Battle Studies

t and Mod

can be made of military men of all countries. They are always eager to expound traditional tactics and organization suitable to the particular character of their race, always the bravest of all races. They fail to consider as a

l matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. It is rarely taken into account; and often strange errors are t

not change. What should increase with the power of material is the strength of organization, the unity of the fighting machine. Yet these are most neglected. A millio

, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid,

tor, leaving aside generals of genius, and luck, is the quality of troops, that is, the organization that best assures their esprit, their reliability, their confidence, their unity. Troops, in this sense

ut battle. The destructive power of improved firearms becomes greater. Battle becomes more open, hindering supervision, passing beyond the vision of the commander and even of subordinate officers. In the same degree, unity should be strengthened. The organization which assures unity of the combatants should be be

t organization, and all organization is defective which neglects any means to strengthen the unity of combatants. Methods cannot be identical. Draconia

must have confidence in his right to command. He must be accustomed to command and proud to comma

composed, the first year, of one-third Hessians, two-thirds Prussians, to control the racial tendencies of troops of a recently a

nd organization has had the inevitable result. Battle has been between hidden skirmishers, at long distance, and has lasted fo

to have reappeared, which merely means a mêlée of fug

this end, and he continues to do so. It was thought that with long range weapons c

ing, governs him at each instant in war. The civilized man, in war, whi

nd the pursuit of wild beasts teaches the pursuit of man. General Daumas depicts Arabs as cav

te of things, requiring experts. War, so long as man ri

such resemblance in modern battle. This gr

cs, for the victors, who l

ed no part in

mprovement of firearms continues to diminish losses. This looks

flees from battle. The battle of Pharsalus lasted some four hours. Caesar broke his camp, which is done in the morning; then the formation for ba

irty. The battle had lasted up to exhaustion without loss by the English! Without Montauban the battle would have been terminated by complete and mutual exhaustion and without further losses. For the greater the fatigue, the less strength remained for piercing the armor. Montauban was at the same time felon and hero; felo

simple. Man is capable of standing before only a certain amount of terror. To-day there m

ake as an example the case of the peasants of the Vendée. Their unity and not individual instruction made them soldiers, whose value could not

more dreadful becomes modern battle, and di

consequently is less affected, man fearing man more than death. Astonishing losses seem to have been suffered

oral effect. The field of action to-day is more extensive than in Frederick's time. Battle is delivered

terrible power that against them too often discipline is broken. What is the solution? Have your combatants opened out?

ry as the ranks become more open, and the material cohesion of the ranks not giving confidence, it must spring from a knowledge of comrades, and a trust in officers, who must always be pr

t liaison between arms is lessened. This has its influence on morale. There is another advantage in reliable troops, in tha

y for scouting, for reconnoitering the terrain by skirmishers. This is something that the Duke of Gramont forgot a

werful, and that the material rank has the inherent lack of cohesion of open order. However, open order is necessary to economize losses and permit the use of weapons. Thus to-d

e Greeks and the Romans. The soldier was known to

ion, the confusion of battle. He seems to fight alone. Unity is no longer insured by mutual surveillance. A man falls, and disappears. Who knows whether it was a bullet or the fear of advancing further that struck him! The ancient combatant was never stru

terrible were its consequences. In modern combat, the

n; above all by the moral action of maneuvers. Dispersion brings us back to t

rategist, long before Napoleon,

est their trade, who are most dependable and of greatest fortitude. To diminish the effect of luck, it is necessary to hold longer, to wait for help from a distance. Battles resolve themselves into battles of soldiers. The

es such as the railroad, render more difficult such strategic surprises as Ulm and Jena. The whole forces of

s appears paradoxical. It is true nevertheless of the mêlée taken in the

a man who, hardly knowing how to sw

troops will more tha

d of new troops, look at the Zouaves of the Guard or t

ed to make the battle ord

Elements

at moment, would be ready to risk their lives? But oblige them to march for days and weeks to arrive at the battle ground, and on the day of battle oblige them to wait minutes, hours, to deliver it. If they were honest they

t in which he does not foresee success. There are some isolated characters of an iron tem

