Great Britain and the American Civil War

to have made Secretary Seward believe that the moment was opportune for a renewal of pr

ter" if those nations would withdraw their "belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, as we conceive, to the insurgents[580]." This was large talk for a relatively unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the door in the West and was still far from having "access to the interior districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy of this despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might be said the position and the spirit of the Northern armies were greatly improved and notable successes probable, it could not be maintained that

ow have been no sedition here, and no disagreement between the United States and foreign nations[584]," a melancholy reflection intended to suggest that the South alone had been responsible for the long delay of American participation in a world humanitarian movement. But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to save the credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing the Union[585]"--an erroneous view evincing a misconception of [V1:pg 276] the intensity of both Northern and Southern

rey, and removed the Southern threat to McClellan's communications. More than any other one battle of the Civil War the duel between the Merrimac and the Monitor struck the imagination of the British people, and justly so because of its significance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has been the main talk of the town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in Parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval people. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over

icative of a new energy in the North promising further and more important successes on land. The Government hoped for such Northern success not because of any belief that these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission, for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with the conviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. The idea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability and

:pg

was not near. Grant's hard-won victory in the West at Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched battle of the war, called out such a flood of Northern expressio

points on the Coast, the Southern men hold out, if they destroy as they threaten to do, their cotton, tobacco and all other property which cannot be removed and then retire into the interior with their families and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be but barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal Armies. The Northern people may be unable or unwi

n advance, and it was at least generally hoped [V1:pg 279] that the projected attack on New Orleans and McClellan's advance up the peninsula toward Richmond would bring to a more definite status the conflict in America. Extreme Southern sympathizers scouted the possibility of any conclusive Northern success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importa

e capture of New Orleans that two remarkable adventures toward a solution in America were made, apparently wholly on individual initiative, by a Frenchman in Ameri

280] expressed were broached by him in a conversation with Seward, only to be met with such positive assertions of intention and ability soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that he wished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself that there also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, upon which the latter at once offered to further such a trip. Mercier asserted to Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having foreseen no such eager acquiescence in a suggestion made without previous thought, but that on consideration he retur

e trip[594]." A circumstance apparently not known to Bancroft was Mercier's consultation with Lyons, before departure, in which were revealed an initiative of the adventure, and a proposed representation to the authorities in Richmond materially dif

hat he had "been for some little time thinking of making this journey." He told of making t

hasten the attainment of this object by conferring personally with the Secession leaders. He should frankly tell them that to all appearances their cause was desperate; that their Armies were beaten in all quarters; and that the time had arrived when they ought to come to some arrangement, which would put an end to a state of

hem. It might induce them to come to terms with the North. At all events it might lead to an Armistice, under which trade might be immediately resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr. Seward his notion of using this language, and had ad

personally, that they had no spirit of vengeance to apprehend, that they would be cordially welcomed back to their Seats in the Senate, and to their due share of political influence. Mr. Seward added that he had not said so much to any othe

French-British attitude which was so desirable. Nor was [V1:pg 283] he without suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separate advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with the South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons to accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to any interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, the Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with the idea." Lyons frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity of declini

would be possible to inveigle France or any other great European Power into an exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected by an offer of great commercial privileges to on

:pg

erroneous, and that neither North nor South was ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace. He prophesied failure of Mercier's avowed hopes. His prophecy proved well founded. On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier's account to him of the results of the journey. Mercier returned to Washington on April 24, reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day called on Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled determination of the South to maintain its indep

:pg

ne and all. It was idle to tell them that they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for making terms with the North. What he had said to them about the recognition of their Independence was that the principal inducement to France to r

yself, of the true condition of things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it." Since the proposed strong representations were not reported to Thouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of the trip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make them. They bear the appearan

, the War would last for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the Governments of Europe should be

s wr

nce or England, but I told Monsieur Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in

Seward of Mercier's trip and was given a very diff

st Armies were in the field. If they were now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be offered them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was idle. If the United States were undisputed

h probably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those of

es which occurred afterwards had somewhat shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the South, and consequently his opinions as to [V1:pg

t. On Lyons the effect of the adventure to Richmond was just the reverse of this; and on Russell also its influ

ill be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will cause but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can the country be

he Union feeling in the South will be of great

sed it[603]. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move. Indeed everyone in London and Paris was much astonished, and many were [V1:pg 288] the speculations as to the meaning of Mercier's unusual procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing "Que diable allait il faire dans cette galére[604]?" and Cowley, at Paris, could give no light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumours of Mercier's trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this could be true[605]." May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicable unless the Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is not the case[606]." Th

vate manipulation, and being confident of his friendship were content to wait events[609]. Slidell had just received assurance from M. Billault, through whom most of his information came, "that the Emperor and all [V1:pg 289] the Ministers are favourable to our cause, have been so for the last year, and are now quite as warmly so as they hav

and Bright, and being a warm personal friend of the latter, though disagreeing with him on the American Civil War. He had been in some sense a minor expert consulted by both French and British Governments in the preparation of the commercial treaty of 1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himself to Cowley asking that

ity, and declared that he was ready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him the example." More than once

from all interference in the internal concerns of France; and that His Majesty considered that the hindrance placed by the Northern States

