With the British Army in The Holy Land

ritime Plain some miles north of the parallel of Jerusalem. It now wheeled to the right and struck into t

s down the Valley of Ajalon, with the villages of Beit-ur el-Foka (Beth-horon the Upper) and Beit-ur el-Tahta (Beth-horon the Lower), where Joshua won his memorable victory over the five kings of the Amorites. It was here that the routed hosts of the Amorites were pursued in panic, and near here that the sun and moon "stood still" at the bidding of Joshua. Further to the south, another gorge, or pass, roughly parallel to the Valley of Ajalon, leads down to the Plain, and along this pass runs the metalle

s next objective. Reports had indicated that it was the probable intention of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem, and in the known or suspected state of the demoralisation of the enemy, it was felt that considerable risks could be taken. Thus a bold and immediate dash for Bir

nd perhaps from Aleppo, would come down and attack our new line, yet it was hoped that Bireh would be reached before serious opposition was encountered. The enemy, however, changed his mind. Having, early in November, decided to withdraw from Jerusalem, he now determined to hold it till the bitter end. T

leh and Junction Station. On the 17th November, the yeomanry commenced to move from Ramleh through the hills direct on Bireh, via the valley of Ajalon an

the day was spent in clearing this defile up to Saris. "These narrow passes from the plain to the plateau of the Jud?an range have seldom been forced, and have been fatal to many invading armies." The natural facilities for defence in this pass were und

f India. The bulk of this hill fighting fell upon the 75th Division, whose Indian experience proved invaluable. It was

tions were reversed. The enemy were well provided with artillery and machine guns, both of which they had had abundant opportunity to post advantageously and use effectually; whereas we had difficulties

repulse a counter-attack. They had, therefore, to be stronger than is usually necessary in India, but had to be particularly careful not to concentrate too much upon the summit. In India, where the enemy generally fight a guerilla warfare, hanging on to rearguards and cutting off stragglers, the stiffest part of the fighting is to be expected during the subsequent withdrawal of the piquets from the heights. Here, the fighting

s with a steep angle of descent. A high velocity gun, with a flat projectory, like our 18-pounder, has two disadvantages in mountain warfare. When the gun is firing from behind a steep hill, the shell, on leaving the gun, is liable to strike the hill in front instead of clearing the crest. When the projectile reaches the distant ridge (behind which the enemy are presumably taking cover), the angle of descent is not sufficiently steep to cause damage. More sat

ter class of warfare men must be lightly equipped; in India, even the men's great-coats are carried for them on pack-mules. Here, the men were, of neces

proved to be the rapidity with which roads coul

from the plain along the more northern track (the Ajalon Valley route) by Berfilja and Beit Likia, and, on this same 20th, they captured Beit Dukka. On the same

re of misery. An isolated Turk rushed down the road, determined to sell his life dearly. But he could find nobody enthusiastic enough to fight, or even to take sufficient interest in him to accept his surrender; until at last he found a

this track, while another portion of the Division was left at Enab to cover the flank and demonstrate along the main Jerusalem road. The latter body drove hostile parties from Kushel, 2? miles east of Enab, and secured this ridge. Meanwhile, progress along the "Roman road" was slow. The track was under hostile shell-fire, and it was found impossible to bring up guns to su

lesiastical tradition connects this place with Ramah, the birth and burial place of the prophet Samuel, whose tomb is said to lie under the Crusading Church, the ruins of which still exist her

ought well. But at least two other divisions, the 52nd and the 75th, had been fighting on this hill for a day or so before the arrival of the 60th. As a matter of fact, this hill,

and bringing it down in ruins. As the night progressed, more troops were poured on to the hill. The snipers were hunted down and summarily dealt with. Machine guns were established in the ruined Mosque and other appropriate positions, and preparations made to hold the hill at all costs. Towards the morning the Turks delivered a determined counter-attack. During the 22nd, the enemy made two counter-attacks on

d support his infantry by artillery fire from guns placed in position along the main road. Our artillery, from lack of roads, could not be brought up to give adequate support to our infantry, and both attacks fail

still in the hands of the Turk. Our advanced dressing station was established in the beautiful monastery on the traditional site of

ns had been won from which our final attack could be prepared and delivered with good prospects of success. Nevertheless, it was evident that a perio

lent to the 21st Corps, and had already taken their place in the fighting on Neby Samwil. Now the 21st Corps were g

round