Christianity and Greek Philosophy

ERS OF ATHENS

IC SCHOOL

AT

is, of course, does not mean that now it had mind alone for its object; on the contrary, it tended, as indeed philosophy must always tend, to the conception of a rational ideal or intellectual system of the universe. It started from the phenomena of m

's "Lectures on the History o

e chosen resort of distinct philosophic sects, the locality of separate schools; but Athens itself, the whole city, was the scene of the studies, the conversations, and the labors of Socrates. He wandered through the streets

st searching and perplexing questions to every bystander, and making every man conscious of his ignorance. He delivered no lectures; he simply talked. He wrote no books; he only argued: and what is usually styled his school must b

roitness of reply; and they were compelled to confess the wisdom and justness of his opinions, and to admire the purity and goodness of his life. The magic power which he wielded, even over men of dissolute character, is strikingly depicted by Alcibiades in his speech at "the Banquet." 488 Of these listeners, however, we can not now speak. Our business is with those only who imbibed his philosophic spirit, and became the future teachers of philosophy. And even

(return) "Banq

rates. He came to Socrates when he was but twenty years

flew away, uttering a sweet sound. The next day a young man came to him who was said to reckon Solon among his near ancestors, and who looked,

es Laertius, "Lives of the Ph

ilosophy of Plato is everywhere discernible. Plato had been taught by Socrates, that beyond the world of sense there is a world of eternal truth, seen by the eye of reason alone. He had also learned from him that the eye of reason is purified and strengthened by reflection, and that to reflect is to observe, and analyze, and define, and classify the facts of consciousness. Self-reflection, then, he had been t

as unreal, that truth was a delusion, and certainty a dream. The world of sense might be fleeting and delusive, but the voice of reason and conscience would not mislead the upright man. The opinions of individual men might vary, but the universal consciousness of the race could not prevaricate. However conflicting the opinions of men concerning beautiful things, right actions, and good sentiments, Plato was persuaded there are ideas of Order, and Right, and Good, which are universal, unchangeable, and eternal. Untruth, injustice, and wrong may endure for a day o

rn) "Republic," bk.

cal analysis, but also historical analysis as a counterproof. 491 And this erudition Plato supplied. He studied carefully the doctrines of the Ionian, Italian, and Eleatic schools. Cratylus gave him special instruction in the theories of Heraclitus. 492 He secured an intimate acquaintance with the lofty speculations of Pythagoras, under Archytas of Tarentum, and in the writings of Philolaus, whose books he is said to have purchased. He studied the principles of Parmenides under Hermogenes, 493 and he more than once speaks of Parmenides in terms of admiration, as one whom he had early learned to reverence. 494 He studied mathematics under Theodoras, the most

's "Lectures on the History o

) Aristotle's "Metaph

Laertius, "Lives of the Philosop

rn) See especially

er's "History of Ancient Ph

er's "Lectures on Ancient P

) Encyclop?dia Britan

tention previous to the time of Socrates and Plato. As the results of this protracted controversy, the o

receptive quality of the organs of sense and which asserted, as its

t essence or being to be found. Hence Protagoras inferred that truth must vary with the ever-varying sensations of the individual. "Man (the individual) is the measure of all things." Knowledge is a purely relative thing, and every man's opinion is truth for him. 500 The law of right, as exemplified in the dominion of a party,

(return) "Th

(return) Ibi

(return) Ibi

1: (return)

eturn) "Republic

images, or mere illusions of the mind) of the whole of sensible phenomena, and

o Parmenides and Zeno, a blank negation, the non ens. The identity of

ame thing as the

thing in which

thought; for there is

he exist

des, quoted in Lewes's "Biog.