Majesty asked what were the opinions of Her Majesty's Govt.; adding that if Her Majesty's Govt. agreed with him as to the inefficiency of the blockade, he was ready to send shi

's Govt. as efficient, though doubtless many ships had been enabled to run it"; and "that at all events there could not be a more inopportune moment for mooting the question both of the recognition of the South and of the efficiency of the blockade. [V1:pg 291] The time was gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--for every mail brought news of expediti

which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to Napoleon Cowley's denial of an

a desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London, lay His Majesty's views before Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, and bring their answers direct to him as quickly as possible, His M

r enlightenment, and Thouvenel had denied all knowledge and declared that certainly no such propos

, and by the present Opposition in Parliament, who would denounce [V1:pg 292] the blockade if in power; that he has found a willing listener in the Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any means; and I am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make politic

gents is shown by his conveyance to Slidell of the

but has received evasive responses. He has now for the third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr. Lindsay will give you all the particulars. This is entirely confidential but you ca

has been seen, was suspected by Cowley, but which had not been stated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to see Derby and Disraeli, the leaders of the parliamentary opposition, and inform them of his views--a suggestion wh

:pg

. Cowley had held a long conversation with Thouvenel, in which it was developed that the source of the Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce, who was very anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared that Lindsay in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "I [Cowley] coincided in his views." This exasperated Cowley, and he resented Lindsay's "unofficial diplomacy," telling Thouvenel that he "was placed in a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference. M. Th

had shewn in his communications with M. de [V1:pg 294] Flahault, but that he knew too well the general opinions prevailing in England to have made proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what proposals could have been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the Emperor and M. Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the South would not

ition of the South would not have prevented the North from continuing its armaments and undertaking the expedition now in progress, and a r

feared you [Cowley] had not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make the proposal through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked to see me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and the French Ambassr. could make the [V1:pg 295] most Confidential as well as Official Communications[619]." This rebuff was not regarded as final, though exasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all being agreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in their favour. Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and on April 18 had still another conversation with Napoleon. He reported Russell's refusal of an interview, and that he had see

ant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was all important. Yet "on the whole Lindsay is hopeful," wrote Mason in conclusion[621]. Within a fortnight following arrived the news of the capture of New Orleans, an event upon which Seward had postulated the relief of a European scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers a serious blow. May 13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him, personally, that "he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the moment but to watch events[622]." Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the fran

"there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong as ever that we must ultimately fail[625]," but on May 16, that "the effect of the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet ... the Times came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; it had believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it has an article still m

thcoming, and the attention, now all focused on McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited in vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence of Northern power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond. McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washington that foreign Powers were about to of

:pg

been talking more freely than usual exactly because of anxiety at Northern success, for McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily, if slowly, progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recent instruction fr

ise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is, however, very much puzzled to devise any mode of intervention, which would have the effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I should suppose he would think it des

be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal of truth in M.

, one may "guess" that McClellan will be at Richmond, having very probably got ther

either or both the Armies opposed to them I think it would disgust the North with the war, rather than excite them to fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much from disease, recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the Government has hitherto

should come in the North, and even then regarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just possible."

those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which were so freely expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate Statesmen at Richmond. I know not how to answer this question. But th

not see any way to any fair solution except separation--but that the North will not hear of

to Richmond, instructed him that France had no intention to depart from her attitu

:pg

ctory as I think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with success and power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would have resulted[632]." The wrong time for Southern pressure on Russell was conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. Immediately following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive instructions to Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the withdrawal of the declaration admitting Southern belligerent rights. Thouvenel replied with some asperity on the folly of Seward's demand, and made a strong representation of the necessity of France to obtain cotton and tobacco[633]. Adams, with evident reluctance, writing, "I had little expectation of success, but I felt it my duty at once to execute the orders," advanced with Russell the now threadbare and customary arguments on the

tories more or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I suppose my positi

fort in Parliament, and since the Washington mediation rumours were becoming current in London also, notice was given of a motion demanding of the Government that, associating itself with France, an offer of mediation be made to the contending [V1:pg 302] parties in America. Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had failed. Now the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a terrible war. Fri

sh opinion Butler's order was an incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for insult. In fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on Northern soldiers, whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. Palmerston was quick to accept the British view, writing to Adams, "it is difficult if not impossible to express adequately the disgust which must be excited in the mind of every honourable man by the general order of General Butler...." [V1:pg 303] "If the Federal government chooses to be served by men capable of such revolting outrages, they must submit to abide by the deserved opinion which mankind will form of their conduct[638]." This extraordinary letter was

laced on the question paper as to the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This question was due for the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell wrote to Palmerston that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that Palmerston might use the term "infamous" if preferred, a

