Thoughts on Religion

ysical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon begins to observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if less refined and delicate than tho

the places round the margin of the basin which are most in danger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would further observe, upon closer inspection, that this process of selective arrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, for instance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweed artistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there he would see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovely little purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which have all been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand. Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are all flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being led by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams, he would find that they serve to supply the water which t

ch was due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with reference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contri

were due to physical causes which are perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay because the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the bay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea arrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive occurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the waves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and different kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific gravity; the fresh-water streams ran in chann

ed so cogent. That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of any special design in the construction of that particular bay, and fall back upon the theory of a much more general design in the construction of one great scheme of Nature as a

hich we meet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous and suggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But if once we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter, are all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of a contriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation),

with a telescope.' He then goes on to point out the analogies between these two pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation

as a mere differentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first instance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature. Pigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure this purpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the nerve-ending begins to distinguish betwee

at follows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development of the eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted structures in any given generation, i.e. the selection of all the better adapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologist maintain that this selective process is itself indicative of special design? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintain that the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the little heap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative of special design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are at least of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the general laws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustration alike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to be that of selection. If it should be argued in

of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceive that Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, after observing with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight,' he goes on to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i.e. that of natural selection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store for it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by intelligence.' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want o

en studying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which have produced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partial key in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogy which is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude that physical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organic structures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design which these structures present is of just the same logical value as that which we may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If it should still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic nature are from their number and unity much more suggestive of design

of the other heavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and the fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the gases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that it was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves (through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular gases which could possibly be expected to occur-just as in matters of still smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited to their several habitats in the marine bay,

es, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the largest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases are likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises, How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means as those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of atoms.' We are led by the most fu

as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of law inevitably follows from the persistence of force.' For 'if in any two cases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuous antecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between those accompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm that the effects will differ, without affirming either that some force has come into

cts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistence of force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should on this account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if we follow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that it spreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which are literally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedent causes). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is a sufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequence contemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, we are thus as far as ever from explaining the determination of this force into the particular channel through which it flows. It may be quite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude and direction by the components; but what about the magnitude and direction of the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined by the outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on till we spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if we knew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in a position to say that an adequate intelligence might determine befo

eive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular adaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency, the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be incomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since it has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special cogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not consider it nece

estions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The first of these questions is as to the presumable character of this supreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are supplied by our observa

l points the analogy is so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much nearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencer has pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in ourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But, he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of the movemen

ced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classin

to conceive. And this, of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above our thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence would be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must remember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from understanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from founding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by the human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be even 'anthropopsychic'

relation to the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether this ulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence in Nature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind the sense of right and wrong-with all its accompanying or constituting emotions of love, sympathy, justice, &c.-is so important a factor, that however greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mind to be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could ever become so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a work as we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to the state of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of special design which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove the intelligent nature of the First Cause, have

be considered by any theory of teleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect of th

n a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to the outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which have survived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for torment-everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence that dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there are compensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the enjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design.... Am I told that I am not competent to judge

secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanisms no less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or 'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a scheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly evolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual without being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the rough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted-even if it can be said to be a

unt of its utility to the species-just in the same way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the occurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other instance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of God; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any other view. The mere fact that to us the moral sense seems such a great and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its importance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as

on. For aught that we can tell to the contrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute morality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for sensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The Deit

is said, 'a religious animal'-i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar nature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical with, true instinct-is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in favour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of this animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument is invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual conceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by different races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts differs greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that these instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they would probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least so much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual conceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably trace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of interpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the fact remains that these instincts exist, and

act is, as I have stated it on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms and instincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanism or instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of another species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism or instinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to be utilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it is impossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same species are invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there should never be any such

Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind which has adopted this method of causation?-then we again reach the answer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of these facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man we should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there may be a moral

suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference depends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the things or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and definiteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we should be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to the supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience from which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability of the inference when drawn-the unknown ratios being confessedly of unknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit of huma

d it impossible to determine the probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. We cannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which essentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; and therefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for a blank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that in some way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as far transcending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanical motion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Nature which seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is either deficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which in man we term moral; while,

TNO

attribute and relation we reach the conception of that which cannot be, i.e. a logical contradiction, or the logical correlative of Being which is Nothing. (All this is well expressed in Caird's Evolution of Reli

ially fulfilled in the penulti

. The whole passage ought to be cons

Flint's Theism, appended

xamination of T

he theological theory of things,' i.e. according to the Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is strictly 'analogous to social relations,' and He not me

dences of Organic E

re, April

RT

ry Note by

was to have been entitled A Candid Examination of Religion. What little does require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval

d in them on the evidence which Nature supplies, or is suppose

sical development must be judged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a Symposium. Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis of 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was developed by pointing to

