The Fight For The Republic In China

on as to its origin. The documents which this envelope contained are so interesting that they merit attention at the hands of all students of histo

entous conversation which took place between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese Minister when the latter personally served the D

portance, to allow others to guess how the "conversation" opened. From the context it seems absolutely clear that the excised words have to deal with the possibility of the re-establishment of the Empire in China-a very important conclusion in view of what followed later in the year.

nfluence and whose policy is for strong measures. Our Government has not been influenced by this policy, but if your Government does not quickly agree to

re that the President entertains anti-Japanese feeling and adopts the policy of "befriending the Far" (Europ

elp the Chinese Government, and if the Chinese Government will speedily agree

ti-Japanese feelings, or adopted the policy of "befriending the Far and antagonizing

clined to render assistance to President Yua

ary than these few paragraphs. Japan, through her official representative, boldly tears down the veil hiding her ambitions, and using the undoubted menace which Chinese revolutionary activities then held f

randum is the most remarkable document dealing with the Far East which has come to light since the famous Cassini Convention was published in 1896. Written presumably late in the autumn of 1914 and immediately presented to the Japanese Government, it may undoubtedly be called the fulminate which exploded the Japanese mine of the 18th January, 1915. It shows such sound knowledge of world-conditions, and is so scientific in its detachment that

PEAN WAR AND THE

policy depends on our being able to skilfully avail ourselves of the world's general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a course of action towards China which shall be practical in execution. If our authorities and people view the present European War with indifference and without deep concern, merely devoting their attention to the attack

our most serious attention to the subject. If, on the other hand, the Germans and Austrians should be crushed by the Allies, Germany will be deprived of her present status as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The Federation will be disintegrated into separate states, and Prussia will have to be content with the status of a second-rate Power. Austria and Hungary, on account of this defeat, will consequently be divided. What their final fate sh

her western frontier. Immediately after the war she will make an effort to carry out her policy of expansion in the East and will not relax that effort until she has acquired a controlling influence in China. At the same time Great Britain will strengthen her position in the Yangtsze Valley and prohibit any other country from getting a footing there. France will

g it so as to be able to decide upon a policy towards China and determine the action to be ultimately taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese Government's policy towards China will lose that subjective influence and our diplomacy will be checked forever by the combined force of the other Powers. The peace of the Far East will be thus endangered and even the existence of the Japanese Empire as a nation will no doubt be imperilled. It is therefore our first important duty at this moment to enquire of our Government what course is to be adopted to face that general situation after the war? What preparations are being made to meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China? What policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question? When the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but wheth

ope in seizing control of China. It is admitted in so many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will forever be the enemy. At the same time it is expected, should the issue of the struggle be clearcut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may be made to operate against Japan. Although the alliance with England, twice renewed since 1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far East as the Entente between England and France occupies in Europe, not one Japanese in a hundred kn

ible death-struggle, this second part of the Memorandum is concerned solely with China and can be broken into two convenient sections. The first section is con

SE QUESTION AND TH

g China voluntarily rely upon Japan. To force China to such a position there is nothing else for the Imperial Japanese Government to do but to take advantage of the pres

ms of the Defe

the responsibility of co-operating with China to guard her against internal trouble and foreign invasion and China shall accord to Japan special facilities in the matter of China's Nati

ion or nations, Japan shall send her army to render assistance, to assume the res

and Inner Mongolia and to cede the sovereign rights of these regions to Japa

njoyed by the Germans in regard to railways, mines and all other interests, and after peace and order is r

rbours along the coast of the Fukien province to Japan to be converted into na

ese army China shall entrust the trai

a shall adopt firearms of Japanese pattern, and at the same time esta

taining a Chinese Navy, China shall ent

tion, China shall entrust the work to Japan, and the latter shall elect competent

rs and extensively establish schools in different parts of the country t

n before she can enter into an agreement with another Power for m

will relieve China of all future anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically with her reforms, and, with a sense of territorial security, she may wait for her national development and regeneration. Even after the present

tained and settled. (1) Its bearing on the Chinese Government. (2) Its bearin

t up into many parts beyond all hope of remedy. That this state of affairs will come is not difficult to foresee. When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan's Government and assist him to suppress the internal insurrection with the certain assurance that we could influence him to agree to our demands, or shall we help the revolutionists to achieve a success and realize our object through them? This question must be definitely decided upon this very moment so that we may put it into practical execution. If we do not look into the future fate of China but go blindly to uphold Yuan's Government, to enter into a Defensive Alliance with China, hoping thus to secure a complete realization of our object by assisting him to suppress the revolutionists, it is obviously a wrong policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chinese people have lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shi-kai who is discredited and attacked by the whole nation for having sold his country. If Japan gives Yuan the support, his Government, though in a very precarious state, may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan Shi-kai belongs to that school of politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and cunning. He may be friendly to us for a time, but he will certainly abandon us and again befriend the other Powers when the European war is at an end. Judging by his past we have no doubt as to what he will do in the future. For Japan to ignore the general sentiment of the Chinese people and support Yuan Shi-kai with the hope that we can settle with him the Chinese Question is a blunder indeed. Therefore in order to secure the permanent peace of the Far East, instead of supporting a Chinese Government which can neither be long continued in power nor ass