nied to man any valid know

censure except in reference to this. Hence it is that the cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for eminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the stronger.... We surround our children from their infancy with preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense tramples on such impositions, and shows what Nature's justice is.... I confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study--in moderation, and for boys. But protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Your philosopher is a complete

tetus," § 108); and the other affirming that "Science is right opinion with logical explication or definition" (μετ? λ?χου), ("The?tetus," § 139). A close examination will, however, convince us that these are but modifications of the sensational theory. The latter forcibly remind us of the system of Locke,

turn) "Republic,"

there nothing that is immutable and permanent? Have we no ultimate standard of Right? Is there no criterion of Truth? Plato believed most confidently there was such a criterion and standard. He had learned from Socrates, his master, to cherish an unwavering faith in the existence of an Eternal Truth, a

(return) "Th

ought in the apperceptions of the reason, and not in opinions founded on sensation. In other words, he must look within. Here, by reflection, he could recognize, dimly and imperfectly at first, but increasing gradually in clearness and distinctness, two classes of cognitions, having essentially distinct and opposite characteristics. He found one class that was complex (σνγκεγυμ?νον), changeable (θ?τερον), contingent and relative (τ? προ? τι σχ?σιν ?χοντα); the other, simple (κεχωρι

ich have this marvellous and undeniable character, that they are encountered in the most common experiences, and, at the same time, instead of being circumscribed within the limits of experience, transcend and govern it--principles which are universal in t

sin's "The True, the Beaut

the modern student, we shall avail ourselves of the lights which modern psychology, faithful to the method of Plato, has thrown upon the subject. Whilst, however, we admit that modern psychology has succeeded in giving more definiteness and precision to the "doctrine of Ideas," we

on of a "regulating Intelligence"--a Supreme Mind. 509 Now that, anterior to the creation of the universe, there must have existed in the Eternal Mind certain fundamental principles of Order, Right, and Good, will not be denied. Every conceivable form, every possible relation, every principle of right, must have been eternally present to the Divine thought. As pure intelligence, the Deity must have always been self

(return) "Ti

: (return) "

t, and is not to be allowed for the Supremely Good to do any thing except what is most excellent (κ?λλιστον)--most fair, most beautiful." 510 Therefore, argues Plato, "inasmuch as the world is the most beautiful of things, and its artificer the best of causes, it is evident that the Creat

(return) "Ti

: (return) I

(return) "Tim?

se, of unity and identity, of the infinite and perfect, must be mirrored there. As it is the "offspring of God," 514 it must bear some traces and lineaments of its Divine parentage. That soul must be configured and correlated to those principles of Order, Right, and Good which dwell in the Eternal Mind. And because it has within itself the same ideas and laws, according to which the great Architect built the universe, therefore it is capable of knowing, an

(return) "Laws

: (return) I

turn) "Republic,"

r actual embodiment in the laws, and typical forms of the material world, they are ε?κ?νε?--images of the eternal perfections of God. The world of sense pictures the world of reason by a participation (μ?θεξι?) of the ideas. And viewed as interwoven in the very texture and framework of the soul, they are ?μοι?ματα--copies of the Divine Ideas which are the primordial laws of knowing, thinking, and reasoning. Ideas are thus the nexus of relation between God and the visible universe, and between the human and the Divine reason. 516 There is something divine in the world, and in the

e world, perceptible by sense, a pattern; but as considered with reference to itself, an existence."--Alcinous, "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato," p. 261. "What general notions are to our minds, he (Plato) held, ideas are to the Su

turn) "Republic,"

on, and not real knowledge." 518 And those only are "philosophers" who have a knowledge of the really-existing, in opposition to the mere seeming; of the always-existing, in opposition to the transitory; and of that which exists permanently, in opposition to that which waxes and wanes--is developed and destroyed alternately. "Those who recognize many beautiful things, but who can not see the Beautiful itself, and can not even follow those who would lead them to it, they opine, but do not know. And the same may be

is right opinion with logical definition." These, in the estimation of the Platonic Socrates, are all unsatisfactory and inadequate. But after you have toiled to the end of this remarkable discussion, in which Socrates demolishes all the then received

eturn) "Republic

return) Ibid.,

(return) "Th

n its digressions, to propound a system of Metaphysics more complete and solid than had yet appeared. The discussion as to the powers or faculties by which we obtain knowledge, the met

w of this "sublimest of sciences," we

which we obtain knowledge, and what are t

processes and laws according to which, t

by this method? what are the objective an

LOGY; the answer to the second will exhibit the PLATONIC DIALE

ONIC PS

cially, if it be asserted that there is a science of absolute Reality, of ultimate and essential Being, then the most important and vital question is, By what power do we cognize real Being? through what faculty do we obtain the knowledge of that which absolutely is? If by sensation we only obtain the knowledge of the fleeting and t