, the army is discouraged and takes flight (

t blood pleases the Frenchman more. He understands it, it appeals to his vanity; it is a characteristic of his nat

carry their officers with them. But they retreat

e directed, with their directors alongside of them or behind. With the forme

ght it useless to have them killed before the others. H

emoralize the rest. What is the solution? Leboeuf must have known that if the officer is not in front of his command, it will advance less confidently, that, with us, all office

as their ferocity. They massacred all who resisted; they massacred without the excuse of resistance. Terror preceded them, breaking down the c

eir emotion, the fear of advancing, without even losing their heads or their coolness. Fear with them never becomes terror; it is forgotten in the act

m and prevent their fear from becoming terror. Their emotion never allows them to sight, or to more than approximately adjust their fire. Often the

ot at all exclude cowardice, horrible devices

mind, so entirely different from ours. A Roman general who had as little coolness as we have would have bee

r when terror has seized you, as experience has shown it often does, you are as before a lion. You fly trembling and let yourself be ea

made possible and effective in battle by organization and mutual support. With unity and sensible formation men of an individual value one-third less beat those who were individually their betters. That is the essential, must be the essential, point in the organization of an army. On reflection, this simple statement of Napoleon's seems to contain the whole of battle m

stinct of self-preservation which at the last moment dominates them utterly, is not opposed by discipline. We have often seen fanatic eastern peoples, implicitly believing that death in battle means a happy and glorious r

chiefs; confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do wi

ways determined from the mechanical point of view, neglecting the e

es shorter and shorter and more and more violent

rely live, quietly going through with drills without understanding their application. Once a man knows how to use his weapon and obey a

are of his weapon; to know how to move to the right and to the left, forward, to the rear, at command, to charge and t

rs overload it each year. To know the essential well is better than having some knowledge of a lot of things, many of them useless. Teach this the first yea

Prussian victory over the Austrians in 1866, "It was ... because each man, being trai

eillance is indeed to be harried. This incessant surveillance weakens the morale of both the watched and the watcher. What i

al and Mo

time material and moral. The material effect of an organization is i

e vanquished. Moral effect does not come entirely from destructive power, real and effective as it may be. It comes, above all, from its presumed, thre

tc.), as the men know better how to use them, and as the men are more nu

rmations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a

ayed by the actions of the enemy. If he closes with you in spite of your superiority in means of destruction, the morale of the

y was twice as numerous. Caesar parried the blow, and his enemy, who saw the failure of the means of action he counted on, w

it is certain that everything that diminishes the enemy's morale adds to your resolution in advancing. Adopt then a formation which permit

fect of fear. It is easy to understand how much armor adds to the moral effect of cavalry action,

yonet distance (something extraordinarily rare), and the attacking troop does not

ainst such troops. (Witness battles in Spain and Waterloo). It is necessary to destroy them, and we are better at this than they by our aptitude in the use of skirmishers and above all in the mad das

s to execute fire in two ranks which never killed anybody. Why not put your skirmishers in advance? Why sound trumpet calls which they neith

y one sees that the enemy is not so terrible as he appeared to be. Physical effect does not. The Greeks tried to dominate. The Romans pref

. Pichegru played the traitor; this had great influence at home a

excellent in spite of conflict between and the inefficiency of its two leaders. Note the defensive retreat across the Rhine; the

comes to hand to hand fighting only to defend his body or if forced to it by some fortuitous encounter. Mo

oral impulse which estimates the attacker is everything. The moral impulse lies in the perception by the enemy of the resolution that animates you. They say that the battle of Amstetten was the only one in which a line actually waited for the shock of another line charging with the bayonets.

ant demoralizes the assailed. He is frightened; he sets his sight no longer; he does not even aim his piece. His lines are broken without

are in disorder and already have suffered a loss of morale under a certain amount of punishment. The moral superiority given by the offensive movement may be more than compensated by the good order and integrity of the defenders, when the

bayonet charges (where bayonet thrusts never occur), otherwise attacks under fire, will have an increasing value, and that victory will be his who secures most order and determined dash. With these two qualities, too much neglected with us, with willingness, with intelligence enough to keep a firm ho

get for the other body which awaits it, calm, ready, sure of its effect. The whole first rank of the assailant falls, smashed. The remainder, little encouraged by their reception, disperse automatically or before the least indication of an advance on them. Is this w

. After firing, they made swift attacks. If they had not, they might have fled. Anyhow the English are stolid folks, with little imagination

under a second fire is a man without

either be shaken nor driven back, who stand patiently the heaviest fire, y

, I see what it does, what it is capable of. It acts; I can estimate the effect of its action. But a force in formation is in hand; I know it is there, I see it, feel it. It may be used in any directio

roops do more to secure victory than do those actively engaged. This is true, whether such a body actually exists or whether it exists only in the imagina

tions taken by frontal attack, which deceive every one, generals as well as civilians, and which always cause the same mistakes to be made. It is time to teach th

ns at Arcola, and the position that held us up for three days, was evacuated. The evacuation wa

the morale of the enemy. That is to say, battle methods vary with the en

ins because of his slowness at the mercy of the victor. In modern battle the mounted man moves swiftly through danger, the infantryman has to walk. He even has to hal

ry of Stron

pay so much attention to it. What they paid most attention to was to seeing that everybody fought. We assume that all the

y, talk only of masses. War is waged by enormous masses, etc. In the masses, man as an individual disappears, the number only is seen. Quality is forgotten, and yet to-day as always, quality alone produces real eff

nseasoned, not yet dependable, whi

r troops were of poor quality

on the eve of battle. At a distance, numbers of troops without cohesion may be impressive, but close up they are reduced to fifty or twenty-five per cent. who really fight.

