Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism

the Philosophy

that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, because the doctrine that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing.[2] ο? περ? τ?ν Α?νησ?δημον ?λεγον ?δ?ν ε?ναι τ?ν σκεπτικ?

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aundice, so that Heraclitus begins from a preconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps to the other schools of philosophy as well.[1] As the statement concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, then Scepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus than to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use common subject matter. "But we are afraid that the Sceptical School not only does not help towar

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o this remarkable fact, does he offer any explanation of it, or express any bitterness against Aenesidemus, whom he always speaks of with respect as a leader of the Sceptical School. We are thus furnish

nt to the world the results of preceding Sceptical thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of ?ποχ?, and perhaps in part their author, and the author of the eight Tropes against aetiology.[1] He develops his Scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor the intellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality.[2] He denied the possibility of studyin

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tius 17

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ossibility of all knowledge, he advocates a theory that the original substance is air,[1] which is most certainly a dogma, although indeed a deviation from the teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sextus seemed unconscious, as he says,

m could form the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, but he does not express surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus personally, or offer any explanation of the apparent contradiction; and while his writings abound in references to him as a respected leader of the Sceptical School, he sometimes seems to include him with the Dogmatics, mentioning him with the δογματικ?ν φιλοσ?φων. [7] In fact, the task of presentin

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ath. IX. 3

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eller Op. cit

p. I.

ath. VIII.

rted to the Heraclitan theories as they were modified by the Stoics. These same theories were the cause of his separation from the Academy, for his chief accusation against the Academy was that it was adopting the dogmatism of the Stoics.[1] The matter is complicated by the fact that Tertullian also attributes to Aenesidemus anthropologic

empted of the apparent heresy of Aenesidemus towards the Sceptical S

presents Aenesidemus as claiming that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, the expression used is ο? περ? τ?ν Α?νησ?δημον, and in many of the other places where Sextus refers to the

eller Op. cit

litismus des Skeptikers

p. I.

lso seeks to prove that Sextus could not have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus from any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by

inconsistency on the part of Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his alleged

res the fact that there is no trace of any such school or sect in history, calling themselves followers of "Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus," but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in Alexandria at the time

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heir system of proofs of the harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus on the connection of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the Sceptics: "Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same thing," with the apparent deduction from this, that "Contrary predicates in reality apply to the same thing." Sextus wishes, according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus does not

ions of Aenesidemus is logical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem from the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings of Heraclitus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The Sceptic says, "Contradictory predicates are apparently applicable to the same thing," and Aenesidemus accepts the Heraclitan result-"Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing." From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus would seem t

hard Op.

sks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus should have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion, Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to Aenesidemus relate to the doctrin

ression so often repeated by Sextus-Α?νησ?δημο? καθ? ?ρ?κλειτον -shows that some one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Heraclitus' doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many authorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justify his quotations from Heraclitus, he had possibly given a short abstract of Heraclitus' teachings; and the misconception advocated by Zeller and found both in Tertullian and Sextus, refers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted fr

1-35; Grundriss der Geschichte

Laert. IX.

ertul

s reputation as an historian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes calls his books τ? δ?κα τ?ν σκεπτικ?ν κα? ?λλα κ?λλιστα. [1] Furthermore, that Se

g. IX.

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ng the Gree

there had been many writers in the Sceptical School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly could not all have misrepresented him. We must remember that Sextus was at the head of the School, and had access to all of its literature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and if he had indeed made it, his contem

aw in the history of philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticism always follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples, Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, who was a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss the absurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked would involve an a priori construction of history. There is no apparent reason for Sai

Op. cit. p.

et, Op. c

et Op. ci

word, but are only applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. The Heraclitism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as he understood the statement, that "Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing," only in the phenomenal sense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same for all

p Op. cit

VIII. 8; Hirzel

dicates in reality apply to the same thing; while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common phenomena to be true

and other closely Belated subjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one of them, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable

th his followers, and is literally translated, "Aenesidemus and his followers." It is noticeable, however, in the writings of Sextus that he uses the expression ο? περ? often for the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this in the mention of Plato and Democ

heim Op. c

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ish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; but such a misunderstanding certainly cannot be asserted in regard to the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for the reasons previously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whose solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical, i.e., that Aen

endency introduced by Antiochus. In fact, Sextus himself claims a close relation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.[1] Aenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, b

xtus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably one of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,[2] while Sextus, in regard to all of these men, opposes the idea that they were Sceptics.[3] Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic, and even Homer,[4] and quo

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. IX. 11

. 213-214;

g. IX.

g. IX.

. IX. 11

g. IX.

ical School of Medicine was considered identical with Scepticism, although not so by Sextus himself.

eeing with him that Aenesidemus ever consciously changed his basis. He was a Sceptic in the Academy. He left the Academy on that ac

account for his a

ctic spirit

n himself of this careful systemi

escape the tendency which his training in the Academy had unconsciously given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove that the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It is not necessary either to explain the matter, as both Hirzel and Natorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by claiming that the truth of contradictory predicates which Aenesidemus accepted from Heraclitus referred only to phenomena. The history of philosophy gives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absolute Scepticism, and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of many of

upon his mental development. In formulating Scepticism, and in advocating it against the many enemies of the School, and amidst all the excitement of the disruption from the Academy, and of establishing a new School, it was inevitable that his mind sh

full significance of which he could not foresee. There must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneer work, and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and a compiler like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies which the two centuries since the time of Aenesidemus had made plain. Aenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absolute Sceptical consistency. He was nevertheless the