Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised)

nes 'Solidarity' wi

olicy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine these proposa

t; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from th

of the French Republic ex

uld come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present d

talian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose c

lves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russ

Grey and the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withsta

ajesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement

nducing to the maintenance of peace, it would merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen

hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav-a struggle for supremacy in

nswer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian Amb

given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happ

ng to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent mobili

de has been a decisive factor in situation. Germ

ntal policy, but could not, with due observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for

and consistent. And unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the c

idating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the disposa

ated in its note of July 23rd. But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing

urged Servia to moderation and even to submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications; he did everything in his pow