Our Changing Constitution

E SUPREME COURT-TH

vernment it is particularly interesting because of provisions[1] purporting to impose a tax on employers of child labor, for these represent an attempt by Congress to nullify a de

venue Act of 19

re not stringent enough to satisfy modern sentiment. Moreover, commercial considerations entered into the reckoning. Industries in states where the laws were stringent were found to be at a disadvantage in comparison with like industries in states where th

to Congress in the Constitution."[1] For some years, however, Congress had been finding ways to legislate indirectly upon matters which it had no power to approach directly. Under the grant of power in the Constitution "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States,"[2] Congress had enacted laws purporting to regulate commerce but in reality designed for the suppression or regulation of

er v. United Stat

2: Art.

the ages of fourteen and sixteen had been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 P.M. or before the hour of 6 A.M. The constitutionality of the act was at once challenged and suit brought to

f September 1, 191

mer v. Dagenhart

e and its validity has been questioned by some writers. It has nowhere been more clearly explained tha

auchery. It was held to be within the power of Congress to keep "the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses." But the Court in this most recent decision has pointed out that in each of these cases "the use of interstate commerce was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results." The Court, finding this element to be wanting in the Child L

rior decisions in which prohibitory rules had been sustained rested upon the character of the particular subjects there involved. It was held that the authority over inter

. Hughes, President's

Bar Association, Vol.

ced, another statute similar in purpose and effect was enacted as part of a Federal Revenue Act.[1] This act provided for an additional tax of ten per cent. of the net profits received from the sale or distribution of the product of any establishment in which children under the age of fourteen years had been employed or permitted to work or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen

venue Act of 19

ure was merely legislative camouflage. To quote the words of Justice Holmes in a recent case,[1] "Co

States v. Jin Fuey

arily inferable from its provisions, it must inevitably be declared unconstitutional. Reliance was placed, however, on the facts that the act was entitled "A bill to raise revenue," and that its provisions did not necessarily, on their face, belie this label. It was argued that the Supreme Court would be bound, under its own previous rulings, to t

ngressional Record"

judge has declared the new act unconstitutional but the

k that Congress has succeeded in its attempt and that the act will be sustained. Certainly there are strong precedents pointing

whose purpose and effect were to suppress the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine artificially colored to look like butter. In the Narcotic Drug case[3] the Court upheld a tax imposed by the so-called Harrison Act[4] whose

ional authority, it is not the province of the judici

nk v. Fenno, 8 Wall.,

United States, 195 U.S.

tes v. Doremus, 249 U.S

4: 38 St

ansas City Title Compan

Drug Act case[

ised at the discretion of Congress; and, where the provisions of the law enacted have some reasonable relation to this power, the fact that they may have been impelled by a motive, or may accom

ed States v. Dore

onal motives, it cannot escape the obligation to construe a statute

lidity, even if that result is not in so many words either enacted or distinctly provided for. In whatev

ins v. New Hampsh

y be determined from the form and contents of the act itself, rather than from o

eclared the former act unconstitutional, not only because it transcended the power of Congress under the particular provision of the Constitution then invoked, viz., the Commerce Clause, but also on the broad ground of state rights, because it "exerts a power as to a purely local matter to whic

conceding that it must interpret the intent and meaning of Congress from the language of the act, held that the act on its face is an attempt to regulate matters of state concern by the use of a so-called t