Albert Ballin

li

a man whose habit it is to fight to the bitter end. Ballin never indulged in fighting for its own sake, nor was it ever his object to see his vanquished opponent lie prostrate before him. Such a mental attitude he, in his own drastic way, would have descri

ption but not the rule. There a really weak opponent is never met with, unless one's rival happens to be exceptionally inexperienced or constitutionally unsound. The minor competitor, where shipping is concerned, is by no means always the less powerful of the two. On the contrary, the contest which inflicts small losses on him

reement which the latter considered to be detrimental to his vital interests, and he would only approve of an agreement if both parties to it felt satisfied that they had done a good stroke of business by concluding it. The numerous "community of interest" agreements to

een Austria-Hungary and Serbia, was so utterly meaningless to the progress of the world. Its actual outbreak was caused by the strained economic relations between Hungary and Serbia, or-to put it quite plainly-by t

rded as sufficient to turn the scale; if it could be adjusted a World War, he felt sure, would be avoided. The possibility of a universal conflagration had been pointed out to him by no less an authority than Prince Bismarck on the occas

e position became worse and worse. When the Government, about the year 1900, embarked upon its propaganda for the creation of a big navy, he lent it his active

th the English-told him that this reasoning was certainly unassailable from the British point of view, and that England would fight for its recognition to the bitter end. Therefore, he considered the situation could only be met by an Anglo-German understanding. The failure of arriving at s

The common platform on which these two groups met was the policy to be pursued regarding customs tariffs, which, although it formed the basis of the economic greatness of Germany, also prepared the way for

the matter of a projected Anglo-German rapprochement, an affair which reached its climax with Lord

as his banker and as his political adviser. The King visited his home almost daily during the last few years of his life to take part in a game of bridge. The motives which may have prompted Sir Ernest to lend his assistance and his great influence to an endeavour which aimed at an understanding between his adopted country and the land of his birth need not, in the case of a man so clever and so experienced, be very far to seek. Sir Ernest repeate

ich bid fair to relegate Great Britain to a subordinate position. People in England regarded the want of a system of protection similar to the German protective tariffs as the real cause of this development, a want which retarded the progress of British industrialism, and which prevented British financiers from taking an active interest in these matters. The German financiers, however, exerted all their influence on behalf of the industrial expansion of their country, thus e

whilst at the same time reducing the burden of her naval armaments which, in her case, too, had become wellnigh insupportable. The Liberal Government then in powe

ested the possibility of approaching the German Government-even if only by informal channels in the first instance. This first attempt, should it prove successful, might at any moment be followed up by direct negotiations between the two governments. In view of the traditional close connexion exis

German relations at that ti

this led to questions in the Reichstag as to whether German interests had been properly safeguarded. At the same time (in the summer of 1907) the Hague Conference came to an end without having led to an understanding regarding the limitation of armaments, which many people in England would have liked to be brought about. Towards the end of the year the German Government submitted to the Reichstag a Navy Bill by which the life of the capital ships was to be reduced from 25 to 20 years. This was tantamount to asking for t

but in spite of this denial, and in spite of the support which he received from Lord Lansdowne and from Lord Rosebery, the matter produced a violent outburst of feeling on the part of the British Press and public. During March, 1908, both houses of Parliament discussed German and British naval policy in great detail. In an article published by the National Review, Lord Esher, the chairman of the Imperial Maritime League, demanded that for every keel

ess on either side of the North Sea how greatly it would be to the mutual adva

rg and Kiel at the end of June. Another report, based on material supplied by Ballin, was composed by the chief of the Press Department of the Foreign Office, Geheimrat Hammann, for t

ribute his share towards the prevention of a dangerous development of the existing rivalry. The King felt very keenly that the rapid increase of the German naval forces constituted a menace to Britain's maritime position. He was convinced, however, that his nephew would never provoke a wanton conflict, and that, in his hear

would always preserve its superiority, not only numerically, but also technically with regard to material, construction, and armaments. Nevertheless, the advantages possessed by the German system of manning the ships and the great efficiency of German naval officers justified an apprehension lest the German superiority in the human factor might outweigh the British superiority in tonnage. The Boer war

s, Ballin replied that his friend, if he was anxious to render a really valuable service to Britain and to the cause of peace, could do no better than make it perfectl

