Germany and the Next War

itical claims which the State puts forward, the strength of the probable hostile comb

nd progress which our history and our national character impose on us. My next task

ee, we can carry out our political intentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-moveme

rselves the intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable efficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is determined by the extent to which m

ar 1910 amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service auxiliaire "-that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in for service without arms. The entire war establishment, accordin

00,000 Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a redu

ipates, that out of the 2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned-to the infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a considerable part of the reservists of

y sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000. Recourse already has been had to the expedient of requiring smaller qualif

egroes raised for military service are heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent t

possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops available. As the black popul

Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. There is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and co

y over a part of the territory termed "Morocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. The French and Moro

as order is gradually established, the country will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, an

, so soon as the limited system of conscription is universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000 men, and the tactical value of these troop

of the service, but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According to the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of Cossacks and Frontier Guards.

about 9,000 strong, the cavalry divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, sharp-shooter briga

the standing army, 1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of Cossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50,000 men, and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in case of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a certain reduction must be made in

s presented to us when

rd member of the

olonies governed by the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have at their disposal a militia, wh

00 strong, and is destined exclusively for home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of

d Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in view of

units, foot artillery, and engineers for coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing its organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of this army can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150,000 men may be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force.

05 men (on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about 25,500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a

venteen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of 3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we have 2,944,931 trained

otal of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., 911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to 9

t open to public discussion. However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the enemy by the inc

s [A] are already reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance that they no longer think it ne

Boucher, "L'offensive

alions and 8 Alpine regiments in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193 field and

nd line. The militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might be mobilized is not known. The field army is d

-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500 native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 1

s have much tactical value. It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, while the p

at importance if they joined the coalition

kish army amounts to 275,000 men. In the y

tive Army

try 1

lry

lery

eers

l troo

ormatio

nics

at is, of 2

25,000 men. Within this limit, according to the Red

troops, military employés, offici

war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of thi

re also able to put conside

ld, with 104 cannons and 44 machine guns, besides 11

000 men, comprising about 165,000 rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and

my of 330,000 is raised, including infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the r

he troops who according to their time of service are permanently with the colours, a militia cavalry called "Cala

me 12,000 serving intermittently. The infantry numbers some 2,500 officers and 57,000 men, the perman

cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part of the Calarashi is not t

ectly come into relations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central European States may under some circumsta

rland and Holland come first unde

ch is of first importance for an offensive war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 2

2-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total stre

cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There is, further, a garrison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr foot artillery companie

lish landing, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannon

llows: 26,000 infantry, 5,400 cavalry, 4,650 field artillery, 3

each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is a garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthene

the training of the units is limited to a few months. This State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men; but the strength

strong, as well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-tw

accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in

tates prove very troublesome to Turkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146,000 men ca

raise 327,000 men (140,000 active army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization i

battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be noticed that among our cruisers are a number of ve

Armoured| Armoured |

t |Gunboats| Cruiser

nce |and | |

s |Armoured| |

om |Ships

ons|under

00 |3,000

|Tons

-+---+-+----+-

|No|Displ|No|Displ. |

| | | | |2

| | | | |

| | | |

---+-+---+-+---

| | | | | |

,600| -| -- |10|114,590

| | | | | |

| -- | -| -- | 4| -

| | | |

| | | | | |

-- | -| -- |38|484,970

| | | | | |

-- | -| -- | 6|145,320

| | | |

| | | | |

-- | -| -- |22|214,670

| | | | | |

-| -- | -| -- | -| --

| | | |

| | | | |

-- | -| -- |10| 79,530

| | | | | |

| -- | -| -- | -| -- |

| | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | |

-- | -| -- | 3| 18,870

| | | | | |

-| -- | -| -- | -|

| | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

-- | 1|1,760| 6| 64,95

| | | | | |

| -- | -| -- | -| -

| | | | | |

| | | | |

-- | -| -- | -| -- |

| | | | | |

| -- | -| -- | -| -

| | | | | |

- | -| -- | -| -- |

| | | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

,120| -| -- |14|181,260

| | | | | |

-| -- | -| -- | -| --

| | | |

| | | | |

,540| -| -- |13|139,830

| | | | | |

-- | -| -- | 4|107,12

---+-+---+-+---

ins that England and France together can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimat

s will probably show a superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up some of the nume

s reckon, is very great, and that our position in this respect is growing worse, since the

ake part in the next war against Germany, we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not b

ion under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of the German race, and the esprit de corps of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the French succeed in making a large African army available for a European theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared

e will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple Alliance break up-as seems probable now-this hour will soon have struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap i

Written in Oc

the support of an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak

to attain the supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices whic

imilar conditions might arise in the case of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England's

impatiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory over Germany and Aust

hat any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have acquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind anti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet their interests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the pe

less affected by defeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese,

vented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all

wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympath

on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every grade, and no personality came

the fact that we have to deal with immense military difficulties, if we are to

strong, can be easily turned on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned through Switzerland. There, of course, the cha

ic, the Sound and the Great Belt, are commanded by fo

e oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three si

armed force a German policy directed towards an increase of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct of Italy at the conference of Alge?iras sufficiently demonstrated. It even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a defensive war. The recent rapprochement of Italy with France and England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which is not easily defended against France and En

r of the nations, as once Frederick the Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the m

certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize the whole future of our natio

ith the confident intention of conquering, and with th

med in order to complete the overthrow of our enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worst

e winning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. We must bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only by continually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out our preparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the future makes on us. A nation of 65,000,000 which stakes all her forc