Heroes We Wish are Immortals

3 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident. On 26 September 1983, three weeks after the Soviet military had shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, Petrov was the duty officer at the command center fo

lies that could have resulted in a large-scale nuclear war which could have wiped out half of the population of the countries involved. An investigation later confirmed that the Soviet sa

and milit

hoto of Stan

ly near Vladivostok. His father, Yevgraf, flew fighte

ting in 1972 he joined the Soviet Air Defence Forces. In the early 1970s, he was assigned to the organizatio

a son, Dmitri, and a daughter, Yele

ci

that multiple sources confirm an attack. In any case, the incident exposed a serious flaw in the So

e system's indication a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that he was right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false a

he message passed through 30 layers of verification too quickly; and that ground radar failed to pick up corroborating evidence, even after minutes of delay. However, in a 2013 interview, Petrov said at the time he was never sure that the alarm was erroneou

e Units, who was the first to hear Petrov's report of the incident (and the first to reveal it to the public in the 1990s), states that Petrov's "correct actions" were "duly noted". Petrov himself st

ientists who were responsible for it, so that if he had been officially rewarded, they would have had to be punished. He was reassigned to a less sensitive post, t

ever made operational, as military psychologists did not want to put

ation of Votintsev's memoirs. Widespread media reports sin

the West. But Petrov's role was crucial in providing information to make that decision. According to Bruce G. Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategies expert and nuclear disarmament advocate, formerly with the Center for Defense Information, "The top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would make a decision to retaliate." In contrast, nuclear security scholar Pavel Podvi

that situation. It was the first and, as far as I know, also the last tim

ovement, September 26th is

in an image fro

had insufficiently documented his actions during the crisis. He explained it as "Because I had a phone in one

arly warning system. He later retired so he could care for his wife after she was diagnosed with cancer. A BBC re

rov toured in May 2007 the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site and, having retired from USSR milit

c pneumonia, though it was not widely rep

nd comme

in averting a catastrophe." In January 2006, Petrov traveled to the United States where he was honored in a meeting at the United Nations in New York City. There the Associati

nd documentary film, directed by Peter Anthony of Denmark. It premiered in October 2014 at the Woodstock Film Festival in Woodstock, New York, winning "

Prize in Dresden, Germany, on 17 February 2013. The award included €25,000. On 24 February 2012,

than an all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States. Yet this might have occurred by accident on September 26, 1983, were it not for the wise decisions of Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov. For this, he deserves humanity’s profound gratitude. Let us resolve to work to

person could not have started or prevented a nuclear war, stating in part, "Under no circumstances a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made or even considered in the Soviet Union or in the United S

was geared to expect an attack and to retaliate very quickly to it. It was on hair-trigger alert. It was very nervous and prone to mistakes and accidents. The false alarm that happened on Petrov's watch could not have come at a more danger

Who Saved the World, Petrov says, "All that happened didn't matter to me—it was my job. I was simply doing my job, and I was the right person

the novel La redención del camarada Petrov by Ar