Armageddon-And After

e. They are indeed speculative, and, perhaps, from one point of view come under the edge of the usual condemnation of prophecy. Prophecy is, of course, if one

s this, it would be a calamity almost worse than the original war. German militarism would still be unsubdued, the Kaiser's pretensions to universal sovereignty, although clipped, would not be wiped out, and we should find remaining in all the nations of the earth a sort of sullen resentment which could not possibly lead to anything else than a purely temporary tr

ble Pac

are able to hold the Russians in the eastern sphere of war. We can suppose all these things, but what we cannot imagine even for a moment is that Great Britain-to confine ourselves only to our own case-will ever consent to stop until she has achieved her object. America may strive to make the combatants desist from hostilities, partly because she is a great pacific power herself, and partly because it is a practical object with her as a commercial nation to secure tranquil conditions. Yet, even so, there would be no answer to the question which most thoughtful minds would propound: Wh

w Eu

ave fought their way into the ranks of supreme powers. From this the deduction is easy that greatness depends on the possession of formidable military power. Indeed, all the arguments of those who are very anxious that we should not reduce our armaments is entirely based on this supposition. The strong man armed keepeth his goods in peace; his only fear is that a stronger man may come with better arms and take away his possessions. Now if the new Europe dawns not indeed for those who are past middle age-for they will have died before its realisation-but for the younger generation for whose sake we are bearing the toil and burden of the day, the one thing which is absolutely necessary is that the index of greatness must no longer be found in armies and navies. Clearly it will take a long time for men to get used to this novel conception. Inveterate prejudices will stand in the way. We shall be told over and over again that peace-lovers are no patriots; that imperialism dema

of Ar

ire to live in peace with their neighbours, but people who will desire to realise themselves in science, in philosophic thought, in art, in literature. What is an indispensable condition for an evolution of this sort? It must be the absence of all uneasiness, the growth of a serene confidence and trust, the obliteration of envy, jealousy, and every kind of unreasonableness. The cause, above all oth

of Pro

ermany restricted within modest dimensions, the three powers of the Triple Entente-Great Britain, France, and Russia-can do what they like, and as they are sworn friends and allies they can take their own steps undisturbed by fears of hostile combinations. Why should these three allies consent any further to keep up bloated armaments? It is against their own interests and against the interests of the world. So long as Germany existed as a power and developed her own ambitions, we were always on the edge of a catastrophe. With the conquest of Germany that nightmare will have gone. And

of

which belongs to the Russian nature, and of which the Tsar himself has given many signs. Of the three nations who control the Poles, the Austrians have done most for their subjects: at all events, the Poles under Austrian control are supposed to be the most happy and contented. Then come the Russian Poles. But the Poles under German government are the most miserable of all, mainly because all German administration is so mechanical, so hard, in a real sense so inhuman. But this determination of the Tsar to do some justice to the Polish subjects is not the only sign of a newer spirit we have to deal with. There was also a proclamation promising liberty to the Jews-a very necessary piece of reform-and giving, as an earnest of the good intentions of the Government, commissions to Jews in the army. Better than all other evidence is the extraordinary outbu

ly, by Sir Donald Macke

ry Aut

s. Wellington, for instance, a hundred years ago, held an extraordinarily strong position in deciding the fate of Europe. And so, too, did the Russian Tsar, whose armies had done so much to destroy the legend of Napoleonic invincibility. Similar conditions must be expected on the present occasion. And, perhaps, the real use of diplomats, if they

ion of

ision can we make to keep in check that desire to fortify itself, to entrench itself in an absolutely commanding position, which inherently belongs to the military mind? In the case of both navies and armies something depends on geographical conditions, and something on financial possibilities. The first represents, as it were, the minimum required for safety; the second the maximum burden which a state can endure without going into bankruptcy.[12] Our own country, we should say, requires fleets, so far as geographical conditions are concerned, for the protection of her shores, and, inasmuch as she is a scattered empire, we must have our warships in all the Seven Seas. France, in her tur

s War of Steel a

ion of

a matter of fact stoutly defended both by Germany and ourselves. If we look at this doctrine-the supposed right that a power possesses to capture the merchandise of private individuals who belong to an enemy country in times of war-we shall perhaps feel some surprise that a principle which is not admitted in land warfare should still prevail at sea. According to the more benevolent notions of conducting a campaign suggested, and indeed enforced by Hague Conventions and such like, an army has no right to steal the food of a country which it has invaded. It must pay for what it takes. Well-conducted armies, as a matter of fact, behave in this fashion: the necessity of paying for what they take is very strictly enforced by responsible officers. Why, therefore, at sea an opposite state of affairs should prevail is really not easy to understand. Most of the enemy's merchant ships which have been captured in the recent war belong to private individuals, or private companies. But they are taken, subject to

