Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 1

s, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act in one and the same fixed an

the thing in question; a law which depends on human decree, and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one whi

remembers another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it, is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man. (5) But the law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their natural right, and that they bind themselves to

far as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it be necessarily, from human power. (9) Hence the sanction of such laws may very well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depend

uses would aid us very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular questions. (12) Let us add that as to the actual coordination and concatenation of things, that is how things are ord

obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human s

: thus endeavouring to restrain the masses, as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of others; hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be under compulsion. (17) In truth, a man who renders everyone their due because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. (18) But a man who does the same f

ct laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into

fe and the state secure. (23) By Divine law I mean that which only regar

e nature of the highest good, which I wil

bt - it follows that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of God. (28) Further, since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception of God as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a particular property of a cause) the greater our

is aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it

f the best states follow its lines, and how men's life is conducted, are questions pertaining to

of the Divine law is to love God as the highest good, namely, as we have said, not from fear of any pains and penalties, or from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure. (35) The idea of God lays down the rule that God is our highest good - in other words, that the knowledge and love of God is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be directed. (36) The worldling cannot understand these things, they appe

also things are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the law of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the disposition and particular preservation of a single peopl

ommon to all men, for we have dedu

ivine law is comprehended solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as existi

ve of God springs from knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general ideas, in themselves certain and kn

view to life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's customs and circumstances, which are best revealed by their acti

ition) actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. (45) The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a means to our blessedness. (46) Such things as are good simply b

nd to love Him of our free choice, and with an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the abs

s being noted, I

reason we can conceive of God as a law-g

Holy Writ concerning this natural

bjects were ceremonie

ood gained by knowing the sacr

eat in this chapter, of the rem

from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal verity, we say that God possesses the idea of a triangle, or that He understands the nature of a triangle; but if afterwards we look to the fact that the nature of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine nature, and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle - in fact, that the necessity of a triangle's esse

e of the tree, we must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose that such evil would of necessity come to pass. (60) Thus it was that Adam took the revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth, but a law - that is, an ordinance followed by gain or loss, not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed, but solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate, so that the revelation in question was solely in relation to Adam, and solely through his

epts and ordinances, and he ordained them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he conceived God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, just, &c., whereas such qualities are simply attributes of human nature, and utterly alien from the nature of the Deity. (66)Thus much we may affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in the name of God; but we must not affirm it of Christ, for Christ, although He too seems to have written laws in the name of God, must be taken to have had a clear and adequate perception, for Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God. (67) For God made revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before done through angels - that is, a created voice, visions, &c. (68) It would be as unreasonable to say that God had accommodated his revelations to the opinions of Chri

thus freeing the minds of His hearers from the bondage of that law which He further confirmed and established. (73) Paul apparently points to this more than once (e.g. Rom. vii:6, and iii:28), though he never himself seems to wish to speak openly, but, to quote his own words (Rom. iii:6, and vi:19), "merely humanly." (74) This he expressly states when he calls God just, and it was doubtless in concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy, grace, anger, and similar qualities to God, adapting his language to the popular mind, or, as he puts it (1 Cor. iii:1, 2), to carnal men. (75) In Rom. ix:18, he teaches undisguisedly that God's auger and mercy depend not on the actions of men, but on God's own nature or will; furth

or allegory of the first man. (82) But I prefer to pass over the subject in silence, because, in the first place, I cannot be absolutely certain that my explanation would be in accordance with the intention of the sacred writer; and, secondly, because many do not admit that this history is an allegory, maintaining it to be a simple narrative of facts. (83) It will be better, therefore, to adduce other passages of Scripture, especially such as were written by him, who speaks with all the strength of his natural understanding, in which he surpassed all his contemporaries, and whose sayings are accepted by the people as of equal weight with those of the prophets. (84) I mean Solomon, whose prudence and wisdom are commended in Scripture rather than his piety and gift of prophecy. (85) Life being taken to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut. xxx:19), the fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life, and its absence constitutes punishment. (86)

teaches us to fear God wisely - that is, to worship Him truly; (2), that wisdom and knowledge flow from God's mouth, and that God bestows on us this gift; this we have already shown in proving that our understanding and our knowledge depend on, spring from, and are perfected by the idea or knowledge of God, and nothing else. (92) Solomon goes on to say in so many words that this knowledge contains and involves the true principles of ethics a

mon also, not so much under the dominion of fortune (or God's external aid) as in inward personal virtue (or

of nature clearly understand the goodness and the eternal divinity of God, and can thence know and deduce what they should seek for and what avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they are without excuse and cannot plead ignorance, as they certainly might if it were a question of supernatural light and the incarnation, passion, and resurrection of Christ. (97) "Wherefore," he goes on to say (ib. 24), "God gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of

ght of natural reason and the natural Divine law, and I have