Submarines, Mines and Torpedoes in the War

INES I

services as "daylight torpedo-boats," for their greatest value lies in their ability to perform the same task in the "light" as the ordinary surface torpedo-boats and destroyers can do under 125cover of darkness or fog-that of creeping up close to an enemy, and launching a torpedo unobserved-they have been given, during recent years, so much greater speed, armament, and range of action, that they can no longer be looked upon as small boats just suitable for daylight torpe

ing two torpedoes); and, secondly, by increasing the distance from which the first projectile can be launched, owing to the increased range of the modern torpedo. There are also the advantages derived from the battery of quick-firing guns installed on the decks of modern submarines. Although at the present time these guns are only of small power they nevertheless afford a means of defence-and even of attack under favourable circumstances-against hostile surface torpedo-boats, destroyers, and air-craft. In fact, a flotilla of submarines cou

as risen from 100 to over 1,000 tons, and the range of action from 400 miles at economical speed to 1285,000 miles. Exactly what this means is more easily realized when it is stated that the earlier types of submarines could scarcely cross the English Channel and return without taking in supplies of fuel, and in rough weather were forced to remain

es and fresh water sufficient only for a few days were carried. In the 129latest British, French and German vessels proper sleeping and messing accommodation is provided, and supplies of all kinds and in sufficient quantity to

lming inrush of water result-overcoming the buoyancy quickly obtained by blowing out the water-ballast tanks-then the vessel must inevitably sink, and the 130question of whether or not the crew can save themselves becomes a problem to which no definite answer can be given, although a special means is provided in all modern vessels belonging to the British Navy. Speaking generall

p the submarine must first get within torpedo range of it; and yet it is on this very point that the strategy and tactics of submarine warfare revolve. A clever naval tactician once described the submarine as a "handicapped torpedo-boat." The two points on which he based this opinion were-the (then) slow speed of these vessels compared with that of the surface warship, and its almost total blindness when submerged. These two defects were for some years the principal drawbacks of all the submarines afloat; but since that naval expert pronounced submarines to be "handicapped torpedo-boats," great changes, great improvements have been made. The speed of the su

g at Rig

ly adds to the difficulty of the attacking submarine, but also the direction from which the attack must be made. This feature is shown in the second diagram, which illustrates a submarine attack on a vessel steaming at 30 miles an hour, such as a fast destroyer or fleet scout. On the other hand, a decrease in the speed of the on-comi

ttp://novel.tingroom.com/file/upload

Attack by

s the line of vision. The submarine sights the warship at a distance of just over 11 miles on her port bow. "B" sh

f attack, she totally submerges and steers forward at a speed of 10 miles an hour. The loss, an

at point "C," but for many reasons this is not the best point of attack. The gain of about six minutes on the longer course enables the s

ccess, attack a destroyer, or other vessel, steaming at 30 (statute) miles an hour, havi

ine. Here, again, the two vessels would be equal; but the most favourable point of

rface vessel accomplishes the 10-mile journey along course "B"-arriving at point "C" 20 minutes in advance of the 136submarine. The table shows how the submarine, by changing her course and "throwing" the surface vesse

e rate at which the two vessels would be approaching each other, the submarine which attempted it would run considerable risk of being detected, and thus destroy her chances of a successful attack. Co

and calculations made assu

1

ther-fine a

2

onsideration strong t

3

nemy on t

4

s at point "D" in

5

submarine travels from point "D" in

he deciding factor. Strategems will undoubtedly play an important part in submarine warfare. An example of this has already been afforded when the 138German submarines resorted to the dishonest trick of laying in wait behind a trawler engaged in laying mines, over which the flag of a neutral state had been hois

rpoise

attack rises quickly to the surface by the action of her horizontal rudders, then dives again, only remaining above water for a few seconds to enable her commander 139to get a glimpse of the enemy, and to take bearings. The submarine

f the Fixed

ine on a line with the centre of the boat, and cannot be moved or aimed in any way apart from the boat itself. It therefore becomes necessary for the submarine to be aligned by the steering rudders on the object of attack before the torpedoes can be discharged. I

otilla v. Su

submerged. Therefore, if each boat was not previously instructed how to act, there would not only be the likelihood of the greater portion of an attacking flotilla firing their torpedoes at one or two vessels of the hostile fleet and allowing the remainder eith

ise A

concealment of the submarine is practically perfect. If she has not been sighted up to the moment of diving, she will almost certainly reach, unob

lour; but this, although causing the hull to be almost totally invisible in certain weather, was found to be useless, as, on a bright day with a blue sky, the green showed up clear against the bluish tint of the surrounding sea. After many months of experimenting, a pale, sea-gree

range; and when cruising on the surface she is equally as invisible at a distance of a few miles. These qualities enable the submarine in nearly all cases where her speed per

awash" condition, and proceed for from 2?? to 5 miles, as might be deemed expedient. She would then submerge and steer by her periscopes, each of which has a field of vision 144of 60 degrees. He would be a very keen look-out who would be able to detect the few square inches of periscopic tube at a distance of three miles. As this distance lessened, it might be advisable, if the sea was very calm and if the object of attack was stationary, for the submarine to slacken speed, so as to prevent any spray being thrown off by the periscopic tube. Assuming, however, that the optical tube was seen by the enemy, it would be extremely difficult to hit it with gun-fire

s, however, that they never remain at anchor or even stationary in an exposed position, and seldom-if wise-proceed without des