Germany and the Next War

rds further progress is threatened by formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it

for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to bat

y) cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our people, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to disc

raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national asset; and, secondly,

ence has a pronounced educative

tually, do not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty of victory-so in the rivalry of nations and States

educates a man to the full mastery of his body, to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mental powers, his self-reliance and readiness o

the benefits of military service and improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly an outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social and educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than achievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring wit

evelopment of the power of defence. The method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depen

igher requirements of combination, subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take

more thorough and intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the requisite military qualities

al functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities expected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to the individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it is quite another

herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social

d where the social duty of maintaining the physical and moral power of the nation to defen

r relations to other States and the military strength of their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater or less importance in the political system of the world-making their military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and expenditure. When we consider the c

d, England develops her land forces only with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power

States of America, again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any considerable forces. On the other hand, they

ilitary nations of Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they are no longer justifie

nation with internal politics, regulate the method and extent of warlike preparations, and the

pendence, to protect its own interests, and, under certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and political schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be deficient in the conditions of individual nat

proclaimed neutral by international conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a Stat

State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent interference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decision will rest. Su

itions exist, the utmost variety should also prevail am

rance, and Italy, preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, situated on the coast and secured by

erwise for a country which r

ion to their grouping and attitudes; but these preparations must never be motived by such considerations alone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent and unqualif

o sacrifice can be considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military efficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditions must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the object thereby to be gained

capacities of a nation find ample scope in international competition. This is also an essential condition for the unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual a

ties of action constitute the only healthy soil for the intellectual and

ical needs. Even the superiority of the enemy cannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On the contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than ever in modern fighting, although they always co

ble. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined by these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmonious development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and military elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system cannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. It need

be remembered that this standard may be very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State's duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst

tion is an end in itself, will see the duty of the State in a quite different light from the political dilettante, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing o

re of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these momentou

nnot be improvised in the present political world

e at a crisis suddenly sent on active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected from such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the highest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre cannon. If it is to be

shifting changes of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of arming because no clouds in the political

spirations, oppositions, and tensions, which are

future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has powerfully aided and extende

influences of the day, the military power of the probable opponents marks a li

s of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an obvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations by every m

cal ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keeping its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive character. States, on the other

f the State, which may lead to an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so clearly expo

n in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, feels t

n willingly supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great duties of the State, if only our po

r will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly great in a country so torn asunder in

udiced for the sake of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the taxpayer, the temporary mai

w. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual enforcement of

efficiently is the duty of the military authorities-a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, since it supplies the machinery with which commander

schke, our great historian and national politician, tells us-that determine the expenditure, and the great Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by sparing the national forces, while renouncing the politically indispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He can only

y considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the entire soci