icon 0
icon TOP UP
rightIcon
icon Reading History
rightIcon
icon Log out
rightIcon
icon Get the APP
rightIcon

Peace Theories and the Balkan War

Chapter 8 WHAT MUST WE DO

Word Count: 3371    |    Released on: 01/12/2017

ood intention not enough-The organization of the great forces of modern

ine that he at least shall not reject, with that silly temper which nearly always meets most new points of

of each one of us; to correct the temper which made us, for instanc

built, or conscription to be introduced, or soap or pills to be sold, effort, organisation, time, money, must be put into these things. But the greatest revolution that the world has known since mankind acquired the right to freedom of opinion, will apparently get itself accomplished without any of these things; or that at least the Government can quite easily attend to it by asking other Governments to attend a Conference. We must realise that a change of opinion, the recognition of a new fact, or of facts heretofore not realised, is a slow and laborious work, even in the relatively simple things which I have mentioned, and that you cannot make savages into civilised men by colle

as ineffective. If the mere meeting and contact of people cleared up misunderstandings, we sho

stem or turn the drift of opinion. What is needed is a permanent organisation of propaganda, framed, not for the purpose of putting some cut and dried scheme into immediate operation, but with the purpose of clarifying European public opinion, making the great mass see a few simple facts straight, instead of crooked, and founded in the hop

mic institutions, our industrial organizations, the political bodies, must all be reached. An effort along the right lines has been made thanks to the generosity of a more than ordinarily enlightened Conservative capitalist. But the work should be taken up at a hundred points. Some able financier should do for the organization of Ba

tigate the nature of the relationship of insects, we have none to investigate the nature of the relationship of man in his political grou

And that can only be done effectually if the two bodies learn something of the aims and objects of the other. The need for a Navy, and the size of the Navy, depends upon policy, either our own policy, or the policy of the prospective aggressor; and to know something of that, and its adjustment, is surely an integral part of national defence. If both these Navy Leagues,

in the Lobbies of the House of Commons; the Labour Party might have their Permanent Delegates in the Lobbies of the Reichstag; and when any Anglo-German question arose, those delegates could

ew to the objects in question. All efforts in this direction have been concentrated upon an attempt to realiz

to arrive at a workable scheme for consuming one another. The elementary conceptions, the foundations of the thing are unworkable. Our statecraft is still founded on a sort of political cannibalism, upon the idea that nations progr

END

out clearly in a recent letter addressed to the Press by my friend

ng Lord Roberts' speech, you will find that though it is variously described as "diabolical," "pernicious," "wicked," "inflammatory" and "criminal," the real fundamental assumptions o

lity than the fact of the speech itself, especially when we remember that Lord Roberts did but adopt and a

e aware of the intentions of Germany-65 millions of people acted upon by all sorts of complex political and social forces-than is Lord Roberts? Do we

that that policy would follow the same general impulse that our own has done in the past, and would necessarily follow it since the relation

he sufferance of stronger nations, who, when pushed by the needs of an expanding population to do so, will deprive us of the capacity for carrying on those vital functions of life, and transfer the means of so doing to themselves to their very great ad

nge it. Mr. Churchill by implication warmly supports it. At Glasgow he said: "The whole fortune of our race and Empire, the whole treasure accum

force, does achieve the best for its people by that means; it does mean that if you are not stronger than your rival, you carry on your trade "on sufferance" and at the appointed

preventing the war. Lor

er or probable combination of powers shall dare

taken straight from

"the way to make war

o make vict

, Liberals and Conserv

om" as se

re modest principle (enunciated in the preamble of the German Navy Law); namely, to be sufficiently strong to make it d

ice which Mr. Churchill and Lord Roberts thus give to the nations of the world, and w

e., that trade and the means of livelihood can be transferred by force. We have transferred it in the past. "It is excellent policy; it is, or shoul

, and they will then, in the light of this advice, be able to put the right interpretation upon our endeavours to create a great c

the inevitable struggle-for the other "axiom" that safety can be secured merely by being enormously stronger than your rival is, as soon as it is tested by applying it to the two parties to the conflict-and,

ell founded? If it is, conflict is inevitable. It is no good crying "panic." If there is this enormous temptation pushing to our national ruin, we ought to be in a panic. And if it is not true? Even in

ems to arise from the fear that if we deny the nonsensical idea that the British Empire would instantaneously fall to pieces were the Germans to dominate the North Sea for 24 hours we should weaken the impulse to def

r becomes not a ri

dreds but thousands of questions arising out of it. And I think that gives me a somewhat special understanding of the mind of the man in the street. The reason he is subject to panic, and "sees red" and will often accept blindly counsels like those of Lord Roberts, is that he holds as axioms these primary assumptions to which I have ref

fundamental facts of this problem they create the impression that Mr. Churchill's axioms are unchallengeable, the panic-mongers will have it all

blic opinion, by encouraging the study and discussion of the elements of the case,

xtraordinarily useful work, but we can only hope to affect policy by a much more general inte

dies just the formula most readily understanded of the people. It constitutes a constructive doctri

are so entrenched th

pinion generally, effo

ead. Mere isolated con

ent character, are al

that have

rmanent and widespread

ches and affiliated

g its work on some

hich can supplant the

le and

er. So long as these misconceptions are dominant, nothing is easier than to precipitate panic and bad feeling, and unless we can modify them, we shall in all human probability drift into conflict; and this incident of Lord Roberts' speech and the comment which it has provoked, show that for some not

ery fai

HAY

Claim Your Bonus at the APP

Open