Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism

ptical

ent the sum total of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many outside the na

word with a different meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2] Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word modus[3] and τρ?πο? also is often used interchangeably with the word λ?γο? by Sextus, Diogenes Laertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with τ?πο?, [4] and τρ?πο? is found in the oldest edition of Sextus.[5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of probabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of doubt.

lauterung Pyrrh.

76; Adv. Mat

cius, Cap

yp. I

on Hyp. I. 3

. IX. 11

Euseb. praep.

cius on H

Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a movement with those of the founders themselves; he gives these Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' work entitled Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving at least a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly or through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correction of the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, whic

Saisset Op

d Op. cit.

Eus. praep. e

original with Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing a more decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found in the Tropes of ?ποχ?. Many of the illustrations given of the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity than that of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancient times, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing principles of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. The terminology, however, with very few e

er Op. c

e powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not es

g. IX.

p. I.

ion, and closes his list of them, in their original concise form, with the remark, "We make this order ourselves."[3] The order is given differently by Diogenes, and also by Favorinus.[4] The Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth is the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the eighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh by Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by Sextus. Diogenes says that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls the eighth, and Sextus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement does not correspond with th

yp. I

Math. V

yp. I

g. IX.

g. IX.

entions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case, howe

based upon external differences. To the first class belong the first, second, third and fourth; to the second class, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and also the ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is applied objectively both by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of the Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, but principally to show the relation of outward objects to each other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance, and it has also a higher subjective value than the othe

Die Tropen der

yp. I

g. IX.

rial that was the common property of the Sceptical School. Many of these illustrations show, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific and medical te

on the varie

n the differen

ences in the constituti

upon circ

position, dis

ed upon

quantities and cons

) Rel

frequency or rar

toms and laws, mythical bel

p. I.

egular gradation, from the arguments based upon differences in animals to those in man, first considering the latter in relation to

for example the subjectivity of color[2] and sound.[3] All knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not absolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Locke regards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in this statement.[4] The form and shape of objects as they appear to us may be chan

p.. I.

p.. I.

yp..

yp..

yp..

s given of this result show a familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastes and habits of many animals,[3] but were probably few of them original with Sextus, unless perhaps in their application; that this train of reasoning was the common property of the Sceptic School, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins his exposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that of Sextus.[4] His illustrations are, however, few and meagre compared with those of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by both of them

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yp..

p.. I.

. IX. 11

lauterung Pyrr. G

yp. I

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ent with the Sceptics.[1] Sextus, however, says that his course of reasoning is different from that of most of the Sceptics on the subject,[2] as they usually applied their arguments to all animals, while he selected

as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to all, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind to him, and keeping off those who do evil.[8] The reasoning power of this animal is proved by the story taken from Chrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in following a scent. After s

yp. I

Brochard O

p. I.

yp. I

yp. I

yp. I

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Hyp. II. 166;

ds that they make.[1] We have an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which reason

yp. I

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og. VI

parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and the body, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in sense-perception and in opinion.[3] Most of the illustrations given of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; of the more general of these I will note the only two which are also given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope,[4] viz., Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, who shivered in the sun, and Andron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he

yp. I

Hyp.

yp. I

. IX. 11

sm primitive, Revue phil., Paris 1

g. IX.

differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general statement that they choose different professions; while Sextus elaborates this point, speaking of

s this, anothe

s the beautiful l

g honours and crowns th

ng life in room

enjoys, in a swift shi

yp. I

p. I.

yp. I

mena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordinary example given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much more condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the results to be deduced from it.[3] The consequence of the incompatibility of the mental representations produced through the s

yp. I

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og. IX

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different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds us of the

ικ? φαντασ?α,[2] by this representation the soul grasps a real existence. There is a λ?γο? in us which is of the same kind, σ?γγενο?, or in relation to all nature. This argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we apprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his teachings.[3] The Sceptics could not, of course, accep

p. I.

. Math.

rweg Op.

Math. V

p. I.

sense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All of these conditions of the body entirely change the character of the mental images, producing different ju

ver able to review the differences of his ideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only are subject to careful inspection.[4] Furthermore, no one is free from the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he can be unbiassed to judge his

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contrary, declares that abnormal states are also conditions according to nature,[2] and just as those who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who are in health, so also those not in health are in a state that is natural to those not in health, and in some respects according to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking exist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3] One mental representation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental conditions. Diogenes states t

g. VII.

yp. I

yp. I

g. IX.

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nment upon them. It makes the difference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, and place of objects, thus taking apparently their real exist

the illustration[4] of the neck of the dove differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an illustration used by Protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the senses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light sunny and purple.

yp. I

yp. I

g. IX.

120; Diog.