changed. Who to-day is braver than they were? And

, at Waterloo, and engaged enormous masses of infantry which did not give material effect. But it involved a frightful loss of men and a disorder that, after they had once been unleashed, did not permit of the rallying and reemployment that day of the tr

y and even that of cavalry to the moral effect of masses. The personnel of his armies was too changing. In ancient battle victory cost much less than with modern armies, and the same soldiers remained longer in ranks. At the end of his campaigns, when he

man in battle, and depended instead on formed

raining. But since the allies had recognized and adopted our methods, Napoleon really had a reason for trying something so old that it was new to secure that surprise which will give victory onc

he practical man not blinded by his supremacy. His entire good sense, his genius

e struck very little, but were struck a lot. These battles were great slaughters of Frenchmen, by English and other Frenchmen, who did not greatly suffer themselves. In what, except in disorder, did the Americ

be found. Perhaps only as many will be found as the enemy has battalions (Note Gideon's proportion of three hundred to thi

mbat

n clear, although we note that many of these ancient accounts are obscure and incomplete, and that we have to supplement them. In m

It is hard to tell which account is truthful, if either. Mere assurance may carry weight. Military politi

ne losses, the leaders are such

e facts stated are so entirely different. What is the truth? Only results can reveal it, su

degree a national pride which tended to hide unpleasant truths

pted the impossible, which is beyond even genius. After a terrible fight against English firmness and tenacity, a fight in which we were not able to subdue them, the Prussians appear. We would have done no better had they not appeared, but they did, very conveniently to sustain our pride. They were confronted. Then the rout began. I

f it. They jump perhaps from the frying pan into the fire. I have known two colonels, one of them a very brave man, who said, "Let soldiers alone before the enemy. They

mous oblique formation. Napoleon decided the question. All discussion of formatio

nt do you want me to guide on? How far should I extend? Is there anybody on my right? On my left?" The general says, "Advance on the enemy, sir. It seems to me that that ought to be enough. What does this hesitation mean?" But my dear general, what are your orders? An o

ne? We have none! Why not adopt that of Marshal Saxe? Ask

for it. We took Melegnano without artillery, without maneuver, but at what a price! At Waterloo the Hougoumont farm held us up all day, cost us dear and disorganized

be it understood. The Portuguese infantry in the Spanish War, to whom the English had taught their method of combat, almost ri

ll the officers, are confused and unoriented. This goes so far that often generals are found who have lost their divisions or brigades; staff officers who have lost their generals and their divisions both; and, although this is more easily understood, many company officers who have lost their commands. This is a serious matter, which might cost u

rs, at least in courage and decisions. All officers are not of such temper. There is need then of prescribed tactics conforming to the national character, which may serve to guide an ordinary officer without requiring him to have the exceptional ability of a Bugeaud. Such prescribed tactics would serve an officer as the perfectly clear and well defined tactics of the Roman legion served the legion commander. The officer could not neglect t

ed by experience, would prevent the gross errors of inefficients. (Such as causing skirmishers to fall back when the formed rank fires, and

t everything is improvised on the battle field and who find no bet

by flight (note the Vendeans) or escape by advancing, as you like. B

better. To demonstrate; try out and describe better. To organize, distribute better, bearing in mind that cohes

d restless people, who wish to finish things quickly and to know in advance where we are going. It must be based on the fact that we are very proud people, but people who would all skulk if we were not seen, and who consequently must always be seen, and act in the presence of our comrades and of the officers who supervise u

d have been lost. He alone, omnipresent, was capable of resolute blows that the others could not execute. His system can be summed up in two phrases; always attack even when on the defensive; fire and take cover only when not attacked. His method was rational, considering his mentality and the existing conditions, but in

ht with their maximum energy. This alone can give an organ

basic in war. In the mass, pride, vanity, is responsible for this dissimulation. With the tiny number of absolutely fearless men, what is responsible is their ignorance of a thing they do not feel. There is however,

ffect will be secured from skirmishers at six hundred paces. They will never, never, never, be nicely aligned in front of their battalions, calm and collected, after an advance. They will not, even at maneuvers. The battalion commander ought to be advanced enough to direct his skirmishers. The whole battalion, one-half engaged, one-half ready for any effort, ought to remain under his command

forward again, if the advance is resumed. The second line should be in the formation, battalions in line or in column, that hides it best. Cover the infantry troops before their entry into action; cover them as much as possible and by a

h precautions for second line battalions or first line troops not committed to action. Yet this

always from a prone position. They are made to rise with difficulty, eit