Christianity and Greek Philosophy

WN GOD (c

ABLE BY REASO

faith in the unity of truth. If there is found any conflict in the results of a right reason, no appeal to practical

dealistic and Materialistic schools; it devolves upon us now to review (iii.) the position of th

is "the knowledge of effects as dependent on their caus

) "Lectures on Metaph

return) Ibid.,

what particular effects, it is rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the mere knowledge of the fact of the phenomenon; on the contrary, we are determined, we are necessitated to regard each phenomenon as only partially known until we discover the causes on which it depends for its existence. 280 Philosophic knowledge is thus, in its widest acceptation, the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes. Now what does this imply? In the first place

(return) Ibid.

) "Lectures on Metaph

(return) Ibid.

is called their subject, or substance, or substratum. 284 The subject of one grand series of phenomena (as, e.g., extension, solidity, figure, etc.) is called matter, or material substance. The subject of the other grand series of phenomena (as, e.g., thought, feeling, volition, etc.) is termed mind, or mental substance. We may, therefore, lay it down as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of the

return) Ibid.,

return) Ibid.,

return) Ibid.,

turn) Ibid., vol.

ind in every act of consciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his "Philosophy of Perception." 287 In the course of the discussion he starts the question, "Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally immediate?" His answer to this question may be condensed in the following sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge of mind there is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. The problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the qualities of matter. Now, says Hamilton, "if we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is categorical and clear. In the simplest act of pe

Philosophy of Sir Wil

: (return) I

(return) Ibid.

291 Whilst teaching that the proper sphere and aim of philosophy is to trace secondary causes up to ultimate or first causes, and that it necessarily tends towards one First and Ultimate Cause, he at the same time asserts that "first causes do not lie within the reach of philosophy," 292 and that it can never attain to the knowledge of the First Cause. 293 "The Infinite God can not, by us, be comprehended, conceived, or thought." 294 God, as First Cause, as infinite, as

) "Lectures on Metaph

return) Ibid.,

(return) Ibid.

(return) Ibid.

return) Ibid.,

, however, indications in his writings that he regarded "the Philosophy of the Conditioned" as his grand achievement. The Law of the Conditioned had "not b

n which this philo

fact, determined by these faculties themselves. All knowledge, therefore, is relative--that is, it is of phenomena only, and of phenomena "under modifications determine

le can not out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is supported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation within and through which the possibility of thought i

"The Infinite and the Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecilities of the human mind" 296--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolute limitation, or an infinite

, again, "The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditione

(return) "Disc

: (return) I

Lectures on Metaphysics,

return) Ibid.,

f "the Philosophy of the Conditio

ce of the doctrine "that all human knowle

er, each can be comprehended only in and through its correlative. The term 'subject' is used to denote the unknown (?) basis which lies under the various phenomena or properties of which we become aware, whether in our external or internal experience." 299 "The term 'relative' is opposed to the term 'absolute;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing absolutely, that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties." 300 Now, in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, "the absolute" is defined as "that which is aloof from relation"--"that which is out of all relation." 301

) "Lectures on Metaph

return) Ibid.,

(return) "Disc

f thought, feeling, etc.; but no one would repudiate the idea that the conscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or "series of phenomena," with more indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictory assertion, "that the subject is unknown," he still teaches, with equal positiveness, "that in every act of perception I am conscious of self, as a perceiving subject." And still more explicitly he says: "As clearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, at every moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself a mere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications [phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications, and a self-subsisting entity." 303 Again: "Thought is possible

ophy of Sir William Hamilton

) "Lectures on Metaph

return) Ibid.,

relativity of human knowledge, and yet at the same time reject the doc

e is meant "that we can only know things by and through the phenomena they present," we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apart from their properties, than we can know qualities apart from the substances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in and through their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has no longer any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc., from matter, and what have you left? "The thing in itself," apart from its qualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge is meant "that all consciousness, all thought are relative," w

nomenon the noumenon, but makes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown and unknowable. The "phenomenon" of Kant was, however, something essentially different from the "quality" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant, phenomenon means an object as we envisage or represent it to ourselves, in opposition to the noumenon, or a thing as it is in itself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elements supplied by the mind

turn) Martineau's

M'Cosh's "Defense of Fu

el's "Lectures on the Philo

doctrine he illustrates by the following supposition: "Suppose the total object of consciousness in perception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some

milton's "Lectures on Met

"Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii

w that there is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear? What is this "thing in itself" about which Hamilton has so much to say, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readily understand what is meant by the thing; it is the object as existing--a substance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what is meant by in itself? There can be no in itself besides or

s themselves; "they develop themselves with rigid necessity out of the simple datum of substance occupying space." 311 "The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies"--"they are the attributes of body as body," and as such "are known immediately in themselves," 312 as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So that we not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things as they exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in an à priori manner. "The bare notion of matter being given, the Primary Qualities may be deduced à priori; they being, in fact, only evolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies." If, then, we know the qualities of things as "in the things themselves," "the things themselves" must