ons, and he emphasized how much the borrowing countries were dependent on the lending ones. Still, even the creditor nations would sometimes be forced into an uncomfortable position, as was, for instance, the case with Great Britain after the United States had passed on to her the greater part of the Japanese debt

rsued by the Entente might lead one to believe. The national balance-sheet had been much more satisfactory during the reign of Queen Victoria; the items now appearing on the credit side being partly bad debts incurred by Spaniard

ul to him for his information, and that in the opinion of both gentlemen his reply to the suggestion concerning the stoppage of naval armament

he delegations, had announced the Government's intention of constructing a railway line connecting the Bosnian system with the town of Mitrovitza in the Sandjak (or province) of Novi Bazar. This announcement led to a violent outburst of the Russian Press, which described this project as a political démarche on the part of Austria in the Balkans and as an interference with the Macedonian reforms aimed at by

ained in Ballin's letter of July 13th, 1908, which, after an express

he facts. Both the Kaiser and, later, Prince Bülow have given me positive assurances that the German Government

e two sovereigns and their peoples. The Kaiser will not return home from his Northern cruise and from his visit to the Swedish Royal Court until the middle of August, but I think it is probable that the two monarchs may me

st Casse

it will after all be possible to arrange for this meeting to take place on the outward journey of the Ki

riendly manifestations on the part of the peoples of both countries. Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, went to Germany in August, 1908, to study the German system of workmen's insurance against disability and old age, and British workmen came to visit German trade unions,

ed that he, during the Boer war, had refused the humiliating suggestion put forward by France and Russia that the three Powers conjointly should compel Britain to put a stop to the war; that he had communicated this refusal to King Edward, and that he previously had presented Queen Victoria with a plan of campaign mapped out by himself, to which the one actually pursued by Brita

f it, as he was bound to do by the Constitution, to Prince Bülow, who was then staying at Norderney. Bülow, however, did not read it himself, but passed it on to the Berlin Foreign Office to be examined. There, indeed, an examination took place, but only with a view to finding out whether it contained any errors of fact, and when this was proved not to be the case, it was marked to that effect, passed the various ministries without any further examination, and was published. This unfortunate chain of accidents did not, however, alter the fact that the Kaiser ought to have been aware of the great political importance o

e estrangement between uncle and nephew, and this, in its turn, had its origin in the natural dislike which the Kaiser felt for his uncle's mode of conducting his private life while still Prince of Wales. It would have been preferable, however, to relegate such personal likes and dislikes to the background where politics or business were concerned. British official comments emphatically underlined the significance of the visit, and the German Press followed suit, although voices were not wanting to warn against any over-estimation of such acts of

rnest Cassel, did not cease their efforts in that direction. In July, 1909, Ballin paid a second visit to Sir Ern

d like very much to take up the threads of the conversation we had had a twelvemonth ago on the subject of the question of the navy-had evidently used the interval to supply himself at the

interesting discussions which we had had on the same subject a year ago. I pointed out that this excitement-spread as it was by an unscrupulous press and fostered by foolish politicians-was apt to produce results altogether different from those which the Government might perhaps consider it d

n establishing complete concord amongst Germans, British, French, Italians, Austrians, and a whole series of small nations on questions affecting their highly important shipping interests, and in replacing an unbridled and economically disastrous competition by friendly agreements to the benefit of each partner, was bound to make me sympathize with any measures that it

German side, but France could by no means be said to be an asset on which it would be safe for Britain to rely, to say nothing about the two 'dark horses,' Russia and Italy. If Britain, in view of these uncertainties, were to permit Germany to nail her down to a fixed programme, she would dwindle down to a fifth-rate Power. Germany possessed her overwhelmingly large army with which she could keep in check Austria, Italy, Russia, and France, but Britain had nothing but her navy to guarantee her existence as a world power and to safeguard the roads that linked her to her colonies. For many decades Bri

itish interests. It was useless to talk of an agreement so long as an element of mutual fear had to be reckoned with. At present this fear manifested itself in Britain in a manner which was most inopportune, so that it was bound to make the German public believe that Britain would be ready to come to an understanding even if the terms of it were detrimental to her own interests. Britain had got behindhand both with her commerce and w

ld merely content itself with the gradual replacement of the units as they became obsolete. Such a proceeding could be justified only if the same plan were adopted by Britain also. If, however, his remarks implied that in the opinion of his Government the moment had now arrived for altering the ratio of naval strength existing between both countries by a comprehensive programme of new building, it would soon become evident that the