:pg

dful state about the letter yo

and asked him to do nothing more

e enough, tho' he denies your

could add something to the effect that you respect the Government of President Li

ltogether it would be the best. Bu

ed feathers, yet making no apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly responded with vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter being official or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previous assertions as "offensive imputations." He also again approached Russell, who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but had received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding was "altogether irregular[642]." In the end Palmerston was brought, June 19, to write a long and

e in a letter to Russell, but knew privately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote for his motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postpone it[648]. The proposed motion [V1:pg 306] was now one for recognition instead of mediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer to Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable to the South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at the moment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in despair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with what prospect of success, to demand recognition from France[649]. This alarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused there would be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay's motion dying away for on consultation with "different parties,

uld be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way advantageous to their cause but I am disposed

TNO

and Documents, 186

l. 826. Nos. 154 an

1435. No. 362. Cowley t

nts, 1862-63, Pt. I, p. 54. Ad

Ibid.,

Lyons to Russell. Pr

6]

' Letters, I, 123. To

. Russell to Palmer

Papers. Ma

No. 244. Extract. Lyons t

Letters, I, 143. Adams t

Le Secret de l'Em

ion "The Yellow Book." It is interesting that the concluding paragraphs of this report of April 28, as printed in the Tribune, are not given in the printed volume of Documents Diplomatiques, 1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to certain pledges given by Seward as to cessati

unt is based on the Tribune translation and on Sewa

escribing the results, but does not bring out sufficiently Lyons' objections and misgivings. Newton thinks that Mercier "whether instructed from home o

nversation with Seward in which the latter declared the time had not yet come for mediation, that in any case France would not be accepted in that r?l

No. 250. Confidential. Lyon

8]

e language used in almost exactly the same terms that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance was attached by Benjamin to Mercier's v

No. 284. Confidential. Lyon

Diplomatiques, 1

No. 284. Confidential. Lyon

No. 315. Confidential. Ly

s. Russell to Lyo

1427. No. 544. Cowley t

uct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" and "tardy con

574. Cowley to Ru

Le Secret de l'Em

on, May 3, 14 and 16, 1862. Mason

, 1862. Billault was a member of the

apoleon III. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both writers drew their information wholly from Confederate documents, using, especially, the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither treats the matter from the English

Cowley to Russell. P

Papers. Ap

on, II, 239. A

pers. Cowley to

. No. 497. Confidential. Cowl

7]

1422. No. 403. Russell

d in fact "charged" Lindsay with a mission must remain in doubt. Cowley beli

Avril

r Lord

votre billet. J'es

ures auront du coton

Lord Russell n'ait

emandé l'autorisat

e d'Etat notre conv

i et vo

s sentiment

ole

l to Benjamin, April 18, 1862. Ne

s. Mason to Slide

Papers. Cowl

s. Slidell to Mas

ason to Slidel

of Adams' Le

Ibid.,

830. No. 338. Lyons to

. Lyons to Russell.

Russell to Lyons. Pr

iplomatiques, 186

s. Mason to Slide

rs. Spence to Ma

Russell, May 23, 1862, and Documents Diplomatiques

uments, 1862, pp. 97-99. Ad

on, Lord L

s. Spence to Maso

are given in Adams,

bid., p

Ibid.,

Palmer

1]

C.F. Adams,

id., pp.

s. Mason to Slide

Palmer

. Ser., CLXVII, p.

s. Mason to Slide

to Mason, June 18,

to me last night to

them to him to-night

opening my mind to

ve postponed my mo

thy of nine-tenths

of immediate recog

as not prepared to

s might have bee

rity of votes would

and I expressed th

would move (as the

or them to do so)

rivate member unde

to the

Lordship that reco

deny us the form of

exercised it was a

ading men in the N

ising it, and that

it exercised so as

he terrible war into

er said, that if th

nition of the Sou

orthern Armies wou

ote may produce the

ment to take the ma

he House was not y

far too grave to w

talk, without act

idell to Mason,

son to Slidell,

1]

, 3rd. Ser.,

s. Slidell to Mas

OR GOLD

raph by Elliot

NT

UME