Our Changing Constitution

es of national revenue during and since the war, the income tax, would not have been available. The federal income tax had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Co

ratified by three-fourths of the states, in 1913. Declared by its sponsors at the outset to be intended merely as a recourse in case of emerge

dment conferred no new power of taxation on the National Government. To explain this seeming para

was its inability to raise revenue directly by taxation. The Confederation was obliged to call upon the several states to furnish their respective contri

ked upon this rock at any rate, and therefore insisted, against great opposition, in conferring upon it powe

ies, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for

nst., Art. I, S

the United States,[2] and that direct taxes should be apportioned among the states according to population.[3] The last mentioned provision was a concession to the fears of the wealthier sta

nst., Art. I, S

d., Art. I, Se

t. I, Sec. 2, Clause

her of these fundamental questions was finally settled. The answer to the latter question (that the term "uniform" refers purely to a geographical uniformity and is synonymous with the expression "to operate generally throughout the United States") was given by the Supreme Court in the year 1900 in the celebrated case of Knowlton v. Moore,[2] and met with general appr

cords of the Federal Conv

2: 178 U

v. Farmers Loan & Tru

Alexander Hamilton argued the case before the Supreme Court in support of the tax. The Court adopted his view and sustained the tax, holding that it was a tax on consumption and therefore a species of excise or duty. The Justices who wrote opinions ex

1: 3 Dal

sion as an attorney. To this extent it was clearly an excise or duty, i.e., an indirect tax. As it was incumbent upon Mr. Springer, by reason of the form of the action, to demonstrate that the tax was void in toto the Court could not do otherwise than decide against him. In rendering its decision, however, the Court took occasion to discuss the question as to what were direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution, and expressed the view that the term included only capitation or poll taxes, and taxes on real estate. There the matter rested until the year 1894 when Congress enacted another income tax law. This time the argument from necessity was lacking. The country was in a state of profound peace. Opposition to the tax among the moneyed interests was widespread. Test suits were brought and after

ger v. United Stat

an & Trust Co., 157 U.S., 429; sam

Court, through the force of legislative and popular opinion, to overrule its decision. Calmer counsels prevailed, however, and plans were initiated to get over the difficulty by a constitutional amendment. Meanwhile, steps were taken to eke out the national revenu

ee Chapters X

as proposed by Congress and r

s, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the

been seen, the only express limitations are that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states, that indirect taxes shall be u

ry of the Treasury a letter[3] protesting against the tax as a virtual diminution of judicial compensation in violation of the constitutional provision. No heed was paid to the protest at the time but some years later, upon the strength of an opinion by Attorney General Hoar, the tax on the compensation of the President and the judges was discontinued and the amounts theretofore collected were refunded. There the matter rested until after the Income Tax Amendment, when Congress again sought to impose a tax upon the income of the President and the judges. A federal j

1: Art.

Art. 2, Sec.

3: See 157

vans v. Gore,

rts on the ground that, by reason of some inequality or injustice in their provisions, the taxpayer was deprived of his property without due process of law. In cases involving state laws such objections have sometimes been sustained.[1] There seems, however, to have been no case in which a federal taxing law was declared invalid on this ground, and the Supreme Court has recently remarked that it is "well settled that such clause (viz., the due process clau

Union Tank Line Co. v.

er v. Union Pacific

y taxation the property or revenues or obligations of a state, or the emoluments of a state official, or anything connected with the exercise by a state of one of its governmental functions. In other

islative branches of the Government. In fact, Congress is now engaged in an effort to do away with it, at least in so far as concerns the right to tax the income from state and munic