On the Improvement of the Understanding

quisition of clear

at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions. In order that all ideas may be reduced t

the thing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be not self-existent, but requires a cause for its ex

tanding with that which is in the thing itself. The best basis for drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and legitimate definition. For the understanding c

to us through pure intellect, so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine: the distinction

understand anything of nature without at the same ti

efinitions Condit

in proportion as the thing given be better defined. Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this second part of method consists in th

of little moment. Such is a circle. If a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every one can see that such a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties. Though, as I have said, this is of no importance in the case of figures

fault, the following rules sho

e. For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, be defined as follows: the figure described by an

rly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal. That this is a necessary characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time in proving it, or in showing that, owing to

nition of an uncreated

- that is, the thing must not need e

been given, there must be no room for dou

ntives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other word

ary, it should be possible to deduce from the de

ious to anyone giving stri

e essence. The more specialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore clear.

cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the utmost possible extent reflect nature. For it will possess, subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union. Thus we can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from physical things - that is, from real entities, proceeding, as f

le for human infirmity to follow up the series of particular mutable things, both on account their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding o

their relations, or, at most, their circumstances, all of which are very different from their inmost essence. This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in those things as in th

tood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought from their series of existence, nor from eternal things. For the latter are all by nature simultaneous. Other aids are therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal thing

es and arrangements which may suffice to determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain an insight into its inmost nature, as

in due order all the legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will readily pro

direct our thoughts can be nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and powers. When this has been acquired we shall possess

e understanding. The chief part of our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (

fine unde

itself, or that we can understand nothing. Nevertheless this definition is not absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously, understand

ch I have chiefly remarked, and which I

rds, it knows that a thing exists in r

ers. Thus it forms the idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other though

med by the motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a point. All these are perceptions which do not serve towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining it. This is proved by the fact that w

rms positive ideas befor

and in an infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number or

cessity of our nature, that they appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; wi

to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it conceives an infini

t are they themselves; for we do not admire the architect who has plan

&c. They are nothing to our present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the u

s of knowledge. Therefore, false and fictitious ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought; this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated; in other words,

the treatise

nd