Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism

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schools of philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presented is a work of the same name by Aenesidemus,[1] either directly used by Sextus, or through the writings of those w

ols of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the possibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and those that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The accusation against the Academicians, that they denied the possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptic

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Math. V

t the Sceptical arguments historically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes his treatment of the subject as general rather than critical, including a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its pri

f the claim of the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the great founder of the movement. In discussing the names given to the Sceptics, Sextus gives precedence very

t. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled περ? α?ρ?σεων, written shortly before our era, does not include Pyrrhonism among th

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ism, namely, ζητητικ?, ??εκτικ?, and ?πορητικ?.[3] The δ?ναμι?[4] of Scepticism is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every possible way to each other, and through the equal weight of things opposed, or ?σοσθ?νεια, to reach first the state of suspension of judgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or "repose and tranquillity of soul."[5] The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard to the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the grea

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. 7; Diog.

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us makes the only reality to consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind. He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown outside, about which the Sceptic can make no assertions. Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they affect life in four different ways. They constitute the guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the arts important.[5] According

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22; Diog.

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ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for

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g. IX.

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r an evil or a good, and so he thinks that "he escapes from difficulties easier."[3] For instance, he who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying "No more," is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4] For he who consider

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30; Diog.

Math. XI.

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hrew the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it produced a representation of the foam.[1] Thus the Sceptics

al to the intellectual, and vice versa, the present to the present, past, and future, one will find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It is not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, and consequently a state of ?ποχ? may always be maintained.[2] Although at

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, and consequently to have the attitude of still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the teachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-exist

mena to objects is. There is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object, and of all

n deal only with phenomena, and a

h. VII. 55;

. Math.

g. IX.