On the Improvement of the Understanding

or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the min

through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new. I perceived that if

ry objects of

lan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts, in vain. For the ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good

r object; when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled. The pursuit of honor

case of sensual pleasures by repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and, consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated

t useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. However, after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and bet

for a remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope

o so many dangers, that they have paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. Examples are no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness fo

e object which we love. When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it - no sadness be felt if it hatred, in

to be desired and sought for with all our strength. Yet it was not at random that I used the words, "If I could go to the root of the matter,"

ch as to resist all remedies. Although these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me, they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had recognized that the acquisition of we

rsued for their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure, or the advancement of science and art. B

ons should be set f

rue and

d evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view, in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. Nothing re

h a character. Thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. The chief good is that he should arrive, together with ot

that many others may understand even as I do, so that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own. In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature as wil

for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivanc

ossible way. Thus it is apparent to everyone that I wish to direct all science to one end 5 and aim, so that we may attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and, therefore, w

e explained more a

te the sciences necessary for our pur

s but one end, to which th

rules

the understanding into the right path we should carry on our life, we are compelled fir

ment of our purpose. For we can gain from the multitude no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves

asures only in so far as they are

r commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and

ing things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. In order to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have

r modes of

odes of perception or knowl

rsay or from some sign which e

e intellect, and only so called because the given event has happened to take place, and we have

, but not adequately; this comes when 6 from some effect we gather its cause, or whe

a thing is perceived solely through its essence

that I shall die, for this I can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the same period, or die by the same disease. I know by mere experience that oil

the cause of the given sensation; but we cannot thence absolutely understand 8 the nature of the sensation and the union. Or, after I have become acquainted with the nature of vision, and know that

m knowing the essence of the mind, I know that it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five, or that two

d the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters; others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that

property of proportion it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the adequat

spoken of in very general terms, such as - there exists then something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the that we only express it in a negative manner - it

For through this union we understand nothing beyond the sensation, the effe

not through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the imagination. For that which is in itself one, men imagine to be multiplex. To those things which are conceived abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are

t mode of

t may be selected, it is well that we should briefly

this way the differences, the agreements, and the oppositions of things. III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified. IV. To

us no insight into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will hereafter appear. We may, ther

very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental properties, wh

f the thing sought, and that it us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet

re, must be the one which we chiefly employ. How, then, should we avail ourselves of it so as to gain the fo

method of finding truth, there is no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. By such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material too

the simplest operations to the making of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, complicated mechanisms which they now possess. So, in like manner, the intellect, by its native strength 10, ma

nature of the method for finding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary c

experience, and shall examine the method adopt

estowed on us by external causes, as I s

ions: I shall explain thei

ts of the intell

ircle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself. Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself; in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia formal

hat the idea of Peter contains actually (formaliter). And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet another idea; and so on, indefinitely. This everyone may make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that he knows that he knows, &c. Hence it is plain that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is no

that, for the certitude of truth, no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that we know. Hence, again, it

y be removed - it follows that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true meth

comprehension of the causes of things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that we

hich shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the standard of the given true idea. Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two ideas is the same as the ratio between the actual realities corresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective knowl

n this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and all other perceptions. In this, one part of the method consists. Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural object

ased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowl

lity, the subjective essence would have no connection 15 with any other ideas - in other words, we could not draw any conclusions with regard to it. On the other hand, those things which are connected with others - as all things that exist in nature - will be understood by the mind, and their subjective

lity, - it is evident that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas

ave just advanced, but also that we have hitherto pro

er presentation." Objectivus generally corresponds to the modern

his belongs to an investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply explained, and

tal search is explai

er things is to be produced

to obj

by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it is not self-evident. We may, therefore, be questioned as to the validity of our reasoning. If our reasoning be sound, we must take as a starting-point

ge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously towards him. But as this never, or rarely, happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acqu

nt misconceptions, whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy. Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate discernment. Lastly, it is h

dent, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of r

or due to misconceptions - that is, to some external influence. Such persons are not conscious of themselves. If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say that they are ignorant

y to suppose that they exist, and seek their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an oath. If they deny, grant, or gai

d use every true idea as a standard in pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. Now, in order that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the

here no doubt of the truth of