, is unquestionably the end (i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A candidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he happens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of failure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore follow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of securing the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the general outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of securing what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature," is assuredly evidence

t everywhere be special Design; so that the evidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of Nature-such as one individual organism or class of organisms-as by having regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense I fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proo

exhibits: but indirectly it does[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79: 'we s

e (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more impressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the religion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The Christian Faith supplies believers not only with an

plan' in the Biblical Revelation considered as a whole. The fact of this study appears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George Romanes left behind him in note-books

, in the main, incomplete notes and not finished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy and unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for repetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hard

.

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mply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism would therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there

elian Society (Williams & Norga

with the argument of Professor Knight's Aspects of Theism (Macmillan, 1893); in which on this subject see pp. 184-186

ON A CANDID EXAMI

TAPHY

sed M

d re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons, one class who w

will say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own impr

e from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is generally true

ntrodu

ble, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several accounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow identity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same pseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay appeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz. in order that the reasoning

ing ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built into new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree accomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this much only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as introspection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the modifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my previous Candid Examination are due so much to purely logical processes of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more or less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life. The extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience modifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is practically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which advancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board play of syllogism as by some underhan

sions result in due logical sequence, so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to detect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by anybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly perceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first wa

being due to contact with science; without ever considering how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier argument as to God

more importance, because so

on obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such; but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher causes' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts-i.e. whether the ult

, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done without entering into any question as to the objective validity of Christian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christian

sophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind, what I m

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publishing was solely that of soliciting criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publ

to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Thus a

that it should appear under the

ave not introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted s

Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was fu

Terms and Purpose

es it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to the process of scientific ratiocination. His main position is therefore this: Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God. But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself by o

t as to the meaning which I shall throug

ei

l always be equivalent to-'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach which the human mind ca

stia

from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its development at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself which a personal Deity has vo

As far as this treatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important question for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious instincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question whether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective evidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old Testament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case only because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far the religious instincts of these men, or this rac

t He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first Man' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical fact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.' And, as regards the 'persona

igi

luence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or in a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in an

m 'pure' a

thing that lies beyond the sphere of sense-perception-a professed inability to found valid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense-and also, in my opinion, its only philosophically

e knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about Him-that He ca

fundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His mind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is the more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to any

esmerism as an object-lesson to warn them, scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest sect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence, inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made t

ilosophy. But in both cases our only guide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from possible experience-i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere contemplated-the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43]. Maximum remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere of the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure agnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we

h super-added faculties-numerous and diverse though their religions be. Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the Candid Examination) which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out of print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong touching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative conclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish

case. He has then only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of religious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their respective spheres even of everyday li

never ask what implications they have. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.

tic' has no hesitation-even though he himself keenly experience the latter-that the former only is worthy of trust. But a pure agnostic must know better, as he will perceive

the conflict between science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of fundamental mystery-which it may be proved that science also recognizes in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate grounds of exp

hey are discovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own experience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although all my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating the problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have been made by mankind for securing their gratificat

atural causation, or, more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such causation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the same stand-point, to consi

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ly Divine Persons. Surely, however, th

n earlier thought; see Burney Essay, p. 25, and c

tters of Charles

further,

have thought it best

te. The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the scientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the physical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument from the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable physical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all s

ghtly Revie

is necessary to compl

rinciples, P

Causa

t without any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting effects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world would more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one universal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigid

t, viz.-that our knowledge of it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47]. If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we can no

d from that known mode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all. Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective. Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest philosophical thinkers have arriv

owing that there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a will objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be

her agree in this-that they attribute the principle of causality to a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is anything ob

n a common hypothesis, the disputes must needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved erroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common hypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations shown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this treatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes between

ation,' working under 'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less expressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present century been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which entertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence'; as well as by that of Pant

ere are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (A) That if there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate expression of His will. (B) That every available reason points to

battle has furnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished the condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of all the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed learning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting, and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here that her error lies-as in past times they woke up to see the error of denying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the origin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains and generals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate consequences. And this is

still grudged His own universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As examples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous religions; the natural spread of i

such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For even the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn on the assumption of

umption in question, because its whole case must rest thereon.

