Great Britain and the American Civil War

elves and as indicative of national policy and purpose. Upon all parties concerned they left a feeling of irritation and suspicion. But the public kne

in arms for which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 additional. The regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy by 18,000 men. Naval vessels widely scattered over

the border states of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly sympathetic with the rest of the South, were held to the Union by the "border state policy" of Lincoln, the first pronouncement of which asserted that the North had no purpose of attacking slavery where it existed, but merely was determined to prese

torial policy was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The Economist on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatal step" rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionate desire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so proud, but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of population and wealth, be the victor, though this could not conceivably result in any real reunion, rather in a

:pg

f course, of actual subjugation of the South (which no one dreams of)--the war which was to end in such a victory would still be, in the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, an objectless and unprofitable folly[319]." But by the middle of June the American irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudly and angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British press r

ion and berating the North for continuing, through pride alone, a bloody conflict doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummer attention was diverted from the ethical causes at issue by the publication in the Times of Motley's letter analysing the nature of the American constitution and defen

hing plainer, then, than the American right of revolution. But, then, it should be called revolution." "It is strange that Englishmen should find difficulty in understanding that the United States Government is a nation among the nations of the earth; a

which nominated Lincoln] strenuously asserted that doctrine." Coming at the moment when the British press and public were seeking ground for a shift from earlier pro-Northern expressions of sympathy to some justification for the South, it may be doubted whether Motley's letter did not do more harm than good to the Northern cause. His denial of a Northern anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a, professedly, more calm [V1:pg 176] and judicial examination of the claimed Southern r

Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous as inevitably destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The Daily News lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of a great leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all free people a question of upholding the eternal principles of liberty, morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be civil war, may perhaps without impiety be called 'God's most perfect instrument in working out a pure intent[322].'" The disaster to the North

ose themselves to the contempt of the world by their paltry theiscles on the divine origin and uses of Slavery[323]...." and writing "day after day ... the impression of my mind was strengthened that 'States Rights' meant protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, and free-trade in slave produce with the other world[324]." But at the same time he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the South in high colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in the North. The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he rode out from Washington to meet the defeated army, and his description of the routed rabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy toward the Capitol, so ridiculed Northern fighting spirit as to leave a permanent [V1:pg 178] sting behind it. At the same time it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that the Northern effort was doomed to failure, even thoug

open the metropolitan British papers which hitherto professing neutrality and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now each took a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke of Argyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear of British interference[329], and to Gladstone (evidently controverting the latter's opinion) that slavery was and would continue to be an object in the war[330], but the press, certainly, was not united either as to future British policy or on basic causes and objects of the war. The Economist believed that a

itten and boasted so much about their Republic that they have now become perfectly furious to find that their idol can be overthrown, [V1:pg 180] and that the false principles upon which the American Rep

s quite obvious, I think, that the North will succeed in reducing the South[335]." But Delane permitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the Times. Darwin is good testimony of the all-prevalent British feeling: "I hope to God we English are utterly w

offered this view as a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of her pamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North. Under the caption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings," the Saturday Review avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy War" in America. "The North does not proclaim abolition and never pretended to fight for anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the Sacred Symbol of Justice to the Negro; its cri de guerre is not unconditional emancipation." "The Governmental course of the British nation ... is not yet directed by small novelists and their small talk[338]." Thomas Hughes also came in for sarcastic re

circulation are considered. The Spectator was a determined and consistent friend of the North. In its issue of September 28 a speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized and attacked. The speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union would be beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen size and strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that the final outcome would be not two, but at least four separate nations, and stated his belief that the friendly emulation

he Confederacy "as soon as the Southern States had achieved for their independence that amount of security with which Great Britain had been satisfied in former cases[343]." But another article in the same issue contained a warning against forcibly raising the blockade since this must lead to war with the North, and that would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman. Two weeks later appeared a long review of Spence's American Union, a work very influential in confirming British pro-Southern belief in the constitutional right of the South to secede and in the certainty of Southern victory. Spence was

haracteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined with a supercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior nation, gave great offence to Americans, whether North or South. But the British press was yet united in proclaiming as correct the governmental policy of neutrality, and in any event Motley was right in stating "the Press is not the Government," adding his opinion that "the present English Government has thus far given us no just cause of offence[346]." Meanwhile the Government,

