Hume / (English Men of Letters Series)

nected with it, and endowed with numerous "faculties," such as sensibility, understanding, memory, volition, which stand in the s

itive faculty by a material world of real objects, of which our sensations are supposed to give us pictures; others, such as the memory and the reasoning

essions; to form conceptions of mental phenomena as they are given us by observation, without any hypothetical admixture, or with only so much as is definitely recognised and held subject to confirmation or otherwise; to classify these phenomena according to their clearly recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomenclature which suggests nothing beyond the results of observation. Thus chastened, observation of the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a

rceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though fa

vour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of the mind than that it is a series of perceptions. Whether there is something in the mind that lies beyond the reach of observation; or whether perceptions themselves are the

ally produce, destroy, influence and modify each other.... In this respect I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than a republic or commonwealth, in which the several memb

hen we take a general survey of all our perceptions or states of consciousness, they naturally fall into sundry groups or classes. Of

ar, see, feel, love, or will;" in other words, "all our sensations, passions

int images of impressions in thinking

y be resolved into simpler constituents. All simple ideas are exact copies of impressions; but, in complex ideas, the

f resolution into the simple impressions of red colour, rose-scent, and numerous others; and we may have a complex idea, which is an accurate, though faint, copy of this complex impression. Once in possession of the ideas of

ations" will be familiar with examples of the extreme difficulty which sometimes attends the discrimination of ideas of sensation from impressions of sensation, when the ideas are very vivid, or the impressions are faint. Who has not "fancied" he heard a noise; or has not explained inattention to a real sound by saying, "I

ume, these are of two kinds: either they are impressions of sensation, or they are impressions of reflection. The former are those afforded by the five senses, together with pleasure and pain. The latter are the passions or the emotions (which Hume employs as equivalent terms). T

ied with the results of a psychological analysis which regards some obvious compound

ychological anatomy, he would have learned that the emotions and passions are all complex states, arising from the close association of ideas of pleasure or pain with other ideas; and, indeed, without going to S

forded by the five senses, with pleasure and pain. Putting aside the muscular sense, which had not come into view in Hume's time, the quest

losopher's exposition of his views is so perplexed in style, so burdened with the weight of a cumbrous and uncouth scholasticism, that it is easy to confound the unessential parts of his system with those which

rine in a far clearer manner than any one else; but, for the purpose of the present summary view of Hume's philosophy, it must suffice

other impression, or idea, as an individual existence. It is perfectly conceivable that a sentient being should have no sense but vision, and that he should have spent his existence in absolute darkness, with the exception of one so

f there were no memory of the latter, the state of the mind on the second occasion would si

d sentient being were like ourselves, there might arise in his mind two altogether new impressions. The

to occur together, then a third feeling might arise which is neith

ure and pain, they are ultimate irresolvable facts of conscious experience; and, if we follow the principle of Hume's nomenclature, they must be called impressions of relation. But it must be remembered, that they differ from the other impressions, in requiring the pre-existence of at least two of the

elementary character of impressions of relation; and, when he discusse

d cause and effect, are said to be the "uniting principles among ideas," "the bond of union"

e place of that inseparable connection by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of attraction, which, in the mental world, will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself i

this section Hum

ideas which are the common subjects of our thought and reasoning, and generally arise from some principle of u

ogether in the imagination," or "which make objects admit of comparison," and seven kinds of relation are enumerated, n

he qualities of "resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect," are said to "attract one another" (save the mark!), and so become associated; though, in a subsequent part of the Treatise, Hume's great effort is to prove that the relation of cause and effect is a particular case of the process of association; that is to say, is a result of the process of which it is suppo

nto the real nature of relations. Speaking of equali

a property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from

perception of equality. On his own principles, Hume should therefore have placed this "perception" among the ideas of r

he mind" by the excision of one territory and the addition of ano

press

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-exis

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ity and di

Ide

uctions in memory

and if so what, portion of these content

accepts the definition. It follows, that neither simple sensation, nor simple emotion, constitutes knowledge; but that, when impressions of relation are adde

ough very arbitrary, limitation of the signification of "knowledge." But, on the face of the matter, it is not obvious why the impression we call a relation should have a better claim to the title of knowledg

of knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to another pain, or to some other mental phenomenon. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient,

ch disposed to call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that disposition and save their consistency, by declaring that even the simplest act of sensation contains two terms and a relation-the sensitive subject,

TNO

ut it is awkward. I have elsewhere proposed psyc

se fait dans nous de telle sorte que nous l'apercevons immédiatement par nous-mêmes: c'est pourquoi non-seulement entend

s en la chose qui pense ne sont que des

rks of Spinoza; for the invariably abusive manner in which he refers to that type of the philoso

discussing pride and

sideration there is no room either for pride or humility." That is, pride is pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain conceptions of one's self; or, as Spinoza puts it:-"Superbia est