the finite cannot comprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically sound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always committed the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been explained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained in toto-forgetting that it has only been explained

ation. The so-called natural sphere has increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But although to lower grades of culture this always see

ly assumed that when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore know all about it-or, as it were, have rem

e greater does this slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to perceive the real state of the case-regarding any rational thinking thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its etymological sense as super-sensuou

nd-i.e. in relation to our experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real distinction is not between nat

ausation; beyond that sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words, even if she were able to

been propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this would be little less than to write a history of philosophy

standing all the theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the same causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which expresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact. Doubtless, if it were not

rceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of the fact itself. Theref

hat it is subsuming the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter thus: in as far as pure reas

Wil

controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logic

se he cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal b

however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant foliage

eir position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be prove

mined by x? And, if this seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the fact. At the same time

he sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility?

without? and Is the will entirely determined by natural causation (x)? For the unknown quantity

are due to natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and that it is of such a nature as supports their con

s, indeed, many systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will is of the nature of a First Cause. In

new and never-ending stream of causality-the cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by c

on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in the mystery of P

nclusion of the whole matt

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at mere observation of causality in external nature would not have y

the Candid Examination; see here. Romanes intended at this point to consider

Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought, pp. 335, ff. [N.B. Th

er was written than what

ll himself appears to perceive it by his introduction after the term 'invariably' of the

ly expressed in an essay published subsequently to the

See he

' referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold depe

. F

of the human mind have to be involved in faith-intellect, emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of reason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children, &c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual ground

nature is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance, regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that Christianity should have enjoined the doing of the doctrine as a necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'-just as to some scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the simplest act of will in regard to religion-that of prayer-has not been performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt. To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct illumination

to the opposite is due to conscious sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find that party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy of will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which similarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little difference in either case what level of general education, mental power, special training, &c., is brought to bear upon the question under judgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference of opinion in politics as w

s? For, unless we beg the question of a future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest

which lead to success in the long run, even more than intellectual ability-supposing, of c

judgement that it is usually taken to be-so far, indeed, that, save in matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,

ost exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that, as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit may be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in respect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned

before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present connexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side of orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams, Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley-not to mention a number of lesser lights, such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c.-were all avowed Christians. Clifford had only just moved at a

hristian in their beliefs,-although certainly not so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it may, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems

nd Supe

lief. It is on this account they are so often confounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more important point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one case is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral. Qua purely intellectual, belief

lows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual verification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the moral ingredient, which ex hypothesi is absent in superstition. In other words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis (which ma

th hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal diff

ves, is logically valid. For no one is entitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of spiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position of pure agnosticism in toto-and this even if there were no objective, or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we have in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degr

lly justifiable if a man not only knows that he believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ of cognition, provided he honestly believ

n developing our ideas of method, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith' is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell science w

rist's winnowing fan, the quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted cannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one could suppos

soning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world, its adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinary diversity of human characters in respect both of morality and spirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same external mate

y of probation is it possible to give any meaning to

that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should need help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men should need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some men are intentionall

n the intellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact that we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral, whatever our theory of religion may be. It is wh

nctions are all well marked a

ima

llect

{Mor

ritu

in any degree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice versa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction betw

enced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic, &c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who ha

no thought without brain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to higher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true, and we are in a state of

, for to disbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe necessitates a spiritual use of the imaginatio

olence, often to prejudice, an

th combined; so to speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of which the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And to this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the purpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of personal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have been propounded at that time, together with i

, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles. No one can dispute thi

re as such, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subje

that God, even if He exists, can be known by reason; H

nd I doubt whether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of itself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to testify thereto would not, nor would letters

alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the latter is confessedly not known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is here a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a state of probati

ven if not experienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic desirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a noumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be of divine origin, as its subjects believe and he

internal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory hallucin

subject, the probability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in Socrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this however as it may, I suppose there is no question that we

to classify all these with lunatics in whom the

r of our age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and pa

view of pure agnosticism, we are not entitled

f the world's scientific thought had resembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed by the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind-would it be possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of subjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any longer have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be communicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any evidential

s similarly barred. The pure agnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high priori road.' But, on the other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly the character,

rable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the whole of the first part of his trea

his however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research, philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste, in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c., the wh

gh to others. Take, e.g., 'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and least 'carnal' of worl

by God

t satisfy the

ctions, this soon palls by custom, and as soon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There is no finality to rest in, while disease and dea

negative side of the subject proves a vacuum in the

nse, it is most enduring, growing, and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal testimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not only

he effects of Christian belief as exercised on human society-1st, by individua

spiritual, are developed. Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them, and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most abundantly. All these me

