Battle Studies

l of P

y was deployed near it and on the same line, the maniples drawn close to each other,

of which were posted the light troops. There were in that army, including

placed the Iberian and Gallic cavalry on the left wing, next the river and facing the Roman cavalry. He placed on the same line, one half of the African in

the main body. As it was joined in a straight line with the rest, on separating, it was formed like the convex face of a crescent. This formation reduce

he former was as fit for thrusting as for cutting while that of the Gauls only cut with the edge, and at a limited distance. These troops were drawn up as follows: the Iberians were in two bodies of troops on the wings, near the Africans; the Gau

ian side, Hasdrubal had the left under his orders, Hanno the right, and Hannibal, who had his brother Mago with him, reserved for himself the command of th

s fought with fury and rather more like barbarians than Romans. This falling back and then returning to the charge was not according to their tactics. Scarcely did they become engaged when they leaped from their horses and each seized his adversary. In

ght at the same time. The action commenced in the center because the Gauls, being drawn up in the form of a crescent, left the wings far behind them, and presented the convex face of the crescent to the Romans. The latter then followed the Gauls and Iberians closely, and crowded towards the center, to the place where the enemy gave way, pushing ahead so forcibly that on both flanks they engaged the heavily armed Africans. The Africans on the right, in swinging about from rig

that it was the legionary infantry that would decide the fate of the battle, he pushed his horse through the fray, warded off or killed every one who opposed him,

sides, they gave him enough to do so that he might not have time to think of helping his own people. Indeed, when the left wing, where Hasdrubal commanded, had route

em, he gave them the fugitives to pursue, and led the Iberian and Gallic cavalry in a charge to aid the African infantry. He pounced on the Romans from the rear, and having bodies of cavalry charge into the mêlée at several places, he gave new strength to

rs diminished more and more, they were finally forced into a smaller circle, and all put to the sword. Attilius and Servilius,

hers were thrown under their horses; some of them escaped to Venusia. Among these was Varro, the Roman general, that abominable man whos

, only three hundred men found shelter in various towns. Ten thousand foot were taken prisoners, but they were not in the battle. 7 Of troops in

hood of four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred

s ana

rmished without result. The real combat commenced with the attack on th

n like Romans; because this falling back, then returning to the charge was not according to their tactics; s

opposite direction on seeing the Roman cavalry coming, the latter prudently slackened its gait, threw some javelins, and, making an about by platoons, took to the rear for the purpose of repeating the charge. The

is by an equal number. It rendered, as we have said, contact inevitable. These two cavalry bodies placed chest to chest had to fight close, had to grapple man to man, and for riders mounted on simple saddle cloths and without stirrup, embarrassed with a shield, a lance, a saber or a sword, to grapple man to man is to grapple together, fall together and fight on foot. That is what happened, as the account of Titus Livius explains it in completing that of Polybius. The same thing happened every time that two ancient cavalry organizations really had to fight, as the battle of the Tecinus show

minated by six to seven thousand Gauls and Iberians who did not lose even tw

that be

always console themselves with their bravery and conquerors never contradict. Unfortunately, the figures are there. The facts of the battle are found in the account, which sounds no note of desperation. The Gallic and Roman cavalry had each already made a brave effort by attacking each other from the front. This effort was followed by the terr

ite of the army, noble knights, guards of

en engaged by the Numidians. 9 The cavalry of the allies did not await the enemy. It turned its back immediately; pursued to the utmost b

o wings of the Carthaginian army and taken in rear by Hasdrubal's cavalry. It is also probable that the Gauls and Iberians, repulsed in the first part of the action and fo

he isolated infantryman possessing coolness. The Iberian and Gallic cavalry ought to have found behind the Roman army the reliable triarians penned in,

We know that his Gallic and Iberian infantry, protected by plain shields, had to fall back, turn, and

the attack of Hannibal's camp and the five thousand

twenty-eight thousand foot soldiers, or, counting Hasdrubal

, the number of combatants immediately engaged was the same on each side. Then there were neither guns nor rifles able to pierce the mass by a converging fire and destroy it by the superiority of this fire over diverging fire. Arrows were exhausted in th

was wip

y a forward oblique march and formed the sides of the salient. The entire Roman army, in wedge order, marched to victory. Suddenly the wings were attacked by the African battalions; the Gauls, the Iberians, 11 who had been in retreat, returned to the fight. The horsemen of Ha

of them; the first ranks, fatigued or wounded, wanted to retreat; but the last ranks, frightened, withdrew, gave way and whirled into the interior of the wedge. Demorali

alus, we cannot resist the temptation, though the matter be a little fo

city. It may be said that to Hannibal victory was not sufficient. He must destroy. Consequently he always tried to

in the masses; he believed in terror and he

the losses of Hannibal. Who, before Hannibal or after him, has lost as many as the Romans and yet been c

center, where he put his Gauls, his food for powder, was broken.

nibal knew how to make fight with singular tenacity. They probably felt as though they had escaped from a press, and, happy to be out of it, they thought only of getting further away from the battle an

ence of the Gallic troops, so broken

such a way that treachery could not injure him. He must have warned his troops that the center would be pierced, but that he wa

dier whether his own or the enemy's. He shows his greatness in this respect in all the different incidents of war, of campaign, of action. His men were not better than the Roman soldiers. They were not as well armed, one-hal

ditions been reversed, he would have changed his methods. The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to

knowledge of men that Hannibal possessed and his influence over the troops. His third line, the only one where he really h

gh state of morale, what des