: the eye has a power of seeing; the ear has a power of hearing. But these powers (of which I now speak) have no color or figure to which I can so refer that I can distinguish one power from another. In order to make such distinction, I must look at the power itself, and see what it is, and

turn) "Republic,"

return) Ibid.,

from each other, but as confused. 524 Prior to the discipline of reflection, men are curious about mere sights and sounds, love beautiful voices, beautiful colors, beautiful forms, but their intelligence can not see, can not embrace, the essential nature of the Bea

ss, that is, when we analyze our notions, we find them composed of diverse and opposite elements, some of which are variable, contingent, individual, and relative, others are permanent, unchangeable, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now these elements, so diverse, so opposite, can not have been

return) Ibid.,

eturn) Ibid., bk

(return) Ibid.

eturn) Ibid., bk

eturn) "Republic

Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi

ct of rational intuition or science. "It is plain," therefore, argues Plato, "that opinion is a different thing from science. They must, therefore, have a different faculty in reference to a different object--science as regards that which is, so as to know the nature of real being--opinion as regards that which can not be said absolutely to be, or not to be. That which is known and that which is opined can not poss

turn) Ibid., bk.

ld. Now take a line divided into two equal segments to represent these two regions, and again divide each segment in the same ratio--both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species. The parts of each segment are to represent differences of clearness and indisti

fference of knowledge and opinion; and the opinionab

he simile of the cave ("Republ

eye, then light meets like, and make a homogeneous body; the external light meeting the internal light, in the direction in which the eye looks. And by this homogeneity like feels like; and if this beam touches any object, or any object touches it, it transmits the motions through the body to the soul, and produces that sensation which we call seeing.... And if (in sleep) some of the strong motions remain in some part of the fra

sing things as images--the other; that which it has by dealing with the ideas themselves; the one part that which it gets by reasoning downward fr

for their assumptions, but taking them as evident to all; and, reasoning from them, they prove the propositions which they have in view. And in such reasonings, they use visible figures or diagr

mind, and these images he uses in his reasoning. There may be images of these images--shadows and refl

ith these the mind depends upon assumptions, and does not ascend to first principles. It does not ascend above these assumption

n it regards the assumptions of the sciences as (what they are) assumptions only, and uses them as occasions and starting-p

nd relations of this principle, it proceeds to the conclusion--using no sensible image in doing this

y acquire of real existence and intelligible things is of a higher degree of certainty than the knowledge which belongs to what are commonly called the Sciences. Such sciences,

ght, intuitive reason, on the subjects of their reasonings, though the subjects are intelligible things. And you call this habit and practice of the geometers and others by

rsive reason), the next; the third, BELIEF (π?στι?); and the fourth, CONJECTURE, or guess (ε?κασ?α); and arrange them in order, so that they may be held to have more or less certainty, as their objects have more or less truth." 532 T

rn) "Republic," bk.

JECTS OF COGNITION, AND T

________________________

RLD | INTELL

nion--δ?ξα). |(the o

ence--?

______________________|_

|

ges. | Intuitio

_____|________________|_

thus furthe

________________________

RLD. | INTEL

______________________|_

|

ages | Ideas

CT |

ικονε?. | ιδεα

_____|________________|_

|

cture. | Intuitio

SS |

?ασια. | ν?ησι

_____|________________|_

|

HANTASY. | INTUI

| | REASON

?αντασ?α. |

_____|________________|_

|

IMAGINATION. | R

tive |Representative

aculty | Facul

_____|________________|_

. | REMI

η. | α

Faculty-- | The Rep

f sensation" |"the

σεω?) [533] | th

(in Eter

ying in th

e Deit

ilebus," § 67] | [F

§

______________________|_

xhibits a perfect view of the Platonic scheme of the cognitive powers--the faculties by which the mind attains

tions which are produced within us by external objects through the medium of the vital organization, an

e object of sensation. This may be done involuntarily as "in dreams, disease, and hallucination," 537 or voluntarily, as in reminiscence. Φαντ?σματα

turn) "Republic,"

hilosophers, had no special term to express the knowledge which the mind has of the operation of its own faculties, though this, of course, was necessarily a frequent matter of consideration. Intellect