DE C

e est

u d'a

de ha

is-bo

e est

u d'e

de rê

s-bon

thout hope of a future one. Is it satisfactory? But Chr

has a tho

e day

ht of a who

e setti

has a tho

heart

ht of a who

ove is

being the religion of love, and causing men to believe both in th

TNO

hose which we hold most firmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect after it.... It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, custom that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we must resort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order to slake our thirst a

believe, the intellect by arguments which it is enough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and by not allowing it to incline

brutes see further on," but nothing further on

anes expressed his cordial approval of Professor Knight's Aspects of Theism-a work i

e Pascal, Pensées (Kega

h in Chri

e. of the validity of the religious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism presented by man, and n

nce then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature

n this respect[59]; while the outcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered a signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science, there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels, Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as

as 'but some doubted,' and (in the account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62].' Such obse

of view. We may then read the records impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent c

ied to anything short of miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges a priori of what a re

t in literal truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in the sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says John Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63].' Contrast Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought-not only because Athens then presented the extraord

this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or deduced from the Old Testament, and so ex hypothesi due to original inspiration. Again, it is n

of any kind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the other hand, those in whom the religious sentiment

xerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular po

is a development, so that it may be regarded as of a piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so immeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it had not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any religion worth our serious attention a

thought of mankind to be compared with the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what belief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race-i.e. its influence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit its incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as regards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its incomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency in the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the entire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic asp

men. Are you highly intellectual? There is in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of material as you may spend your life upon with the same interminabl

nera

t is, Christ foretold repeatedly and distinctly-as did also His apostles after Him-that while those who received the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the Son, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous phrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were b

eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from arrogance and

the first time. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has been attributed by professed historians to

t the apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of th

ersi

thers, bear testimony to a sudden, enduring and extra

e. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual, though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden and th

on; this is by no means the point; the point is that it

-called supernatural source, unless we beg the whole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence from conversions and regeneration lies in th

anity a

parent paradox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse roots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion-or rather let us say the religion-of Love, with these appa

btless a survival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no evidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the Christian belief represents it], for sup

I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved spiritual life-such as were attained wonderfully early, historically speaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused throughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question are those which arise from th

on-a merely abstract theory of the mind, having nothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only when it takes the New Testament, tears out a

ndefinite degree more probable that He shoul

doubt that the largest part of the explanation would consist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men, and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life. This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other psychological differentiae between the sexes, such as ambition, selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of Christian ethics is of a

and more recognized by logical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded on reason alone are ipso facto nugatory. Now, all the strongest objections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind; hence the effect

can ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of God we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against God.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination. What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought reasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That is, in this case, try the only experiment available-the experiment of faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verifica

His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should

hin the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles, 'inventions of priests,' &c., which was th

nticity are enough for all that is wanted t

ortance to have proved. Old Testament cri

n Reve

ion as probably furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of ascertainable causes up to some certain po

ited in the Old and New Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in organic nature-i

ncing than a gradual one. But it would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides, even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of demonstrative value-as by making prophecies of historical events, scientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there may well

ion is in analogy w

ithout witness at any time d

s-i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to

n is, in fact, certainly remarkable

itions of the human race. This reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts, unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by cri

ereby this scheme is itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with moral and religious teaching throughout.

tian

to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to the mental, &c

tion of all questions-viz. is or is not mechanical causation 'the outward and visible form

which has resulted from His life on earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins'; that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an a

Doctrines of the Incar

verbally intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by [purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it ought to be if true. Common sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view for the sake of argument,

all, the Or

tuting the logical basis of the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the question is w

rom a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely because it has been prove

tural and Revealed

ause? But if it be allowed, as it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation, like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when i

tude of pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all ages, although such recognition has become more general s

gain we note the analogy. And if a man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our p

ature, and so, to the spiritually minded man, the

bserved the similarity of the argument, as developed in his Natural Theology and Evidences of Christianity respectively. But no one has developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not perceiving that this teleological argument, per se, is not in either case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason a

is apt to be confused with that of its being done by God with an adequate moral object. The f

n Demono

was true or it was not. If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases are so wel

due to devils, He may also have known it was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He, if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case, if He had denied the current theory, He would have

Christ and demonology is bu

Difficu

so small a proportion of mankind havi

revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it follows from the very method that the la

gion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of developm

ut for Him [i.e. apart from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at the times of ignorance.' T

of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it is certain that H

r historians are agreed as to the suitability of the combinations, and deduce the success of

TNO

he current teaching of Christianity, but is finally seen

regard to the Christian

s Bampton Lect

xxviii. 17;

ssays on The

e unfinis

make a collection of N.T. text

scal, Pensé

bject were often too fragm

Ps.

sées, pp

eteenth Cent

tely expressed, I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds in prominence the elements which we regard as ch

part i. ch. 7; par

n of Darwin and Af

treatise Butler might have written had he kno

s Bampton Lect

sées, pp

is not a reality, He must be regarded either as seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or else as seriously misleading others. And

tributing this difficulty to him specially. But he knew Darwin so intimately and rever

Note by t

n of the scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy an

s cut short very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no one to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his death to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of J

et inquietum est cor nost

.

