The Desert Mounted Corps

in it as soon as possible. The Australian Mounted Division, therefore, left Huj on the evening of the 9th, although all its horses were not yet watered, and marched to the north-

gade. This brigade, in turn, dropped pickets to be picked up by the rearguard. Signallers with lamps were sent by the two leading brigades on to every prominent hill top during the march, to flash the letters of

Hesi, and the rest of the horses got their fill at last,

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h had left Huj early in the morning, after having spent all the previous night trying to water horses. This division took over Arak el Menshiye, and extended a little farther east. Thus, on the afternoon of

or lorries and camels along the single, narrow, ill-metalled road from Gaza to Junction Station. Between Gaza and Beit Hanun the road was unmetalled and deep in sand, and lorries had great difficulty in getting over this part, even with the light load of one ton, which was the maximum allowed to be carried. The marching ration of our

all its transport to assist the other two divisions. All the available motor lorries and camels were organised in convoys along the Gaza-Junction Station road, from Deir el Belah to El Mejdel, whence the supplies were distributed to divisions by the horse-drawn wagons of the divisional trains. These trains had heavier work than any other part of the force. Even on the rare occasions when the cavalry got some rest at night, there was n

s also in a bad way. Moreover, owing to the rapid advance of the last two days, forage and rations had failed to reach this division. There was absolutely no grazing to[Pg 64] be found, and what little grain the Turks had left in the villages was securely hidden. The 2nd A.L.H. and 7th Mounted Brigades, some of the horses of which had not had a drink for eighty-four h

rch for water, that too often proved fruitless, while the enemy, moving in his own country, utilised the hours of darkness to put such a distance between his troops and their pursuers as enabled him generally to entrench lightly before our cavalry came up with him in the morning. The marching powers of the Turks are phenomenal. Time after time, aft

and organise[Pg 65] some sort of line of resistance. Already, on the 10th of November, his troops could be seen digging in along the

. Regiment attacked, and drove them off. General Cox at once ordered a bridgehead to be established on the north bank, and entrenched. The possession of this bridge was of great value to us during the next few days. The Nahr Sukereir, in its lower course, runs between high, precipitous banks, and form

age, causing a number of casualties among the Arabs and Turks. The Arabs fled to the shelter of their houses, and the prisoners were sent back out of the way. Later on in the morning, some troops of the brigade returned[Pg 66] to the village to continue watering. No sooner had they entered the place, than the enemy guns opened fire again. A thorough search of the houses now revealed two Turk

Mounted Brigades were withdrawn to water and rest near Hamame. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade held an outpost line during the night f

horses slowly after the retreating Turks, advanced a few miles, and located the left half of the enemy

ed anxiously if we had any men from his village[Pg 67] among our prisoners. We, of course, could not tell, as all prisoners were sent back as soon as possible after being taken. The old man remarked sadly that he had not had much hope of finding any of them, as he

ion become in the Turkish Army that there was a standing reward of ￡5 Turkish offered to all natives for delivering a deserter to the Army authorities. An organised propaganda was also carried on by the officers, by means of lectures to their men, the chief feature of which was a description of the tortures and hideous deaths inflicted on their prisoners by British soldiers. These lectures were illustrated by pictures suppli

counter-attacks were simply heroic. Out-numbered, out-gunned, out-man?uvred, doomed to defeat before even the attack was launched, they yet advanced with the most reckless courage, shouting their war cry, 'Allah

ng day to preparations for the attack on the enemy positions. The delay would afford time f

from east to west, behind our line, and relieve the 2nd and 7th Brigades on the coast. The Australian Mounted Division was directed to extend to the east, to a point south-west of Zeita, so as to cover the country vacated by the Yeomanry. Its r?le was to protect the right flank of our forces during the o

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time the New Zealand Brigade and the Camel Corps were ordered up from the Beersheba area, to join the cavalry force on the left of our lin

attempt the capture of the hill. The 2nd A.L.H. Regiment, which was selected for the task, reconnoitred the river west of the bridge during the day, but found no crossing place. Undeterred by this, the regiment concentrated in the evening under cover of the hill of Nebi Yunus, which concealed it from the Turks, and the Australians swam their horses across the riv

navy reopened the sea-borne supply line, with the mouth of the Nahr Sukereir as its terminus. The reopening of the sea

ery unit of the Turkish army, showed that the enemy rearguards had been driven in on his main body, and that we were now opposed by the whole of the remainder of his force. It was soon apparent t

h was located by the Royal Air Force on the 11th, running from Kubeibe, three miles north-east of Yebnah, through Zernuka, El Mughar, Katrah and Tel el Turmus, to about Beit Jibrin. Each of these localities had been prepared for defence, and was held by a considerable force of Turks.

of[Pg 71] the ground. The line ran parallel to, and about five miles to the west of, the railway he wished to defend. The right flank rested on a high, steep ridge connecting the villages of

f first driving the enemy from his advanced positions along the north bank of the Nahr Sukereir. The hot east wind had continued to blow thr

e left by the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, and on the right by part of the 75th Division. The Turks were well posted, and fought stubbornly, and the village was only taken after an hour and a h

uac south of Esdud. The 8th Mounted Brigade had arrived in time to take part in the capture of Burka. The New Zealand B

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task of making a big noise, and carried it out so effectively as to att

oncentrated in a concealed position at Summeil, sent a squadron into Berkusie, and pushed out strong, fighting patrols to the east and south-east. The 4th A.L.H. Brigade was directed to send a squ

al von Falkenhayn in person. The attack was made by two columns, one of which had come down the track from Junction Station to Tel el Safi, and the other by rail to El Tine Station. Just after the attack was launched two large motors came tearing down the road to Tel el S

attery H.A.C., attached to the brigade, would be lost, as the country was a mass of rocks, and it was impossible to move them quickly. Assisted by the magnifi

right of the 5th Brigade just as the latter had cleared Balin. Almost immediately afterwards the enemy turned his attention to Berkusie, now occupied

ne Bir Summeil-Khurbet Jeladiyeh. Hardly had the order been given when an enemy train appeared, coming south along the Beersheba line. It stopped west of Balin, and disgorged a fresh force of Turks, which deployed rapidly, and advanced against the left of the 5th Brigade. Our other two batteries were now, however, in action on the high ground no

ge. Here, favoured by the protection afforded by the houses and walls of the village, and by the rocky

ctor in extricating the brigade from Balin. Towards the end of the fighting there, the Turks had got to within a few hundred yards of our troops on three sides. A few of them even succeeded in getting across our line of withdrawal, and several of the battery drivers we

eneral Hodgson, however, elected to keep his artillery together, and under his immediate command, only attaching a battery to a brigade when on some[Pg 75] special mission, as in this case,

as was generally the case in these operations, a division is moving on a very wide front, there is little doubt t

doubt that their fire materially assisted in the final defeat of the enemy thrust. Had these two batteries been attached to the 3rd and 4th Brigades, one of them would probably have been far to the south towards Zeita, and the

ess than it achieved. It was a repetition, on a smaller scale, of his tactics at Tel Khuweilfeh, after the battle of Beersheba. In both

he seemed to know, as by instinct, the minimum force necessary to hold any counter-thrust that might possibly be made. In this case aeroplane and cavalry reconnaissances had establishe

u

ter the

va

Australian Cavalry advanci

TNO

asserif; these in turn are divided into Kazas, each under a Kaimakam; and eac