I accepted my friend's invitation to dine with him that eve

well enough to see them. It was obvious to me that he had, meanwhile, reported on the outcome of our conversation, and that the atmosphere had changed. This change had without doubt been brought about by my remarks concerning

He thought the days of the Liberal party were numbered, and another party would soon be in office. Anti-German feeling would be non-existent to-day if the Liberal cabinet had not, because of its preoccupation with questions of social policy, neglected the navy. The whole matter was further aggravated by other questions of a political kind. France, on account of the French national character, had a

erself, but not for her great colonies. History had proved that she lost her American colonies as soon as she tried to foist her own commercial policy on the colonists. He had no doubt that Germany, despite the disagreeable surprises which she had experienced when adjusting the system of her Imperial finances, possessed sufficient wealth to go on increasing her navy in the same proportion as Britain. The great mistake committed by the Liberal cabinet and by the other advisers of the King had been their assumption that financial considerations wou

n. As the colonies enjoyed complete independence in these as in other matters, the difficulties would be insurmountable. In return for such a concession on Germany's part, Britain would doubtless be willing to meet the views of the German Government in other respects. For these reasons he would be quite ready to change the opinion he had expressed in the morning, and

s to this end when an opportunity should present itself,

that during my long experience, extending over many years, I have ever come across a man who could d

that the Secretary for the Navy was relieved of all responsibility in the matter. Ballin, in later days, summed up his views on this way of dealing with the subject by saying that if Herr v. Tirpitz had been left a free hand in the whole matter-if, for instance, he had conducted it as Imperial Chancellor-it would hardly have turned out a failure. The main object of the negotiations that Ballin had carried on was to ensure that a number of "experts and men of moderate views," i.e. naval experts in the first instance, should join in conference in order to discuss how, without injury to their relative fighting efficiency, both countries could bring about a reduction of their naval armaments.

s report, and Ballin approached the Chancellor with the request to let him know whether he should continue to work on the same lines as before, or whether the Chancellor would prefer a different method, by which he understood direct official negotiations. In a telegram to the Chancellor he explained that in his opinion Sir Ernes

n. I shall send you further details as soon as I have interviewed the gentl

made up his mind to deal with the matter along o

ated by a letter of the Chancellor to Ba

, and as a statement of your friend to the British Government to the effect that I had undertaken an official démarche, might possibly be regarded

ike Sir Ernest Cassel, whose status and whose good intentions were beyond criticism. If, on receipt of this news, Sir Ernest, who had been working so hard for an understanding, was not entirely di

unbiased, may also be inferred from another piece of news which reached B

ing with this country concerning naval matters, I am quite satisfied from the inquiries I have made that the present would be an opportune time f

a success of it. Why they failed, and why the step which Herr v. Bethmann had taken with the British Ambassado

al programme delivered on July 14th, 1910, explained

hts are constructed, the rate of construction drops in the two succeeding years to two each year, so that we are now, we may hope, at the very crest of the wave. If it were possible, even now, by arrangement to reduce the rate of construction no one would be more delighted than his Majesty's Government. We h

a repeal or a modification of the Navy Law was out of the question. If this assumption is correct, it is evident that no touch of political genius was revealed in the treatment o

911, raised to an international limitation of armaments

iness to submit any disputes to arbitration, her navy must under all circumstances be equal-or even superior-to any possible combination. Great Britain is perfectly justified in making this claim, and in conformity with the views I hold on the disarmament problem, I am the last person in the world to question her right to do so. But it is quite a different matter to use such a claim as the basis of an agreement which is to rece

quoted from Mr. Asquith, the fact had been disregarded that the most serious problem under discussion

a speech delivered before the Reichstag, had enlarged

e various Powers would conduce to an important improvement of international relations.... We, too, share Great Britain's desire to eliminate the question of naval competition, but during the informal pourparlers which have taken place from time to time, and which have been conducted in a spirit of mutual friendship, we have always given prominenc

suggestion required some careful thinking over. If he were to hold out any hope that Germany, in compliance with the terms of some such agreement would be willing to cancel or to modify her naval programme, he would be contradicted at once. Only within the limits of this programme would it be possible to come to some understanding between the two Governments. It might, for instance, be agreed to spread the expenditure voted for the navy over a longer term of years, or to arrange that the present German programme should not be increased in future. Matters such as these could form the sub

