Battle Studies

account of the ba

mp, he noted that Pompey's army w

ed the troops already mentioned as the most reliable of his army. Between them, that is, between the center and the wings, he had distributed the remainder, consisting of one hundred and ten complete cohorts in line. These were made up of forty-five thousand men, two thousand of whom were veterans, previously rewarded for their services, who had c

t to guard the camp. Caesar had entrusted the command of the left wing to Anthony, that of the right to P. Sylla, and of the center to C. Domitius. He placed himself in front of Pompey. But when he saw the disposition of the opposing army, he feared that his right wing was going to be enveloped by Pompey's numerous cavalry. He therefore withdrew immediately from his third line a cohort from each legion (six cohor

exhort his men to do well, and seeing t

battle order would be broken up and his own soldiers, well disposed in ranks, would have to fight with sword in hand only men in disorder. He thought that this formation would best protect his troops from the force of the fall of heavy javelins. At the same time he hoped that Caesar's soldiers charging at the run would be out of breath and overcome with fatigue at the

and stopped in the midst of their run, in order not to arrive out of breath and worn out. Some moments after, having taken up their run again, they launched their javelins, and immediately afterwards, according to Caesar's order drew

exposed flank. As soon as Caesar saw this intention, he gave the signal to the fourth line of six cohorts. This line started directly and, standards low, they charged the Pompeian cavalry with such vigor and resolution that not a single man stood his ground. All wheeled about and not only withdrew i

n kept quietly at its post. These fresh troops relieved those that were fatigue

he cavalry, and urged them to do well, since their effort would bring victory. They repulsed the cavalry

He quit the battle and galloped to his camp, where, addressing his centurions who were guarding the praetorian gate, he told them in a loud voice heard by the s

e praetorium, despairing of

they did not object to greater fatigue and obeyed. The camp was at first well defended by the cohorts on watch and especially by the Thracians and barbarians. The men who had fled from the battle, full of fright and overcome with fatigue, had nearly all thrown their arms and colors away and thought rather m

ed therein. Of Pompey's army fifteen thousand perished, and more than twenty-four thousand took refuge in t

ion is so clearly shown that ther

olute, however, since Marius fought with two only. But, as we have said, according to the occasion, the genius of the c

ops, and he knew the apparent force of deep ranks to be a delusion. He did not hesitate to diminish his depth in order to keep the formation and morale of three-fifths of his troops intact, until the moment of their engagement. In order to be even more sure of

ce that these two thousand men would make Pompey's cavalry wheel about, and that his one thousand horsemen would then press the action so energetically that Pompey's cavalry would not even think of rallying. It happened so; and the forty-two hundred archers and slingers

-two hundred infantrymen slaughtered without a struggl

ain moral influence. But with trusted soldiers, duly trained, one can try a stratagem, and the men of Pompey had proven their dependability by awaiting on the spot, without stirring, a vigorous enemy in good order, when they counted on meeting him in disorder and o

. Forty-five thousand good troops lost scarcely two hundred men in this struggle for, with like arms, courage and ability, Pompey's infantry ought not to have lost in hand-to

epel him, and he was fought on the spot. Pompey had announced to them, says Caesar, that the enemy's army would be turned by his cavalry, and sud

ror is so great that they do not think of re-forming in their camp, which is defended for a moment only by the cohorts on guard. Just as at Cannae, their arms drop from their hands. B

us, however, add some other characteristic examples, which we shall sel

n the neighborhood of Rome, I do not recall now which, the R

the enemy, asking the consul for permission to dismount and fight on foot. This is true not only of Roman cavalrymen, for

allen, and carnage being all about them, they threw away their arms and started to scatter. The cavalry then dashed forward, with orders not to kill the i

valry and light infantry, then heavily armed phalanxes. At the approach of the mercenaries who were marching vigorously towards him the two lines formed by the elephants, the cavalry and light infantry, turned about and moved quickly to place themselves on

d lost practically nobody. It was a question as to whether

n hundred men, nearly all Gauls; the Romans fifteen thousand an

two thousand killed. This was a serious struggle in which Hannibal's third line al

alanx thirty-two deep. Twenty maniples took the phalanx from behind. The battle was lost by Philip

e gaps in the phalanx and killed the men embarrassed with their long pikes. They were effective only when united, abreast, and at shaft's length. There was frightful disord

d the Teutons from behind. There was frightful carnage; one

ty thousand men, Archelaus, one hundred and ten thousand. Archelaus was beaten by being surprise

against Archelaus, was a

g itself, because they pretended flight in order to get the cavalry away from the

hed an advantageous position and passed the night. At the break of day, Otacilius dispatched some four hundred horsemen and some infantry from the A

lry five to seven thousand strong, with his cavalry of six hundred to one thousand men, among which he had taken care to intermingle four hundred picked infantrymen.

gainst Scipio, Caesar killed ten thou

y-eight thousand men. Pompey with thirteen legions had sixty thousand troops of the line, six thousand cavalry, six thousand light infantry, six

hundred wounded; Pompey thirty-three thousand dead, and if Munda had not been so near, scarcely two miles away, hi

the Romans. It was in this way that their excellent tactics might be confused. Roman tactics were so excellent that a Roman general who was only half as good as

eseen, the more does it cause pleasure or dismay. This is nowhere better illustrated t

with cuirass and shield we

body but Gauls, his cannon-fodder, who f

nevertheless, with a tenacity that the

ightly armed, by saying: "As a rule, the lig

ure but little loss, the men not being at liberty

nks and files to open, so that his legionaries, closed in mass, paralyzed and forced to give way to a very strong pressure, might be able to kill and consequently demoralize the enemy. And indeed, as s