n not now carry on an active campaign is because they are insufficiently provided with funds. If the Imperial Government can take advantage of this fact to make

he Republican form of government, acknowledge that they have made a mistake. The retention of the Republican form of Government in China will be a great future obstacle in the way of a Chino- Japanese Alliance. And why must it be so? Because, in a Republic the fundamental principles of government as well as the social and moral aims of the people are distinctly different from that of a Constitutional Monarchy. Their laws and administration also conflict. If Japan act as a guide to China and China models herself after Japan, it will only then be possible for the two nations to solve by mutual effort the Far East Question without differences and disagreements. Therefore to start from the foundation for the purpose of reconstructing the Chinese Government, of establishing a Chino-Japanese Alliance, of maintaining the permanent peace of the Far East and of realizing the consummation of Japan's Imperial policy, we must take advantage of the present opportunity to alter China's Republican form of Go

other in the future. This means that Japan after the acquisition of sovereign rights in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia will work together with Russia after her acquisition of sovereign rights in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia to maintain the status quo, and endeavour by every effort to protect the peace of the Far East. Russia, since the outbreak of the European War, has not only laid aside al

ileges to Great Britain in the Yangtsze Valley, with an assurance to protect those privileges, no matter how powerful Great Britain might be, she will surely not oppose Japan's policy in regard to this Chinese Questi

garding our policy towards China has already declared the principle of maintaining China's territorial integrity and equal opportunity and will be satisfied, if we do not impair America's already acquired rights and privileges. We think America will al

ation of the Chinese Government to be followed up by preparing for the conclusion of the Defensive Alliance. The precipitate action on the part of our present Cabinet in acceding to the request of Great Britain to declare war against Germany without having definitely se

nts in our policy towards China and the result depends on how we carry them out. Can our authorities firmly make up their mind to solve this Chinese Question by the actual carrying out of this fundamental principle? If they show irresolution while we have this heaven-conferred chance and merely depend on the good will of the other Powers, we shall e

aborate memorandum of the Black Dragon Society with the original text of the Twenty-one Demands it is plain that the proposed plan, having been handed to Viscount Kato, had to be passed through the diplomatic filters again and again until all gritty matter had been removed, and an appearance of innocuousness given to it. It is for this reason that the defensive alliance finally emerges as five compact little "groups" of demands, with the vital things directly affecting Chinese sovereignty labelled desiderata, so that Japanese ambassadors abroad could leave very w

btle is the manner in which the ultimate solution is left open: it is consistently admitted throughout the mass of reasoning that there is no means of knowing whether suasion or force will ultimately be necessary. Force, however, always beckons to Japan because that is the simplest formula. And since Jap

lthough we may here again recall that in 1912 in the midst of the revolution Japan privately sounded England regarding the advisability of lending the Manchus armed assistance, a proposal which was immediately vetoed. But there are other things: nothing is forgotten in the Memorandum. Russia is to be specially placated, E

e dossier-the method of subsidizing and arranging

y Japanese killed on active service; it declares that the Japanese will deliver arms and ammunition in the districts of Jihchow in Shantung and Haichow in Kiangsu; and it ends by stating that the first instalment of cash, Yen 400,000, had been paid over in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

MADE BETWEEN SUN WEN (SUN

orce while China shall be responsible for the finances. It is impossible for the present Chinese Government to work hand in hand with the Japanese Government nor does the Japanese Government desire to co-operate with the fo

s shall provide the necessary funds, weapons and military force, but the funds s

orth of bonds to be issued by Sun Wen (Sun Yat Sen). It shall however be secured afterwards

how, Hunan, Hupeh, Szechuan, Kiangsi, Anhuei, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. If it is intended to invade the Northern provinces No

y. After the occupation of a place, the two parties will settle the mode of rewarding the meritorious and compensating the family of the killed, adopting t

se military officers accompanying these expeditions shall have

ndustrial undertakings and railway construction and the like, not mentioned in the Treatie

ina, all Japan's demands on China shall be recogn

by the Chinese revolutionary army shall have the privilege of being continued in their

ond instalment ... yen and the third instalment ... yen. After the first instalment is paid over, Okur

s and ammunition in the Districts of Jih Chao and H

the loan shall be made not later than thr

d Japanese volunteers are in duty bound to obey th

ary officers and Japanese volunteers who disobey his orders and their passage money shall not be paid if su

e occupied territory must employ Japanese

effect immediately it is

en the two parties and signed by them in February. The first instalmen

EPRESENTED BY CHANG YAO CHING AND HIS ASSOCIATES OF T

panese Central Bank shall hand over 3/10 of the loan as the first instalment. When Chang Yao Ching and his associates arrive at their proper destination the

point supervisers. Responsible individuals of the contracting parties shall j

ecure a volunteer force of 150 men, only retir

themselves. After reaching China, Chang Yao Ching and his associates shall give the volunteers the pa

00 yen. When wounded seriously a provisional compensation of 5,000 yen shall be paid as well as a life pension in accordance with the rules

shall have the power to dismiss him. All volunteers are subject to the orders

their duty to do so. But the necessary expenses for the undertaking shall be de

of the Japanese army. Two Japanese officers recommended

ve the power to dispose of the public propertie

the first preference for working the mines in pla

ed? The point seems unimportant. The thing of importance is the undoubted fact that assembled and treated in the way we have treated them they present a complete and a