fted into a violent conflict with the Conservative party, and that the latter, in its turn, during the election campaign had accused the Cabinet of having neglected the navy, driving home its arguments by constantly pointing out the "German danger." Moreover, King Edward had died

h the situation in England which Ballin wrote in the spring and in the summer of 1910 respecti

y part of 1

ogether, and are the most ardent advocates of Tariff Reform. Every victory of a Conservative candidate is cheered by them to the echo. Under these circumstances, even in the City, the fear of war has grown. If we ask ourselves what it is that has brought about such an extraordinary change in the attitude of common

n two years, a people endowed with such business instincts as the British should feel favourably disposed towards a change of the country's commercial policy. This disposition is further strengthened by the constant

In this country everything depends on the state of business. If, in the course of the year, trade prospects brighten up again, and if everything becomes normal once more, the Tariff Reformers in the City will turn Free Traders again and will take great care not to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. I am quite convinced that everything hangs on the future development of trade and traffic. To-day, as I have said before, Tariff Reform and a Zollverein with the Colonies are the catchwords that are on everybody's lips, and the anti-German feeling is so strong that it is scarcely possible to discuss matters with one

he summer of 1910, the follo

out of place to report the impressions I received o

, and I have already described the fit of mad excitement which had ta

the visit of the Kaiser on the occasion of the Royal funeral. Everyone whom I met in London-Liberals and Conservatives alike-spoke in terms of the highest praise of the Kaiser's sympa

voidable in the spring or even before. I have met a great many persons of political experience who are of opinion that, even if a compromise is made, it will be necessary to submit such an arrangement to the decision of the electorate by an appeal to the country. It is difficult to predict the result of such new elections. The views h

kely, much will depend on the further development of trade. I must confess that I take a very pessimistic view as to the future of Great Britain in this respect. The British can really no longer compete with us, and if it were not for the large funds they have i

now been trained for centuries, will always attract business to their country, the possession of which w

e feeling remained friendly

ueen Victoria, has created a most sympathetic impression-an impression which has been strengthened by the participation of the Crown Prince and Princess in the Coronation festivities. At present the Kais

ent of which was that Great Britain, in questions affecting her vital interests, could not allow herself to be treated as though she were non-existent. In Germany this pronouncement led to violent attacks on the part of the Conservative opposition against Herr v. Bethmann and against England, and it was the latter against whom Herr v. Heydebrand directed his quotation from Schiller, to the effect that a nation which did

er the world may be gauged by reading the following letter from Ballin to the Secretary of Stat

people there are greatly disappointed to see that the German answer-the details of which are still unknown there-leaves some important questions still unsolved. Pu

tention to this statement, and you

y, are watching the progress of events with growing anxiety. In this respect, the

in England and the British armaments, as the information you derive from your official

lution of this difficult and importan

ncy's most ob

ed) B

rgence of opinion held in Germany and Great Britain, and on the chances of arr

d it to Berlin for the Kaiser's information, with a note saying that he had received it from one of the most level-headed Englishmen he had ever met. It was subsequently returned to him, with the addition of a number of marginal notes and a lengthy paragraph at its close, all written in th

y are of our own kin. To this the British object, because it absolutely knocks to pieces their theory of the Balance of Power, i.e. their desire to be able to play off one European Power against another at their own pleasure, and because it would lead to the establishment of a united Continent-a contingency which

d) Wilh

raise no objections to a possible extension of Germany's colonial activities, or, as one paper put it, "to the foundation of a German African empire str

s which will not allow him to pay a visit of the kind you suggest so long as the situation remains what it is. Should the King go to Germany, and should he take Winston with him, he-Winston-would feel highly honoured if he were permitt

ung man, and he has never made a secret of his admiration of the Kaiser and of the German people. He looks upon the estrangement exi

e of the German Navy as a grave menace to her vital interests. This conviction is

of Germany, would relieve Great Britain of this nightmare, it is my opinion

and that the Liberal Cabinet would prefer to gain its laurels by bringing about a more peaceful frame of mind. Finally, Mr. Winston Churchill had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in October, 1911, and as he was known to be by no means anti-German, his entering upon office may have given rise to the hope that, while he was administering the affairs of the Navy, it would be possible to settle certain purely technical matters affecting his department, which could then furnish the conditions preliminary to an understanding with Germany. Ballin, at any rate, had cherished the hope-as is borne out by the letter quoted above-that Mr. Churchill could be induced to pay a visit to Germany, and that an opportunity might then be found to bring the naval experts of both coun