"Lectures on Metaphys

n) Philosophy of Sir

(return) Ibid.

s "Examination of Hamilton's

sland in the emptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not be represented: the same experience which gives us the definite object gives us also the infinite space; and both terms--the limited appearance and the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal certitude and clearness, and furnished with names equ

t. As a definite body reveals also the space around, and an interrupted succession exhibits the uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand for itself a power bene

e than scientific ideas of phenomenal disposition and succession." 316 In these instances of relation between a phenomenon given in perception and an entity as a logical conditi

return) "Essays

: (return) I

: (return) I

existent." 317 It may mean the absence of all necessary relation, but it does not mean the absence of all relation. If God can not voluntarily call a finite existence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He is certainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limit which substitutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know God out of all relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his created universe, is not felt by us

f the conditioned, viz., that "conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the p

lly limiting each other" 318 Thought necessarily supposes conditions; "to think is simply to condition," that is, to predicate limits; and as the infinite is the unlimited, it

alderwood's "Philosophy

(return) "Disc

infinite thought, we can have no clear and definite thought of or concerning the Infinite. We have a precise and definite idea of infinitude; we can define the idea; we can set it apart without danger of being confounded with another, and we can reason concerning it. There is nothing we more certainly and intuitively know than that space is infinite, and yet we can not comprehend or grasp within the compass of our thought the infinite space. We can not form an image of infinite space, can not traverse it in perception, or represent it by any combination of

ectures on History of Phi

ed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in our finite perception and experience. But to have the thought of it as an idea of the reason, not of the phantasy, an

n not be thought." We grant at once that all human thought is limited and finite, but, at the same time, we emphatically deny that the limitation of our thought imposes any conditions or limits upon the object of thought. No such affirma

er does our thought impose any conditions upon the man, so that he must be as our thought conceives or represents him; but our thought is of the man, concerning or about the man, and is only so far true and valid as it conforms to the objective reality. And so we

derwood's "Philosophy of t

ing." 323 The Infinite, as thus defined, must include in itself all being, and all modes of being, actual and possible, not even excepting evil. And this, let it be observed, Dr. Mansel has the hardihood to affirm. "If the Absolute and the Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception requir

on's "Lectures on Metaphysics

n) "Limits of Religi

324: (ret

he infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy nor theology can afford to disregard the difference. Quantitative Infinity is illimitation by quantity. Qualitative Infinity is illimitation by degree. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categories of the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind of infinitude to the latter can not be overstated. God alone possesses Qualitative Infinity, which is strictly synonymous with absolute perfection; and the neglect of the distinction between this and Quantitative Infinity, leads irresistibly to pantheistic and materialistic notions. Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of 'infinite extension' to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. Samuel Clarke's identification of Go

greatest absurdity, for in that case nothing can be known. This Infinite must be at least partially known, or all human knowledge is reduced to zero. To the all-inclusive Infinite every thing affir

eing, and its determinate and distinguishing characteristics. The limit of a being is its imperfection; the determination of a being is its perfection. The less a thing is determined, the more it sinks in the scale of being; the most determinate being is the most perfect being. "In this sense God is the only being absolutely det

Conditioned and the Unconditioned," pp. 422, 423. See also Young's "Provinc

Saisset, "Modern Pant

limitation of their infinity." If all distinction is determination, and if all determination is negation, that is (as here used), limitation, then the infinite, as distinguished from the finite, loses its own infinity, and either becomes identical with the finite, or else vanishes into pure nothing. If Hamilton will persist in affirming that

e Ultimate Reality is absolutely unknown; it can not be apprehended by the human intellect, and it can not present itself to the intellect at all. This Ultimate Reality can not be intelligent, because to think is to condition, and the Absolute is the unconditioned; can not be conscious, because all consciousness is of plurality and difference, and the

." 330 He knows also that it can not be intelligent, self-conscious, and a personality. 331 This is a great deal to affirm and deny of an existence "absolutely unknown." May we not be permitted to affirm of this hidden and unknown something

urn) "First Princi

eturn) "First Pr

: (return) I

: (return) I

(return) Ibid.