18, ed. Brandis; Pappen.

yp. I

laces.[4] The condition of the organ of the ?γεμονικ?ν, or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures. Pappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea of a priori, only on a materialistic foundation.[5] A careful consideration of the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with the philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, ?σω? δ? κα? α?τη (? δι?νοια) ?πιμιξ?αν τιν? ?δ?αν ποιε?ται πρ?? τ? ?π? τ?ν α?σθ?σεων ?ναγγελλ?μενα, [6] stood alone, without further explanation, it might well refer to a priori laws of thought, but the explanation which follows beginning with "because" makes that impossible.[7] "Because in each of the places where the Dogmatics think that the ruli

yp. I

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to Bekker's ed

Er. Pyr.

yp. I

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g. VII.

yp. I

. Math.

of most things depend on their quantity. Things act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large quantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the form of a solid.[1] The r

p. I.

yp. I

g. IX.

. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been used to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to the e

yp. I

p. I.

p. I.

g. IX.

omet or an earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to them.[1] The value of objects also depends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold.[2] Furthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and

p. I.

yp. I

yp. I

g. IX.

thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his introduction[3] to the life of Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes.[4] As it is apparently one of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much used in discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wide ethical significance, and must also have held an important place in the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophical discussions. The definition[5] in the beginning of Sextus' exposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken from Aristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs and dogmatic opinions,[6] and the definition which Diogenes gives of law in his life of Plato[7] is similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps from Chrysippus.[8] The argument is based upon the differences in development of thought, as affecting

yp. I

p. III

g. IX.

g. IX.

p. I.

icius, C

og. II

Gr. Pyrr. Gru

yp. I

og. IX.

rippa.[3] Agrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of the Sceptical School, but[4] his influence in the development of the thought of the School must have been great, as the transition from the ten Tropes of the "older Sceptics" to the five attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows the entrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in it. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written from an entirely different standpoint. The ten Tropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are rather rules of thought leading to l

e based up

egressus i

Rela

e hypot

irculus i

e first one everything in question is either sensible or intellectual, and in attempting to judge it either in life, practically, or "among philosophers," a position is developed from which it is impossible to reach a conclusion.[7] According to the second, every proof requires another proof, and so on to infinity, and there is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning.[8] According to the third, all percepti

yp. I

g. IX.

g. IX.

. IX. 12

Natorp. Op.

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Hyp.

critus and Plato; and to those that claimed some of both to be true, to the Stoics and the Peripatetics.[3] The three new Tropes added by Agrippa have nothing to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon the possibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of logic, in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely, with the exception of the tenth, to material objects. Sextus claims that these five Tropes also lead to the suspension of judgment,[4] but their logical result is rather the dogmatic denial of all possibility of knowledge, showing as Hirzel has well demonstrated, far more the influence of the New Academy than the spirit of the Sceptical School.[5] It was the standpoint of the older Sceptics, that although the search for the truth had not

yp. I

p. I.

III. 185-186; VI

yp. I

l Op. cit

yp. I

yp. I

Bekker's edition

o far as the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the New Academy can be unravelled, and the separation of Pyrrhon

c, and simplifying the amount of material to be used. In a certain sense Saisset is correct in saying that Agrippa contributed more than any other in completing the organisation of Scepticism,[1] but it is not correct when we

Tropes. Ritter attributes them to Menodotus and his followers, and Zeller agrees with that opinion,[3] while Saisset thinks that Agrippa was also the author of these,[4] which is a stran

et Op. ci

yp. I

III. 38; Ri

et Op. ci

rough itself, because of the discord existing between all things of the senses and intellect, nor can it be known through something els

t, Sextus has well remarked in his introduction to them, t

p. I.

yp. I

istory of the development of sceptical thought. They have a much closer connection with the spirit of Scepticism than the Trop

of Aenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes against aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows:[1] "There are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who believe in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion." This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller ex

is no reference to the strongest argument of modern Scepticism, since the time of Hume, against causality, namely that th

iob. 17

Math. V

p. I.

weg Op. c

s contested against in all his Tropes, the ten as well as the eight.[1] They are written from

give testimony that is incontestable in regard to phenomena. For example,

is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain the inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at i

ow any order, as for example, the motion of the stars is explained by their mut

he same way as phenomena, as vision is explained in t

otheses about the elements, but not with common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world

probable are passed by, as Aristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collect

hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit like Epicurus an inclination or

table, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the a

yp. I

186; Fabricius,

ough the Tropes of Aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so prominent with Sextus, between the signs ?πομνηστικ? and ?νδειτικ?,[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his argument on the subject with the general assertion, Σημε?ον ο?κ ε?ναι,[4] and proceeds

ality has only a subjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an argument against its real ex

heir judicious and strong criticism, and are directed against the false method of observing facts through the light of preconceived o

. IX. 11

p. III

Math. V

g. IX.

yp. I

Maccoll Op

gnet Op.

ll Op. ci