e; all that was achieved was a preliminary st

r's thanks for the invitation to attend a meeting of delegates in Berlin and his appreciation of the whole spirit which had prompted the German suggestion, and then went on to say that the new German Navy Bill would necessitate an immediate increase in the British naval estimates, because the latter had been framed on the supposition that the German programme would remain unaltered. If the British Government were compelled to find the means for such an increase, the suggested negotiations would be difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, the German programme might perhaps be modified b

t any further comment, as these latter speak for themselves. The first

Febr. 4

Mr. Ba

Under these circumstances I think it is doubtful whether we ought to adhere to the time fixed for our appointment. I rather fancy that I cannot tell you anything definite before 12 or

reat

Bethmann

Ballin to Sir Ernest Cassel, in

han the nation and the Reichstag had expected. If after this a still further curtailment is decided upon, such a step will create the highly undesirable impression that, in order to pave the way for an understanding w

terest and that it is keenly anxious to bring about a successful issue. The reception with whic

ula proposed by your Government, viz. 'It is agreed to submit the question of the proposed increase of naval tonnage to a bona fide discussion.' T

t is intended to subject the British programme, too, to such alterations as will make it not less, but rather more, acceptable than it is now. Surely, your Government has never desired that we should give you a definite undertaking on our pa

d her action last summer had been submitted to a court of law, it would hardly be found to have violated the obligatio

so that you, for the benefit of the great cause we are engaged in, may take

f coming over to this country when the meeting takes place. I personally consider

er thinks it would be better not to send it, becaus

ituation to you than the note. Please convince the delegate that it is a matter of give and take, and p

ry, Mr. Huldermann. He is a past master of disc

l with the request to pass it on to the British Government, and at the same time I was t

e official not

of the British Government if we, in return, receive sufficient guarantees as to a friendly disposition of British policy towards our own interests. Any agreement would have to state that either Power undertakes no

and we should be glad if a British Cabinet minister could proceed to Berlin, in

evening and went straight to Sir Ernest Cassel. I prepared the following statement for Ballin a

nt across, who, if they did go, would not return without having effected the object of their visit. Sir Ernest always emphasized that he only stated his own private views, but it was evident that he spoke with the highest authority. The demand for three Dreadnoughts, he said, which the new German Navy Bill asked for, amounted to a big increase of armaments, and Great Britain would be compelled to counterbalance it by a corresponding increase, which she would not fail to do. If, however, Germany were prepared not to enlarge her existing programme, Great Britain would be pleased to effect a reduction on her part. When I referred to the apprehension of the German Government lest Great Britain should take advantage of the fact that Germany had her hands tied, in order to effect big armaments which it would be impossible for us to equal, our friend remarked that, for the reason stated above, such fears were groundless. In spite of this assurance, I repeatedly and emphatically drew his att

interpret them in various ways. I imagined that what was in his mind were the obligations which Britain had taken upon herself in her agreement with France, and I therefore asked him for a definition of the term 'neutrality.' His answer was very guarded and contained

take the side of France if war had broken out between that country and ourselves, because in this case we-as he argued with much conviction-had been the aggressors. On the other hand, if we had severed our relati

d when I visited him for the second time he assured me most emphatically that Great Britain would concede to us as much as she had conceded to the other

would overtake Great Britain. If, then, such a dangerous competitor commenced to increase his armaments in a manner which could be directed only against Britain, he must not be surprised if the latter made every effort to check him wherever his influence was felt. Great Britain, therefore, could not remain passive if Germany attempted to dominate the whole Continent; because this, if successful, would upset the Balance of P

the evening the latter sent an acknowledgment of its receipt, from which Sir Ernest read out to me the words: 'So

t leaving when I arrived at 3 o'clock. He did not want to be accompanied by a naval expert, for, although he did not pretend to understand all the technic

been worth nothing since Bismarck's time. What Ballin had attained in his dealings with t

ch this report contained was

of a third active squadron in order to adapt the increase in the number of the crews to the increase in the material. This third squadron necessitated the addition of

not attend, he had a separate interview with Haldane. The outcome of the conference is described in a statement from an authoritative source,

astle,

1912.

