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The Desert Mounted Corps

CHAPTER IV THE DECISIVE BATTLE

Word Count: 3252    |    Released on: 17/11/2017

n attack on Sharia and Hareira, and in developing the scanty water supply, and organising wate

ued during the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, in the course of which it became clear that the enemy had concentrated practically the whole of his available reserves in this area. The 19th Turkish Division, the rema

to meet this counter-attack. Had they succeeded in involving any considerable portion of our army in the difficult, waterless country around Tel Khuweilfeh, it is probable that our main force would have[Pg 39] been so weakened as to be unable

thus prevented from rendering any assistance to the garrisons of Sharia and Hareira when those places were attacked. This, in fact, was exactly what happened. General Allenby refused to be drawn to the

tiff day's fighting, culminating in the seizing of the hill of Ras el Nukb, near Tel Khuweilfeh, to which the enemy attached great importance, and which he defended most stubbornly. The brigade withdrew from Ras el Nukb at nightfall, as it was too much in advance of our

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enemy, and by evening had gained only a precarious footing on the south-western spur of the hill. The caval

eavour to drive it in. He completely failed in his effort, and our troops, after three days and nights of incessant fighting, short of food and water, and, at one time, perilously short of ammunition, not only held their own, but drove back the Turks inch by inch, and at last, on the morning of

, thus permitting our concentration for the main attack to proceed unhindered. The cavalry had an especially hard time. The country was quite unsuited for mounted work, and so all their fighting was done on foot. But it was necessary to keep th

ed up, and, by the morning of the 5th of November, had finally given out. The horses then had to be sent back to Beersheba to water. From the Dhahariyeh area to Beersheba and back again is twe

h Brigade at Ras el Nukb for the same purpose. This brigade had also been thirty hours without water. On the 5th the New Zealanders remained at Ras el Nukb, since there was no brigade available to relieve them

little water here and there, generally at night. Indeed many units of the division spent every night in a search for water that too often proved fruitless,

aulted Ras el Nukb repeatedly on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of November. This hill was held in turn by the 7th Brigade, which had c

s in readiness for the assault on the Sharia-Hareira po

secure the troops engaged in this attempt from molestation by the considerable body of enemy about El Dhahariyeh, a force, known as Barrow's Detachment,[9] was formed to protect our right flank. This force consisted of the 53rd Division, the New Zealand Mounted Brigade, and the Camel Corps Brigade, with the Yeomanry Division, which crossed over to the ri

s possible, though not very probable, that the enemy might attempt to throw his cavalry through this gap in an endeavou

0th and 60th Divisions, which were attacking on the left of the 74th, had farther to go, and the heavy wire of the main Kauwukah position had to be methodically cut before the attack could be launched. To reach its objectives, the 10th (Irish) Division had to cross a perfectly flat, open plain, two mi

e Kauwukah and Rushdi systems. The 60th Division reached Sharia station, but was unable to cross the Wadi Sharia to capture the hil

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hree miles south-west of Sharia, in readiness for the expected break-through. The

the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions were ordered to push forward, as soon as the way was clear, the Anzac Division, on the right of the movement, being directed to keep well in advance, so as to outflank any enemy opposition. The 60th Division was

our front which were believed to be capable of supplying the large number of horses we had were at Bir Jemameh, where there was reported to be a good well with a steam pumping plant, and at Tel el Nejile and Huj. The Anzac Division was

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aria in the early afternoon, but the enemy succeeded in withdrawing in good order to a long ridge on the north side of and overlooking the Wadi Sharia, where he held out al

ook some time to disengage this brigade, and the division was consequently unable to move farther that night. The 3rd A.L.H. and the 5th Mounted Brigades, however, were sent round the right flank of the 60th Division, to endeavour to make a mounted attack on the retreating enemy. They had to rid

advanced on its first objective, the station of[Pg 46] Umm el Ameidat on the Junction Station-Beersheba line, where the enemy had a large supply and ammuni

once to the north and east located a strong enemy rearguard in position on the hill of Tel Abu Dilakh. The 2nd Brigade was despatched to the assistance of the 1st, and the two brigades attacked the hill dismounted. The position was taken just before dark, after severe l

h with the Anzac Division about Abu Dilakh late at night.

a pre-arranged place, and notify its location to the divisional ammunition columns,[Pg 48] which could then send their light, limbered wagons to that place to refill. The spot chosen for the 7th of November was Tel el Sharia, and the column was directed to report there at 11 A.M. The order was actually issued on the morning of the 6th, the staff officer who

a

e situation on the even

ere seemed to be something wrong at Tel el Sharia, so he thought he had better go to

ntinued for the following three days with growing intensity. On the 5th and 6th the Navy joined in the fight, and plastered the town with shells of heavy calibre. During the night of the 6th a series of attacks

f the Wadi Hesi, early in the afternoon. At the same time two brigades of the 52nd Division made their way along[Pg 49] the seash

n

avalry ne

enemy pho

tt

chine-gun battery in

enemy pho

erintended the making of this line. He expressed keen disappointment that the Turks had been driven out of it before they had had time to settle down, and declared that, had they got there a few hours sooner, all our operations would have come to a standstill. No doubt he was biassed in favour of his own handiwork, but there is little doubt that the Turks

TNO

General Sir G. de S. Barrow, G

berately turned their heavy artillery on to a convoy of ambulance

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