(return) "Th

the memory previously brought into action with the sensation produced a second time, and we say within ourselves [this is] Socrates, or a horse, or fire, or whatever thing there may be of such a kind. Now this is called opinion, through our combining the recollection brought previously into action with the sensation recently produced. And when these, placed alon

ect, and are mirrored in the soul of man. "Time itself is a moving image of Eternity." 539 But inasmuch as the immediate object of sense-perception is a representative image generated in the vital organism, and all empirical cognitions are mere "conjectures" (ε?κασ?αι) founded on representative images, they need to be certified by a higher faculty, which i

nous, "Introduction to the

: (return) "

nciples. These assumptions Plato calls hypotheses (?ποθ?σει?). But by hypotheses he does not mean baseless assumptions--"mere theories--"but things self-evident and "obvious to all;" 540 as for example, the postulates and definitions of Geometry. "After laying down hypotheses of the odd and even,

eturn) "Republic

return) Ibid.,

ning (λογ?ζεσθαι) is simply the extension of this process. When we look at two straight lines of equal length, we do not merely think of them separately as this straight line, and that straight line, but they are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes place in the mind. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they are of equal length, and they are both straight; and the connection which is perceived as existing between them is a relation of sameness or identity. 543 When we observe any change occurring in nature, as, for example

n) Thompson's "Laws

return) "Ph?do,

n) "Tim?us," ch. ix.

turn) "Republic,"

eason, Plato does not regard as "real Science." "It is something

return) Ibid.,

ds on objects the light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows, the power of knowing." 547 Under this light, the eye of reason apprehends the eternal world of being as truly, yes more truly, than the eye of sense apprehends the world of phenomena. This power the rational soul possesses by virtue of its having a nature kindred, or even homogeneous with the Divinity. It was "generated by the Divine Father," and, like him, it is in a certain sense "eternal." 548

Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xi

n of his doctrine of the eternal nature of the rational essence of the soul. An eternal nature "generated" in a "past" or "present" time is a contradiction. But that was not Plato's conception of "eternity," as the reader will discover on perusing the "Tim?us" (ch. xiv.). "God resolved to create a moving image of eternity, and out of that eternity which reposes in its own u

h. xvi., and "Ph?drus," where the

t. It is a beam of the eternal Sun, a spark of the Divinity, an emanation from God. On the other side it is linked to the phenomenal or sensible world, its emotive part 550 being formed of that which

he seat of the nobler--?πιθυμητικ?

we call the body." In its incorporate state, and previous to the discipline of education, the rational element is "asleep." "Life is more of a dream than a reality." Men are utterly the slaves of sense, the sport of phantoms and illusions. We now resemble those "captives chained in a subterraneous cave," so poetically described in the seventh book of the "Republic;" their backs are turned to the light, and consequently they see but the shadows of the objects which pass behind them, and they "attribute to these shadows a perf

(return) "Ph?d

but a sleep an

ises with us, o

sewhere it

eth fro

tire forg

n utter n

clouds of glo

who is our

sworth, "Ode on the Intimat

iss, in which it was first created. Its affinities are still on high. It yearns for a higher and nobler form of life. It essays to rise, but its eye is darkened by sense, its wings are besmeared

asks how the soul may be delivered from the illusions of sense, the distempering influence of the

bondage of sense 553 and raised into the empyrean of pure thought "where truth and reality shine forth." All souls have the faculty of knowing, but it is only by reflection, and self-knowledge, and

f the intellectual struggle into "the intelligible world" is death. The int