r Ba

Our standpoint has been explained in great detail, and the Bill has been examined. At m

e, the Agreement must be concluded, and it

n any reference to the size of the two fleets,

ent is to be pu

-in-chief, instruct Tirpitz to make the following statement to the Committee: The third squadron will be asked for and voted, but the building of

st be the limit. He was very nice and very reasonable, and he perfectly understood my position as comm

r me to Cassel

incere

d) Wilh

time Mr. Churchill made a speech which not only the German papers but also the Liberal Press in Great Britain described as wanting in discretion. The passage which German

he Chancellor to Ballin may throw some light o

er

3.1

Mr.

eared that the Bill as it stands will have such an adverse influence on public opinion that the latter will not accept a political agreement along with

don requires to be reconsidered, and it has not been dispa

erely

Bethmann

er

3.1

Mr.

y a big increase in the Naval Estimates hand in hand with the conclusion of a political and colonial agreement. However, even if an agreement should not be reached, she hopes that the confidential relations a

as they are. Great Britain has no right to interfere with our views on the number of the crews which we desire to place on board our existing units. As far as the building dates of the three battleships are concerned,

om private quarters

now that and why I was prevented

erely

Bethmann

f Europe early in March. Ballin supplied me with a letter containing a detailed account of the general situation. Owing to a delay in the propose

it appeared to him after his consultations with the various co

at he was highly pleased with the successful issue of Lord Haldane's mission, and g

of Commons which amply confirmed the views held by Sir Edward G

o make an equally amicable and ho

g which neither Count Metternich nor anybody in Berlin received any news from

o the building dates of the three battleships. As you will remember, it had been agreed not to discuss the proposed establishment of the third squadron on an active footing and the increase in the number of the crews connected with it, but to look upon these subjects as lying outside the negotiations." Quite suddenly and quite unexpectedly we are now faced with a great change in th

from 4,000 to 5,000 men at the outset. It appeared that this large increase was looked upon with misgivings, and that it was desired to enter into fresh negotiations which would greatly interfere with the arrangements made by the German competent quarters with regard to the navy. Hence Metternich

ny further. We could not, and we would not, give rise to the suspicion that great alterations had been made merely to meet British objections.

rnest Cassel, which took place at Marsei

raised new objections at his interview with Metternich, and when I explained how, after that, the matter had come to a dead stop, so that nothing further was heard of it in Germany, our friend interrupted me by saying that since then the Br

interfered with the course of events, our friend positively denied this. France, he said, was on good terms with Great Brit

of which was very angry. Churchill complained that Germany had presented such a long list of the wishes with which she wanted Great Britain to comply, that the least one could hope for was an accommodating spirit in the question of the Navy. Everything now depended on Churchill; if he could be satisfied, all the rest would be plain sailing. He and Lloyd George were the greatest friends of the agreement. Sir Ernest also made it fairly clear that Great Britain would be content with a postponement of the building dates, or in other words with a 'retardation of the building programme.' The negotiations would be bound to fail, unless Ballin could secure such a postponement. It was necessary to strike whilst the iron was hot, and this particular iron had already become rather cool. He quite a

e Navy Bill, and that the Admiralty had prepared a memorandum for the German Government dealing with these questions. The letter was dated February 25th, and its tone was not pessimistic; Churchill, howeve

se, Ballin, immediately after my return, proceeded to Paris and then to London. He reported to the C

dly welcome an agreement between Germany and Great Britain. My friends assure me that the Government also does not view the idea of such an understanding with displeasure; on the contrary, it looks upon it as an advantage. It is, however, thought unlikely that an agreement will be reached, because it is believed that popular feeling in Germany is too much opposed to it. If, notwithstanding these pacific views held by influential and competent

repancy. Ballin's impression was that the British Cabinet, and also the King, were still favourably disposed to the whole plan, and that the Cabinet was unanimous in this view. A conversation with Churchill, which lasted several hours, confirmed these impressions. In London the increase in the number of the crews had previously been estimated at half of what it would really be, and alarm was felt about the large number of torpedo boats and submarines demanded; but since the German Government

t consider it appropriate that any private person should do anything further for the time being, and as he th

Navy Bill would have to remain as it stood. This was the information Ballin recei

ad subsided, which would probably be the case within a few months, and that the interval should be utilized for clearing up the details. In Berlin, however, the discussions were looked upon as h

s done by Churchill's arrogant speech which a large section of the British press justly described as a provocation of Germany. The 'agreement' has thus been broken by Great Britain, and we have do

d) Wilh

broken off was confirmed to Ballin by a

Mr.