ens of South Carolina and explain the matter to him verbally, adding "you should act with great caution, in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the new Confederation by Great Britain." Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I am authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this matter to you," thus after all implying that a real negotiation with the South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent similar instructions to St. André, the French Acting-Consul at Charleston[348]. Bunch received Lyons' official letter on July 19[349], together with a private one of

ingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the Confederate Congress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris except for the article on privateering[353]. Bunch took great pride in the secrecy observed. "I do not see how any clue is given to the way in which the Resolutions have been procured.... We made a positive stipulation that France and England were not to be alluded to in the event of the compliance of the Confederate Govt.[354]," he wrote Lyons on August 16. But he failed to take account either of the penetrating power of mouth-to-mouth gossip or of the efficacy of Seward's secret agents. On this same day, August 16, L

Government[356]. The language used by Lyons was such as to provide an excellent defence in published despatches, and it was later so used. But privately neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of the correctness of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest on August 18, and at once protested that no passport had been given, but merely a "Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a British Merchant residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he was carrying official despatches to the Foreign Office[357]. In fact Mure had long since taken out American citizenship papers, and the distinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion. Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, in taking charge [V1:pg 188] of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr. Bunch's confidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me not to forward himself any letters alluding to military or p

rance, through Cowley, as to her stand in the matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russell intimating by an enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), as to the initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it was Thouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through the Consuls[363]. This was an error of memory[364], and Cowley was perturbed by Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question. The latter stated that if a like American demand were made on France "undoubtedly he could not give up an Agent who had done no more than execute the orders entrusted to him[365]." This looked like harmony, but the situation for the two countries was not the same as no demand had been made for the recall of Belligny. Cowley was, in reality, anxious and suspicious, for Thouvenel, in

t step to the recognition of the Southern States by Great Britain has been t

hey will continue to recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's Government have not recognized and

y, will send away Lyons," and he thought that Seward ought to be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive part of Bunch's supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sending reinforcements to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel about Bunch, we may rest on our oars for the winter[372]." There was nothing further to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of the British refusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at Washington was writing in a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract assertions of principles," but accustoming the North to the practice of British recognition of Southern belligerent rights[373]. Lyons believed that Seward would not go further than to withdraw Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious for the return of Mercier (long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "our position is unluckily not exactly the same with that of France[374]." On October 12 Lyons conferred at length with Seward on

be Seward's final determination, was that if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letters carried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I mean the [V1:pg 193] distinction between B. merchant and B.S., and the distinction between a document requesting that the bearer 'may be permitted to pass freely and receive all proper protection and assistance' and a passport[377]." Russell, on receipt of Bunch's explanation was also dissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated Lyons' instructions against entrusting despatches to persons carrying private correspondence, and second, because Bunch "gives no distinct denial" to the newspaper stories that he had gossiped about his activities and had stated them to be "a first step toward recognition[378]." These criticisms were directed entirely to Bunch's conduct subsequent to the overture to the South; on the propriety of that act Russell suppo

ons. It is the business of Seward to feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to be the most grateful food he can offer[383]." For Russell saw clearly that Great Britain could not object to the removal of Bunch on the purely personal grounds alleged by Seward. There followed in [V1:pg 195] due course the formal notification by Adams on November 21, just six days before he learned of the Trent affair, which had occurred on November 8. That alarming incident no doubt coloured the later communications of both parties, for while both Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative papers, such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the only point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain that future occasions might arise where, in defence

concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton from America, due to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The latter now informed Lyons that his reply had outlined the following steps: first, complete harmony of action between England and France; second, recognition of Southern independence; third, refusal longer to recognize the blockade; fourth, England and France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment," when the North became disheartened, the present moment not being a good one[387]. This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument over this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, but thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced the idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to develop other so

this time reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons insisted [V1:pg 198] that the North would most certainly declare war on any power that recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of attitude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France could get cotton was by a Northern conq

s' complaint about Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would magnify [V1:pg 199] that incident int

od sense in Merci

I am persuaded tha

and scale. It will

k a blockade for t

e, powers have often

arrels. We prop

ch we think fair an

nd good. But, if yo

se them, our medi

to see us your en

to hold this la

were to be adopt

f the year, or imm

f Parliam

as but a briefly held thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Nor was he alone in minist

ca, our best and t

ve begun, and to kee

n North and Sou

ion] would be the dan

nflict went on; b

be pleaded by th

th you that the w

proceeding, unless,

that want was far more

ty is that some cott

and that we shall

from othe

o do seems to be

text to the Washin

the other hand, we

our fellow co

see what the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]." Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention. Since Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point which Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no expanded treatment here. Its significance is that

