The Desert Mounted Corps

solution and vigour with which the first part of the plan, the attack of Beersheba, was carried out. Owing to the waterless

d, and the operations commenced anew at some later date, against an enemy forewarned of our plans,

nched positions from Beersheba to the sea. This was primarily an infantry operation. Secondly, the pursuit of the enemy over the plain of Philistia, culminating in the capture of Junction Station, and

g 11] operations could be thought out in detail be

reira and Sharia. After the fall of Beersheba the cavalry would thus all be concentrated on the right flank of our forces, ready to pursue the enemy when driven from the remainder of his po

the enemy's open left flank at Hareira, and e

him to his positions, and to draw reinforcements away from his left flank, an attack, preceded by a wee

try, a great deal of preliminary work was required. The water supply had to be developed, tracks and the crossing places of wadis improved and marked on the maps, and the enemy positions

g

r line was organ

nded to El Gamli, and this was held by one cavalry division, which also supplied the outposts and patrols in the wide 'no man's land' at this end of the line. A second cavalry division w

ss mats, and erected over rectangular pits dug in the ground. These bivouac shelters gave fair cover from the sun

owards cutting down the time taken to turn out in 'marching order.' The division in the line had plenty of work to do, with daily outposts, e

the iron ration) of bully beef, biscuit, and groceries, besides the few articles of clothing he was allowed to take. Two nose-bags on each saddle carried 19 lb. of grain (two days' forage on the marching scale). A third day's forage was carried in limbered G.S. wagons, three to each regiment. The divisions were, therefore, self-supporting for three days, without recou

t of them was ever given beforehand, even to the Staff, they constituted a real test of mobility. The time taken by each unit to turn out was noted by Staff officers, and the keenest rivalry sprang up between the divisions and the different units of each division to make the best showing. Ration and store wagons were packed each night, nose-bags filled after the last feed and tied on the saddles, and all harne

march all night, and occupy a line of posts on the high ground west of Beersheba by dawn next morning. Behind this line of protecting posts the infantry corps and divisional commanders, and innumerable lesser fry, disported t

h time it was not uncommon for regiments to cover seventy miles or more. Apart from the fatigue occasioned by thirty-six hours of constant anxiety and hard work, the absence of water caused severe hardship to the horses and no little discomfort to their riders. No water for h

isted of a narrow, stony cleft in the rock sides of the wadi, down which troops could only move in very narrow formation, often only in single file. When, as sometimes happened, a whole brigade of cavalry had to cross by one of these narrow drifts, while the bed of the wadi was being swept by shrapnel and high explosive shell the whole time, tempers were apt to get short. We on our side could rarely spare an aeropl

by the bodies of men and horses), and the flies were innumerable and persistent. It was with a sigh of heartfelt relief that the troops saw the last of the motor car

never varied in their description of the operations. 'The enemy made a determined attack on Beersheba with about seventy squadrons supported by artillery.' This was the invariable formula. 'After heavy fighting, the hostile force

s of the highest value in the subsequent operations. The sappers attached to the cavalry divisions also took advantage of the reconnaissances to reconnoitre for water at Khalasa and Asluj, where they subsequentl

Column during its advance across Sinai. After the occupation of El Arish, the doubling of the railway track had been taken in hand, and, by the end of September 1917, the double track extended as far[Pg 17] as Deir el Belah. During September and October a branch line was laid from this place to S

r el Belah was organised by the Royal Navy during September. All the supplies for the 21st Corps, which held the coastal sector of our line, were then carried

ments concealed, that, up to the moment when our attack was launched, the enemy believed that we had six infantry divisions still in the Gaza sector and only one in the eastern sector. This apparent disposition of our troops confirmed him in his mistaken op