not come up to my expectations. He really seems to be a firebrand past praying for. The Army and Navy Bills will probably not go up to the Fe

the defect that, because of its inherent difficulties, it admits of no solution. I shall always remain sincerely gratef

indest

erely

Bethmann

e connected with the Navy; and some critics went so far as to say that Great Britain had never honestly meant to arrive at an unders

ar in 1914, he wrote a letter from there to a naval officer of high rank with whom he had been on terms of friendship for years. This do

d with success, and you yourself contend that it would have been better if such negotiations had never been started. Your standpoint is that th

aims far exceeding those we have openly avowed. My somewhat fatigued brain is unable to see whether the German contention is right or wrong. But naturally, I always look upon things from the business man's point of view, and so I always think it better to come to some kind

ore me last night. I cannot, however, refrain from contradicting by a few brief words the contention that the motives which had prompted the Haldane mission were not sincere. A conversation with Sir Edward Grey the night before last has strengthened this c

has proved whose standpoint was the correct one: t

subsequent development of even

d upon Churchill's speech as a suitable means of making people see what would be the ultimate consequences of the interminable naval armaments. I made a German translation of it which, with the aid of one of the committees for an Anglo-German understanding, I spread broadcast all over the country. However, it proved a complete failure, as there were powerful groups in both countries who contended that the efforts to reconcile the two standpoints could not lead to any positive result, and that the old injunction, si vis pacem, para bellum, indicated the only right solution. Only a master mind

, Herr v. Kiderlen, wished to resign, because he felt that he had been left too much in the dark with regard to the Anglo-German negotiations. It was also reported that the Chancellor's position had been shaken, and that Admiral Tirpitz felt dissatisfied, becau

received a letter from a personage belonging

r broad-minded scheme is being wrecked by our official circles, partly through their clumsiness, and partly through t

ation-which, as usual, was explained by the state of his health-was really due to a report of his in which he stated it as his opinion that a continuation of German armaments would lead to war with Great Britain no later than 1915. It is alleged that the Kaiser added a very "ungracious" marginal note to this report. Consequently, the ambassador, who was a man of very independent character,

to the activities displayed by Herr v. Kühlmann, the then Secretary to the Legation and subsequent Secretary of State. The public did not see a deal of his work, which was conducted with skill and was consistent. His close personal acquaintance with some of the leading British politicians, especially with Sir Edward Grey, enabled him to do much work for the maintenance of good relations and in the interest of European peace, particularly during the time when the post of ambassador was vacant, and also during the Balkan War. He had, moreover, a great deal to do with the drafting of the two colonial agreements dealing with the Bagdad Railway and the African problems respectively, both of which were ready for signature in the summer of 1914. The former especially

de for the information of his Government. In these reports he mentions an event to which the Kaiser had already referred in a letter to Ballin dated December 15th, 1912. The Kaiser, in commenting on the state of tension then existing between Austria and Serbia, made some significant remarks concerning the policy o

in a suitable ally, or the Slav element would gain the upper hand, and she would cease to be an ally altogether. If we were compelled to take up arms, we should do so to assist Austria not only against Russian aggression, but also against the Slavs in general, and in her efforts to remain German. That would mean that we should have to face a racial struggle

nce a war against Russia would automatically imply a war with France as well, it was of interest to us to know whether, in this

n given for this attitude was that Britain could not and would not tolerate at any time that we should acquire a position of continental predominance which might easily lead to the formation of a united continent. Great Britain could therefore never allow France to be crushed by us. You can imagine the ef

the visit of Lord Haldane mentioned in the Kaiser's letter, and wa

collection, had not been touched at all. He had spent a very pleasant half-hour with the Prince, and in the course of their conversation he had seen fit to repeat the formula which had bee

amphlet entitled "My London Mission

prevent it by every means within her power. At the same time, however, she could never tolerate the weakening or the crushing of France, because it would disturb the Balance of Power and r

o that of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. The latter arrangement was looked upon in Germany as a menace directed against Italy, and produced a sharp semi-official criticism in the Fr

tanding is demonstrated by the circumstance that in 1914, when the British squadron was present during the Kiel

he Kaiser, that the British Government should make an official inquiry whether his visit would be welcomed. The Government, however, was not disposed to do s

failure, and before any further efforts in the same dire