: (return) I

oned, viz., that the terms infinite and absolute are names for a "mere negation of thought"--a "mental i

an object as devoid of this or that particular attribute, but as devoid of all attributes, and thus of all existence; that is, it is "the negation of all thought"--nothing. "When we think a thing, that is done by conceiving it as possessed of certain modes of being or qualities, and the sum of these qualities constitutes its concept or notion." "When we perform an act of negat

rn) "Discussions,"

(return) "Logi

ty, and infinity. Thought can only be realized by thinking something existing, and existing in a determinate manner; and when we cease to think something having predicates, we cease to think at all. This is emphatically asserted by Hamilton himself. 335 "Negative thinking" is, therefore, a meaningless phrase, a contradiction in terms; it is no thought at all. We are cautioned, however, against regarding "the negation of thought" as "a negation of all mental ability." It is, we are told, "an attempt to think, and a failure in the attempt." An attempt to think about what? Surely it must be about some object, and an object which is k

: (return) "

n) "Philosophy of th

nking away of every characteristic" which can be conceived, and thus "ceasing to think at all." We can only form a "negative concept," which, we are told, "is in fact no concept at all." We can form only

he relative. To say we can not know the Absolute is, by implication, to affirm there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as nothing, but as something. And so with every step in the reas

argument that our consciousness of it is negative? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no meaning, is simply an elaborate sui

. He who says we have no such notion asks the question how we have it? Here it may be asked, how have we, then, the word infinite? How ha

h each other;" that is, such relatives as finite and infinite are known necessarily in the same act of thought. The knowledge of one is as necessary as the knowledge of the other. We can not have a consciousness of the one without the correlative consciousness of the other. "For," says Hamilton, "a relation is, in truth, a thought, one and indivisible; and while the thinking a relation necessarily involves the thought of its two terms,, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either." If, then, we are conscious of the two terms of the relation in the same "one and indivisible" mental act--if we can not have "the consciousness of the one without the consciousness of the other"--if space and position, time and succession, substance and quality, i

: (return) L

turn) Martineau's

a relation necessarily implies that of the other, it being the very nature of a relative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its correlative." We comprehend nothing more completely than the infinite; "for the idea of illimitation is as clear, precise, and intelligible as the idea of limitability, which is its basis. The proposi

ond knowledge." 343 We heartily assent to the doctrine that the Infinite Being is the object of faith, but we earnestly deny that the Infinite Being is not an object of knowledge. May not knowledge be grounded upon faith, and does not faith imply k

eturn) Hamilton'

eview, October, 1864, article "Conditio

Letter to Calderwood, A

"Lectures on Metaphys

eing rests entirely upon faith, then upon what ultimate ground does faith itself rest? On the authority of Scripture, of the Church, or of reason? The only explicit statement of his view which has fallen in our way is a note in his edition of Reid. 344 "We know what rests upon reason; we believe what rests upon authority. But reason itself must rest at last upon authority;

760; also Philosophy of Si

tions," "beliefs," "judgments." He declares most explicitly "that the principles of our knowledge must themselves be knowledges;" 345 and these first principles, which are "the primary condition of reason," are elsewhere called "à priori cognitions;" also "native, pure, or transcendental knowledge," in contradistinction to "à posteriori cognitions," or that knowledge which is obtained in the exercise of reason. 346 All this confusion results from an attempt to put asunder what God has joined together. As Clemens of Alexandria has said, "Neither is faith without k

: (return) I

) "Lectures on Metaph

uitions," pp. 197, 198; Calderwood,

ivine Revelation, because beliefs are called "instinctive," "native," "innate," "common," "catholic," 348 all which terms seem to indicate that this "authority" lies within the sphere of the human mind; at any rate, this faith does not rest on the authority of Scripture. Neither is it the authority

Philosophy of Sir Wm.