reburn, in his Captu

in Arm

ends have reached twenty per cent., and Armstrongs yield rarely less than ten per cent. It is necessary to speak very plainly about industries of this kind, because, however we like to phrase it, they represent the realisation of private profit through the instruments of death and slaughter. It would be bad enough if they remained purely private companies, but they really represent the most solid public organisations in the world. We know the intimate relations between Krupp and the German Government, and doubtless also between Messrs. Schneider and the French Government. This sordid manufacture of the instruments of death constitutes a vast business, with all kinds of ramifications, and the main and deadly stigma on it i

not to be an industry left in private hands. If a nation, through its accredited representatives, thinks it is necessary to arm itself, it must keep

ephen's House, Westminster), and The War Trust Exposed, by J.F. Walton Newbold (the National Leader Press, Manchester). See also The War of Steel and Gold

ial In

ents are strictly limited to the needs of self-defence, and if we further assume that in the new Europe countries are not animated by the strongest dislikes against one another, but are prepared to live and let live (a tolerably large assumption, I am aware), we can readily imagine a steady process of curtailment in the absolutely necessary armament. Further, if Great Britain gave up its doctrine of the Right of Capture at Sea (and if Great Britain surr

eforms. This, however, is not perhaps the most significant point. Financial conditions act much more subtly than this. Why has it grown so imperative on states to have large armies or large navies, or both? Because-so we have been told over and over again-diplomacy cannot speak with effect unless it is backed by power. And what are the main occasions on which diplomacy has to speak effectively? We should be i

United States are opposed to

on of Fi

so that Armenia is to belong to Russia, Syria to France, Arabia to Great Britain, and Anatolia and I know not what besides to Germany! Think of the competition for the carrying out of railways in Asia Minor and the constant friction as to which power has obtained, by fair means or foul, the greatest influence! Or let us remember the recent disputes as to the proper floating of a loan to China and the bickering about the Five-Power Group and the determination on the part of the last named that no one else should share the spoil! Or shall we transfer our attention to Mexico, where the severe struggle between the two rival Oil Companies-the Cowdray group and the American grou

ow thrown in her

ng Mone

reign loan-in itself a perfectly legitimate and harmless operation, but not harmless or legitimate if one of the conditions of the loan is that the country to which it is lent should purchase its artillery from Essen or Creusot, or its battleships from our yards. For that is precisely one of the ways in which the traffic in munitions of war goes on increasing and itself helps to bring about a conflagration. Financial enterprise is, of course, the life-blood of moder

al

e should aim at the organisation of a Public Will of Europe, a sort of Collective Conscience which should act as a corrective of national defects and as a support of international morality. Nothing could well be more speculative or vague than this, and we have already seen the kind of difficulties which surround the conception, especially the conflict between a collective European constraint and an eager and energetic patriotism. We must not, however, be deterred by the nebulous character of some of the ideals which are floating through our minds. Ideals are always nebulous, and always resisted by the narrow sort of practical men who suggest that we are metaphysical dreamers unaware o

ess of

knowledge, room for the discoveries of science, quick susceptibility in the domain of art, the organisation of literature-all these things are part and parcel of greatness, as we want to understand it in the future. It is precisely these things that militarism, as such, cares nothing for. Therefore, if we are out for war against militarism, the whole end and object of our endeavour must be by means of war to make war impossible. Hence it follows, as a matter of course, that the new Europe must take very serious and energetic steps to diminish military establishments and to limit the size of armaments. If once the new masters of Europe understand the immense importance of reducing their military equipment, they have it in their power to relieve nations of one of the greatest burdens which have ever checked the social and economic development of the world. Suggestions have already been made as to the reduction of armaments, and, although such schemes as have been set forward are, in the truest sense, speculative,

s of th

ave to learn a new set of formul?, or more likely, perhaps, they will find that ordinary people, who have seen to what a pass diplomacy has brought us, may work out for themselves some better system. Clearly the tasks of the future will depend on the co-operation of intelligent, far-sighted philanthropic reformers in the various states of the world, who will recognise that at critical periods of the world's history they must set to work with a new ardour to think out problems from the very beginning. We want fresh and intelligent minds, specially of the younger idealists, keen, ardent, and energetic souls, touched with the sacred fire, erecting the fabric of humanity on a novel basis. Democracy will have a great deal to do in the new Europe. It, to

n Great B

lay & Son

t., Stamfor

ngay,

dditional table of contents with subse