: HORA

TO THE U

RTIS

brary of Prac

d Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. Darwell

s. each

bolt, M.A., Canon and Chancellor

... The publishers have spared no pains in making the appearance of the volumes as attractive as possible

Stone, M.A., Librarian of the Pu

ffort our highest approval. It might well be made a text-book for candidates for the diaconate, or at least

v. A.C.A. Hall, D.D., Bishop

of material for their instruction, and quite the best treatise that we have on the subject it tre

he Rev. Leighton Pullan, M.A., Fellow of St. J

rs, and they will gain a great deal from the perusal of it. It may be certainly recomm

.J. Knox Little, M.A., Canon

nd deep study of the various aspects, and the essential characteristics of Christian marriage.... We would strongly advise the clergy to place this work upon t

H.V.S. Eck, M.A., Rector of B

didates for Orders or of intelligent and educated lay people who desire fuller instruc

ght Rev. E.T. Churton, D.D.

iew of Missions, It is good for us all to understand it, thereby we shall be saved alike fro

Worlledge, M.A., Canon and Chanc

lly useful; and we anticipate that it will be a standa

yan, M.A., Vicar of St. Matthew

important subject, and we are confident it will ran

. Leighton Pullan, M.A., Fellow of

e destroying the Catholic Faith. However that may be, his book should render some assistance in determining what is and what i

ev. Charles Bodington, Cano

f reality in private devotion. To those who have never studied the subject, it should reveal a

R. Whitham, M.A., Principal

laity to it really is, this is the best book with which we have met. Young men who are considering whether they will se

ANUAL. By the Rev. W.C.E. Newbolt, M.A

acher who can afford it, and in every Church Library for t

. Darwell Stone, M.A., Librari

M.A., of the Community of the Resurrection, Examining

one, M.A., Librarian of the Pusey

Very Rev. Henry Wace, D.D., Dean

ling, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesi

Rev. L.G. Mylne, D.D., late Bis

hur John Worlledge, M.A., Canon and

ullan, M.A., Fellow of St. John Bapti

te, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen Colleg

rd Reynolds, M.A., Prebendary

ev. E.F. Russell, M.A., of St. A

S FOR TH

REV. ARTHUR W.

ALLOWS BARKIN

ice 2s. 6d. n

guidance, in regard both to aims and to methods, as experience may have shown to be valuable. It is hoped that the Series, while primarily intended for those who are already fa

Impr

FE OF THE CLERG

e part of the book are the extremely apt and striking quotations from various writers of eminence, which are placed in the f

umber by explaining the nature of the life to which a vocation to Holy Orders calls men; but we need still more that priests should realise the life to whi

d Edi

wete, D.D., Regius Professor of Div

bly done. Sufficient is told about the personal history of the Fathers

nows how to guide. It is sound and learned, and crammed full of informa

Impre

A.J. Mason, D.D., Master of Pembroke Col

ost valuable and in

clergy or laity, who have in any way to share in the "Ministry of Conversion" by

Impr

.D., formerly Bishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Soc

on which gives one an adequate impression of the spirit which pervades a religion, of what is its strength and wea

Impr

he Very Rev. J. Armitage Robin

nd to which this little volume will introduce them, and should regard the questions with which Biblical st

rgy and laity. Any intelligent person who takes the trouble to work through this little volume of 150 pages will be rewarded by gaini

L. Robbins, Dean of the General Theological Sem

clergy and teachers who have thoughtful doubters to deal with, and who

H.E. Savage, M.A., Vicar of South

xcellent book

the Very Rev. T.B. Strong,

e, and is well calculated to clear men's minds in regard to questions of very far-reaching importance. Its calm tone, and its clear

TORY. By the Right Rev. W.E. Co

, a sober, practical, common-sense strain about it, which is hardly ever found in those w

By the Right Rev. Huyshe Yeatman-Bi

P.N. Waggett, M.A., of the Society

son, Mus. Doc., Organist of St. Sav

v. H.H. Pereira, D.D., Bishop

s, M.A., Rector of Barnsley, and Hon

, GREEN,

EW YORK,