te commencement or an infinite non-commencement. We can conceive of degree, but we can not conceive it as absolutely limited or as infinitely unlimited. We can conceive of existence, but not as an absolute part or an infinite whole. Therefore, "the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable or cogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable or incogitable. The conditioned, or the thinkable, lies between two extremes or poles; and each of

ed from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and the finite, inspired with a be

ii. pp. 368, 374. With Hamilton, the Unconditioned is a

rn) "Discussions on

milton hesitate to apply the doctrine of the unconditioned to

e which compels me to believe in the Infinite must supply me some object upon which my belief can take hold. We can not believe in contradictions. Our faith must be a rational belief--a faith in the ultimate harmony and unity of all truth, in the veracity and integrity of human reason as the organ of truth; and, a

) Philosophy of Sir W

ost in the same breath we are told that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation of thought. On the one hand, we are told they differ; on the other, we are told they do not differ. Now which does Hamilton mean? If he insist upon the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivable difference, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insist upon the inconceivability, he must abandon the definition as sheer verbiage, devoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from this dilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict; for contradiction is the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denials can

orth American Review, Oc

ly before the mind in this connection, we state that the principle of Contradiction is this: "A thing can not at the same time be and not be; A is, A is not, are propositions which can not both be true at once." The principle of Excluded Middle is this: "A thing either is or is not--A either is or is not B; there is no medium." 354 Now, to mention the law of Excluded Middle and two contradictories with a mean between them, in the same sentence, is really astounding. "If the two contradictory extremes are equally incogitable, yet inc

ton's "Logic," pp. 58, 59; "

orth British Review, Oct

racterized as universality, eternity, infinity. I can form an image of an extended and figured object, but I can not form an image of space, time, or God; neither, indeed, can I form an image of Goodness, Justice, or Truth. But I can have a clear and precise idea of space, and time, and God, as I can of Justice, Goodness, and Truth. There are many things which I can most surely know that I can not po

vindicate for it the honor of supplying to us all our knowledge of God, they assail every fundamental principle of reason, often by the very weapons whic

whose writings are extensively quoted in Watson's "Institu

with the idea of God, makes it, at first sight, difficult to conceive that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequate to it; yet if ever the human mind commenced such an inquiry at all, it is highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an eternal succession of causes and effects, rather than acquire the ideas of creation,

tention to the unfortunate and, indeed, absurd phrase, "an eternal succession of causes and effects." An "eternal succession" is a contradictio in adjecto, and as such inconceivable and unthinkable. No human mind can "rest" in any such thing, because an eternal succession is no rest a

atson's "Institutes of T

return) Id., ib

turn) See ante, p

nothing of "subordinate causes" except as modes of the Divine Efficiency. 360 The principle of causality compels us to think causation behind nature, and under causation to think of Volition. "Other forces we have no sort of ground for believing; or, except by artifices of abstraction, even power of conceiving. The dynamic idea is either this or nothing; and the logical alternative assuredly is that nature is either a mere

y of all Forces clearly proves that they are not many, but one--"a dynamic

rn) Martineau's "Es

2: (return)

eptacle" (?ποδοχ?), "the nurse" (τιθ?νη) of all that is produced, and was apparently identified, in his mind, with pure space--a logical rather than a physical entity--the mere negative condition and medium of Divine manifestation. He never regards it as a "cause," or ascribes to it any efficiency. We grant that he places this very indefinite something (?ποιο

e the argument for the existence of God. The proof of the Divine Existence, as Chalmers has shown, does not rest on the existence of matter, but on the orderly a

s, by what means could they have demonstrated to themselves that he is eternal, self-existent, immortal, and independent?" 365 "Between things visible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beings infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, the connection is n

return) Plato,

tural Theology," bk. i. ch. v.; also

Watson's "Institutes of

eturn) Id., ib.,

the creation, are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made." We may also point to the fact that in every age and in every land the human mind has spontaneously and instinctively recognized the existence of an invisible Power and Presence pervading nature and controlling the destinies of man, and that religious worship--prayer, and praise, and sacrifice--offered to

e given in one and the same indivisible act of thought. "The conception of one term of a relation necessarily implies that of the other; it being the very nature of a correlative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its correlative; for a relation is, in truth, a thought one and indivisible; and whilst the thinking of one relation necessarily involves the thought of its two terms, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either." 367 Finite, dependent, contingent, temporal existen

