up seventy-five in Sheridan's division and some two hundred in Davis's. Shortly before sunset the rebel position was plainly discernible from Davis's front, and was formed diagonally across the old Murfreesboro and Franklin road. In the afternoon, McCook learned from a citizen who had seen the enemy's line of battle and the position of his troops, that they were posted with the right of Cheatham's division resting on the Wilkinson pike; Wither's division on Cheatham's left, with his left resting on the Franklin road; the entire of Hardee's corps to the left of that road extending toward Salem pike. This formation of the enemy's line placed the right of McCook's line as then formed directly in front of the enemy's centre. Information was at once sent to Rosecrans, and McCook informed his three division commanders of this fact and then placed two brigades of the reserve division under Willich and Kirk-two of the best and most experienced brigade commanders in the army-on the right of Davis, to protect the right flank and guard against surprise-that of Kirk with his left resting on Davis's right, with his right refused, Willich on Kirk's right and in a line nearly perpendicular to the main line, thus covering the right flank. The third brigade of Johnson's division was held as reserve. McCook's line of battle as thus formed was broken in several points. The general direction of Sheridan's line was to the east and south, facing nearly at right ang

s sent back by Thomas from Brentwood, to take the direct Nolinsville pike. On the 28th, Rousseau, under order, marched to Stewartsboro, where he joined Negley's division. On the 29th Negley crossed Stewart's Creek at the ford southwest of, and two miles above the turnpike bridge, and marched in supporting distance of the head of Crittenden's command on the Murfreesboro pike. Rousseau was ordered to remain in camp at Stewartsboro, detaching Starkweather's brigades with a section of artillery to the Jefferson pike, to watch the movements of the enemy. Negley's division moved eight miles that day and took position within three miles of Murfreesboro. Walker reached Stewartsboro from the Nolinsville pike about dark. Early in the morning, Crittenden's command moved into line of battle on the left, under a brisk fire, while Negley's division, by an oblique movement to the right, took position on the r

hat night four miles north of Lavergne. On the 27th Wood's division was placed in the advance of Crittenden's column. Hascall's brigade drove the enemy from Lavergne with a loss of twenty men wounded, and pushing rapidly on, forced them south of Stewart's Creek, five miles beyond. At this place the enemy set fire to the bridge, which Hascall's advance reached in time to save. Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division was sent down the Jefferson pike to seize the bridge over Ste

ssage of the river had been forced. Wood on receiving the order objected greatly to carrying it out, saying that it was hazarding a great deal for very little, to move over unknown ground in the night, instead of waiting for daylight, and that Crittenden ought to take the responsibility of disobeying the order. This the latter refused to do. After Wood and Palmer had issued their orders to advance, they both insisted that the order should not be carried out. The order was then suspended an hour, so that Rosecrans could be heard from. During this interval the general himself came to this portion of the front, and approved of the action of Crittenden, as the order had been issued on the report that the enemy had evacuated Murfreesboro. Under the order, before it was suspended, Harker with his brigade had crossed the river at a ford on his left,

e, under Captain St. Clair Morton, covered the lower one. At night Crittenden's corps with Negley's division bivouacked in order of battle,

xperience with the matter of surprise to an army led him to be well prepared to know and take advantage of the slightest change in his immediate front. By the night of the 26th Bragg knew that Rosecrans's entire army was moving out to force him to fight or compel his retreat. He at once selected his line of battle at Stone's

an early settler-is formed here by the middle and south branches of the stream uniting, and flows in a northerly direction between low banks of limestone, generally steep and difficult to cross, emptying into the Cumberland. At the time of the battle the stream was so low that it could be crossed by infantry everywhere. The Nashville Railroad crosses the river about two hundred yards above the tur

dred yards in width, which was apparently left unoccupied, but was covered by the Twentieth Tennessee and Wright's battery, of Preston's brigade, which swept it and the fields in front. The remainder of Preston's brigade rested with its right in the woods, and extended along the edge with its left toward the river. On the left of Preston, Palmer's brigade was formed, and on his left Hanson's completed that portion of the line. Jackson's brigade reported to Breckinridge and was placed on the east side of the Lebanon road, on commanding ground, a little in the advance of the right of Adams. On the other side of the river the right of Withers's division rested at the bank, near the intersection of the turnpike with the railroad, and was slightly in advance of Hanson's right. It extended southwardly across the Wilkinson pike to the Triune or Franklin road, in an irregular line adapted to the topography of the country. In the rear of Withers's division that of Cheatham was posted as a supporting force. McCown's division was placed in the rear of these divisions as the reserve. This was Bragg's first disposition of his troops for battle. On Monday, the 29th, no change of importance was made, the troops remaining in line of battle. In the evening, when Harker's brigade crossed the river, Bragg thought this was a movement to occupy a hill situated

of Negley, Rousseau being in reserve. Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve's division across the river at the lower ford, covered and supported by the pioneer brigade and at once advance on Breckinridge. Wood's division was to follow-crossing at the upper ford and joining Van Cleve's right-when they were to press everything before them into Murfreesboro. This gave a strong attack from two divisions of Federal troops on the one of Breckinridge's, which was known to be the only one of the enemy's on the east of the river. As soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from his position, the artillery of Wood's division was to take position on the heights east of the river and open fire on the enemy's lines on the other side, which could here be seen in reverse, and dislodge them, when Palmer was to drive them southward across the river or through the wood. Sustained by the a

the main attack was to be made by the forces on the left, followed up the advance of the centre, the right to be temporarily sacrificed for the success of the general plan. Rosecrans knew that Bra

made by a steady wheel to the right on the right of Polk's command as a pivot. Bragg's plan was to drive our right and centre back against our left on Stone's River, seize our line of communication with Nashville, thus cutting us off from our base of operations and supplies, and ultimately securing the objective of his campaign, Nashville. Bragg's pla