:pg

cier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyons into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he "had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered the time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the South" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied that he did not b

ad just escaped a "trap." Two weeks after this Russell learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch's recall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six days later, on November 27, London heard of the Trent affair of November 8. It is small wonder that Russell [V1:pg 202] and his colleagues felt an increasing uncertainty as to the intent of the United States, and also an increasing irrit

TNO

omist, May

d., June

f the American Civil War. Publi

y News, Ju

work is in effect a condensation of Russell's letters to the Times,

Ibid.,

imes, Augus

rible epistle has been read with quite as much avidity as an average President's message. We scarcely exaggerate the fact when we say, the first and foremost thought on the minds of a very large portion of our people after the repulse at Bull's Run was, what will Russell say?" Ibid., p. 297. As

sions see G.H. Putnam, Memories

at of Manassas or Bull's Run seems to me to show a great want of zeal. For I cannot believe the d

spondence, II, p. 3

ne Papers, Au

omist, Aug

ng Star, Se

Bull, Sep

cussed fully in

1861. Dasent, De

ept. 17 and Dec. 11, 1861.

tator, Sep

ay Review, S

tator, Sep

an article in the Times of October 9, arguing that even if the South were r

e. By Justin McCarthy and J

tator, Sep

ay Review, N

ead, and furnished the argument for many a pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself so

rence from Bernard's la guage is per

dence, II, p. 37. To hi

ee ante

respecting International Maritime Law." No. 21 and Inclosure. Belli

days were here required to transmit a letter that in ordinary times would have reached its destination in tw

. Private. Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in r

"low morality" and that Southern privateers would be in reality pirates. F

's account privately was that he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally unfit to be intrusted with anythi

oft, Seward

Papers. Bu

XV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Ex

2. Lyons to Russe

Lyons, Aug. 18, 1861. Copy in L

. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Ex

rs. Bunch to Lyo

orrespondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur.

specting International Maritime

. Russell to Palmer

. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Ex

Cowley to Russell. P

V. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exeq

y to Russell, Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Pap

. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Ex

as ignorant of Seward's intentions, and that the Queen wished a modification of the "phrase

No. 12. Ada

ept. 13, 1861. (Cited in

. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Ex

. Russell to Palmer

Lyons to Russell. Pr

André. It will have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier sent their instructions to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier was addressed to St. André. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thus th

ons to Russell,

Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatu

al, Lyons to Bunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was inf

. No. 381. Russell to Lyo

ny specifically that he had told anyone of his activities. (Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords, Vol. XXV. "

Exequatur." No. 17. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting unindicated eli

roceeding being deemed advisable with a view to gratify the American Public, Mr. Bunch has merely been selected as a safer object

untenance, but I said nothing. From my knowledge of Mr. Seward's character, I was sure that at the moment nothing which I could say would make so much i

rs. Lyons to Russe

s. Russell to Lyo

12. 1861. He added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems

. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Ex

rmitted to remain privately at Charleston. (Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded by the United State

other negotiation "that British representatives were careful to preserve perfect

Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing that the mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass him in his relations with the North. Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea, and adde

ers. Lyons to Rus

rote to Head, "If we can get through the winter and spring without American

72. No. 585. Lyons to

606. Lyons to Russell. Co

ole, Russe

ee ante

ize the Southern States. A step further would enable us to open the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless be a great calamity."

ne expressing himself as worried about cotton but stating that the North was

m Seward to his wife showing that he appreciated thoroughly the prob

3. No. 623. Confidential. Ly

ething of that suspicion of France indicated by Cowley, and for both men these suspicions d

:pg