Hamilton's "Metaphysics

in itself. That which is first in the order of existence, and in the logical order of thought, can have nothing prior to itself. If the supposed First Cause is not necessarily self-existent and independent, it is not the first; if it has a dependent existence, there must be a prior being on which it depends. If the First Cause is not eternal, then prior to this Ultimate Cause there was nothingness and vacu

h they can not produce. If all the exertions of power in the universe can be accounted for without resort to something back of, and superior to, nature, what is there which can force the mind to such a resort?" (p. 463). "Having granted that power, or self-activity, is a natural attribute of all matter, what right have we to deny it intelligence?" (p. 465). "Self-moving matter must have thought and design" (p. 469). It is not our intention to offer an extended criticism of the above positions in this note. We shall discuss "the Dynamical theory" more fully in

ous power either of rest or motion, but is equally susceptible to each as it may be acted on by external causes" (Silliman's "Principles of Physics," p. 13). The above proposition is "a truth on which the whole science of mechanical philosophy ultimately depends" (Encyclop?dia Britannica, art. "Dynamics," vol. viii. p. 326). "A material substance existing alone in the universe could not produce any effects. There is not, so far as we know, a self-acting material substance in the universe" (M'Cosh, "Divine Government, Physical and Moral," p. 78). "Perhaps the only true indication of matter is inertia." "The cause of gravitation is not resident in the particles of matter merely," but also "in all space" (Dr. Faraday on "Conservation of Force," in "Correlation and Conservation of Force." (p. 368). He also quotes with approbation the words of Newton, "That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, is so great an absurdity, that I beli

ections of matter, into self-activity, intelligence, thought, and design. Weight or density are merely relative terms. Supposing one particle or

erings of this great truth, the existence of a First Cause, might, by induction, have been discovered, by what means could

) "Institutes of Theo

rst principle of reason that all differentiation and plurality supposes an incomposite unity, all diversity implies an indivisible identity. The sensuous perception of a plurality of parts supposes the rational idea of an absolute unity, which has no parts, as its necessary correlative. For example, extension is a congeries of indefinitesimal parts; the continuity of matter, as empirically known by us, is never absolute. Space is absolutely continuous, incapable of d

cts to general laws, from general laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in its ascent till it comprehends all laws in a single formula, and consummates all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional existence." "The history of philosophy is only the history of this tendency, and philosophers have borne ample testi

Hamilton's "Metaphysi

cal convertibility, and indestructibility of all Forces in nature, leads us upward towards the recognition of one Omnipresent and Omnipotent Will, which, like a mighty tide, sweeps through the universe and effects all its changes. The universal prevalence of the same physical laws and numerical relations throughout all

Christian Advocate, in which the à posteriori proof of "the Unity of God" is forcibly exhibited, and

rong, or any native and original feeling of obligation, Mr. Watson i

of the populace." 373 "Their conclusions have no authority, and place them under no obligation." 374 And, indeed, man without a revelation "is without moral control, without princip

) "Institutes of Theo

(return) Ibid.

return) Ibid.,

return) Ibid.,

to be regarded as the chief corner-stone of moral science. "The Gentiles (?θνη, heathen), which have not the written law, do by the guidance of nature (reason or conscience) the works enjoined by the revealed law; these, having no written law, are a law unto themselves; who show plainly the works of the law written on their hearts, their conscience bearing witness, and also their reasonings one with another, when they accuse, or else excuse, each other." 376 To deny this is to relegate the heathen from all responsibility. For Mr. Watson admits "tha

eturn) Romans, c

ct, suggests, as with the speed of the lightning-flash, the notion of a Judge who will finally call us to account. This "accusing or excusing of each other," this recognition of goo

of the fall, "the understanding and reason are weakened by the deterioration of his whole intellectual nature." 377 "Without some degree

) "Institutes of Theo

return) Ibid.,

n the Creator." "And as they did not approve of holding God with acknowledgment, God delivered them over to an unapproving mind, to work those things which are not suitable." After drawing a fearful picture of the darkness and depravity of the heathen, the Apostle adds, "Who, though they KNOW the law of God, that they who practise such things are worthy of death, not only do them, but even are well pleased with those who practise them." 379 The obvious and direct teaching of this passage is that the heathen, in the midst of their depravity and idolatry, are not utterly ignorant of God; "they know God"--"they know the law of God "--"they worship Him," though they worship the creature more than H

eturn) Romans, c

ttain some valid knowledge of his character and will. Every attempt to solve the great problem of existence, to offer an explanation of the phenomenal world, or to explore the fundamental idea of reason, when fairly and fully conducted, has resulted in the recognition