War and the Arme Blanche

ODUC

L EARL ROBER

e army that I need not labour to say how entirely I agree with the author's main thesis; indeed, anyone who will take the trouble to read "Cavalry Training" (1904), will see that I ant

nts depended almost entirely on the sword.[1] This was inevitable because of the inaccuracy and short range of the smooth-bore carbine. Tentative changes were made when rifled arms viwere adopted, but it is only within the last thirty years that Lancer r

tion, and their rifles reside in buckets attached to the horse, only to be used on certai

"shock-tactics, the charge, and the hand-to-hand encounter are still the one ideal of Cavalry action; and the power of man?uvring in great masses, maintaining an absolute uniformity of pace and formation, and moving at the highest speed with accurately dressed ranks,

aining of the individual, in any other branch of his business than that of riding boot-to-boot and of rendering instant obedience to the word or signal of his superior, fell more and more into abeyance. Shock-tactics filled the entire bill, and the Cavalry of Europe, admirably trained to man?uvre and attack, whether by the squadron of 150 sabres, or the division of 3,000 or 4,000, was practically unfitted for any other duty. The climax of incompetency may be said to have been reach

enough to paralyze a whole brigade.... In fact, to the student who follows out the operations of the Cavalry of 1870–71 step by step, and who bears in mind its deficiencies in armament and training, it will appear very doubtful whether a strong

the Infantry was armed with muzzle-loaders-of a charge decisive of the battle; not one single instance of Infantry being scattered and cut down in panic flight; not one single instance of a force larger than a brigade intervening at a critical moment. And how many failures? How often were the Cavalry dashed vainly in reckless gallantry against the hail of a thin line of rifles! How often were great masses held back inactive, without drawing a sabre or firing a shot, while the battle was decided by the Infantry and the guns! How few the enterprises against the enemy's communications! How few men killed or disabled, even when Cavalry met Cavalry in the mêlée! Can it be said in face of these facts that the devotion to shock-

been said that this war was abnormal, but are not all wars abnormal? As, however, it was the first war in which magazine rifles were made use of, and as the weapon used in future wars is certain to be even mor

ons in reviewing the period from the beg

rectly or indirectly crippling the Cavalry, and the greater the numbers employed and the larger the measure of independence permitted, the more unmistakable is the weakness. When the Cavalry succeed strategically, xas in the ride to Kimberley and back to Paardeberg, they succeed in spite of disabilities traceable to arme blanche d

not know, because they had never been required to know, how to use the principal and most useful weapon with which they were armed. Because they did not understand, bec

pid advance of fighting men carried out at extended intervals. It was a rapid advance of warriors who possessed the ability, by means of horses and rifles (not swords or lances), to pl

it-and there is no doubt that on many occasions such an advance will have a far greater effect than a methodical advance on foot. But,

ng only 213 men, took part in the engagement. Partly owing to the rough nature of the ground, and partly to the enemy's fire, several horses fell, and before the men could disengage the carbines from the buckets the Afghans were upon them. Without their firearms the dismounted Cavalry were quite helpless, and it was a sorry spectacle to behold these men, with their swords dangling between their legs and imp

ore had to pass xiibefore officers were authorized (Army Order, June 1, 1902) to have their swords similarly carried. But the rifle is still being carried on the horse, and, if this arrangement is not changed, the result will certainly be that, if a man gets upse

ading arms. That lesson is, that knee to knee, close order charging is practically a thing of the past. There may be, there probably will be, mounted attacks, preferably in open order, against Cavalry caught unawares, or against broken Infantry. But, after readi

in a mist, or on other occasions when a fire-fight might be impossible or inadvisable. Instead, however, of the present sword, the Cavalry soldier would be more suitably equipped with a sword-bayonet for fixing on the rifle when xiiifighting on foot-something like that w

s in every possible way, and by skill in the use of the rifle, that Cavalry soldiers can hope to carry out properly the many important functions required of them in advance of, at a distance from, and in conjunction with, the main army. Further,

of armies on the actual battle-field, and to the extended formations necessitated by the long-reaching effect of modern weapons, the strain upon the Cavalry horses is infinitely greater than in former days, and unless men are taught

ns. It is frequently due to the information gained by Cavalry that a commander is enabled to make, or alter, his plan of action. It may often happen that Cavalry may help to decide the issue of a

raining. The men should be intelligent and trustworthy; they require to have their wits about them even in a greater degree than other soldiers, for a single Cavalry soldier may at times have great respons

cision have been brought into use-when shock action alone has produced decisive results, and I doubt whether shock action, or, in other words, the arme blanche alone, will ever again be able to bring about such results against a highly trained enemy armed with magazine rifles. I confess I c

enables the Infantry soldier to stand the strain of lying out in the open, possibly for hours, under a burning sun or in drenching rain, unable to move hand or foot without being shot at, a strain to which the order to charge the enemy's position comes as a distinct and welcome relief. And it is the same soldierly spirit which sustains the Cavalry soldier when employed on

ion from the fact that I have taken part in Cavalry combats, and have frequently had occasion to scout and reconnoitre with two, three, or perhaps half a dozen Cavalry soldiers, at

unbiassed mind, and not to be put off by the opening chapters, or to throw the book on one side with some such remark as, "This is written by a civilian, and what can he know of the subject?" Remember that most of our finest military histories have been written by civilians. I would ask you to study the fa