Hume / (English Men of Letters Series)

erence between the signification of the terms when applied to them and when applied to those animals which possess language. The thoughts of the former a

which it represents, that the association becomes indissoluble. No Englishman, for example, can think of the word "dog" without immediately having the

d language approaches perfection, in proportion as the shades of difference betw

er, mouth; while the names of impressions or ideas considered as parts or attributes of a complex whole, are adjectives. Thus redness, considered as part of the complex idea

ling of relation. The words which serve to indicate predication are verbs. If I say "silver" and then "white," I merely utter two names; but if I interpose between them the verb "is," I express

y of verbs, the word is the sign of a complex idea, and the predication is expressed only by its form. Thus in "silver shi

y are made to indicate that a belief, or predication, is a memory, or is an expect

o a memory, it follows that, in the long run, all propositions express either immediate states of consciousness, or memories. The proposition which predicates A of X must mean either, that the fact is testified by my present consciousness, as when I say th

philosophical tenets, turns upon the value and the origin of verbal propositions, that this summary

would be impossible to follow him throughout all the windings of his long journey, within the limits of this essay. I purpose, therefore, to limit myself to

erning causation, have, more than any other part of his teaching, co

stratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these two figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Proposition

use it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contra

but such as are expressed in the Inquiry, we may confine ourselves to the latter; and it is needful to look narrowly into the propositions here laid down, as much stress has been laid upon H

ind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought witho

of the relations between its sides? The fundamental proposition of all Hume's philosophy is that ideas are copied from impressions; and, therefore, if there were no impressio

n experience, before their relations can be perceived. Form and number are mere names for certain relations between matters of fact; unless a man had seen

icular case of the predication of similarity; if there were no impressions, it is obvious t

ies the possibility of intelligible speech, that terms shall always have the same meaning; or they are propositions the negation of which implies

that "two straight lines cannot inclose a space," means that we have no memory, and can form no expectation of their so

act, and the contrary proposition is inconceivable. If I remember[26] something that happened five minutes ago, that is matter of fact; and, at the same time, it expresses a relation between the event remembered and the present time. It is wholly inconceivable to me that the event did not happen, so that my assura

ssible to prove, that the cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than these circumstances; that the experiences with which they are concerned are among the first which arise in the mind; that they are so incessantly repeated as to

ssary trouble; since the ordinary process of association appears to be amply sufficie

ar about the axiom of causation, "That whatever event has a beginning must have a cause;" whether

e sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary. The evidence by which he suppo

ch produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by e

ceed, any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and will be succeeded by an effect. The scientific investigator who notes a new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, b

me indeed takes th

ently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment find existen

notorious that, to the unthinking mass of mankind, nine-tenths of the facts of life do not suggest the relation of cause and effect; and they practically deny the existence of any such relation by attributing them to chance. Few gamblers but would stare if they were told that the falling of a die on a particular face is as much the effect of a definite cause as the fact of its falling; it is a proverb that "the wind bloweth where it listeth;" and even thoughtful men usually receive with surprise the suggestion, that the form of the cr

however, is of the circular sort, for the major premiss, that all d

, to say that an idea is necessary is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact tha

on arising in the brain, it is utterly impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina. In the same way, he who touches anything with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to believe that the sensation of contact is at the end o

has come into existence: therefore A had a cause," is obviously fallacious, if A is not previously shown to be one of the "many things." And this objection is perfectly sound so far as it goes. The axiom of causation cannot possibly be deduced from any general proposi

experience. Experience, as we have seen, stores up memories; memories generate expectations or beliefs-why they do so may be explained hereafter by proper investigation of cerebral physiology. But, to seek for the reason of the facts in t

upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object Cause, the other Effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them: some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.... But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist.... The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two bi

me gives a sketch of the method of allocating effects to their causes, upon which, so far as I am aware, no improvement was made do

ty which we discover to be common amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must a

of the method of di

fer. For, as like causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find our expectation to be dis

the method of concomitant

ise from the several different parts of the cause. The absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable part of

awkwardly stated, contains a sugg

to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward its influence and operation. For as like effects necessarily follow from lik

in the cause which, as we say, produces the effect, and we call this something Force, Power, or Energy. Hume explains Force and Power as the results o

l. In the former case, there is a strong suggestion of something having gone from myself into the ball; in the latter, of something having been received from the ball. Let any one hold a pi

ume

ke or blow of an external object that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can, a priori, draw no inference, we

th to exist in a fire, to imagine that the subjective sensation of effort or resistance in ourselv

ort or resistance; and that we have not the slightest means of knowing whether it has anything to do with the production of bodily motion or mental changes. And he points out, as Descartes and Spinoza had done before him, that when voluntary motion takes place, that which we will is not the immediate conse

ch the member itself, whose motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof that the power by which the whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and un

ts, may be urged from the unquestionable fact, that we do not know, and cannot know, that volition does cause corporeal motion; while there is a great deal to

TNO

des the "records of our memory" amo