Battle Studies

es-Deep

anks of the battalion, coming up successively, would come in contact with it, pushing it forward.... Experiments made have shown that beyond the sixteenth the impulsion of the ranks in rear has no effect on the front, it is completely taken up by the fifteen ranks already massed behind the

f extraordinary calmness and coolness, thrown full speed on the enemy, at one hundred and twenty steps to the minute. To-day it would have to advance under a fire of five shots a minute! At this last desperate moment if the front rank stops, it will not

(so strong is routine and prejudice) attacks in close column. Such attacks are marked by absolute disorder and lack of leadership. Take a battalion fresh from barracks, in light marching order; intent only on the maneuver to be executed. It marches in close column in good order; its subdivisions are full four paces apart. The non-commissioned officers control

diminishing the danger; they are to flee or to throw one-self upon it. Let us rush upon it. Now, however small the intervals of space and time that separate us from the enemy, instinct shows itself. We rush forward, but ... generally, we rush with prudence, with a tendency to let the most urgent ones, the most intrepid ones, pass on. It is strange, but tr

gins in the rear, which is affe

confidence of the generals in their troops. Napoleon expressly condemns in his memoirs such attacks. He, therefore, never ordered them. But when good troops were used up, and his generals b

, of pushing, your force will disa

m. The first line of the assailant would be sensible of death and no one would wish to be in the first rank. Therefore, the enemy never merely stands; because if he does, it is you that flee. This alw

At the muzzle of the gun-barrel the bullet can not fail to find its mark. But if I can frighten them, they will run away. I can shoot them and bayonet in the back. Let u

es loaded arms and th

nd the victor is the one who kills most," is not founded on fact. No enemy awaits you if you are determined, and never, never, never, are two equal de

defeated them.... The English were not dismayed at the mass. If Napoleon had recalled the defeat of th

d that the French have never held out before the r

Yet his battalions in Italy drove

ch, no more than others, resist a resolute attack. All are persuaded that their attacks are irresistable; that an

enemy in an attack, for it indicates real determination. That is why it is necessary to secure good order and retain it to the very last. It is unwise to take the running step prematurely, because you become a flock of sheep and leave so many men behind that you will not reach your objective. The close column is absurd; it turns you in advance into a flock of sheep, where officers and men are jumbled together without mutual support. It is then necessary to march as far as possible in such order as best permits the action of the non-

ulse. No one denies that this moral impulse is stronger as one feels better supported, that it has greater effect on the enemy

not possible to flee, and until there is complete demoralization, absolute terror, the infantry appreciates this. Every infantryman knows it is folly to flee before cavalry when the rifle is infallible at point-blank, at least from the rider's point of view. It is true t

alf-distance, in order to avoid the frightful confusion of the mass. And yet, the allurement of mathematical reasoning is such that cavalry officers, especially the Germans, have seriously proposed attacking infantry by dee

. The troops who made the bold charge did nothing but strike and fire at backs. These instances show men unexpectedly finding themselves face to face with the enemy, at a distance at which a man can close fearlessly without falling out on the

a moral effect. They are t

hough cavalry possesses a speed that would bring on more of a push upon the front at a halt than the

st such use of his life. The Frenchman wants to fight, to return blow for blow. If he is not allowed to, this is what happens. It happened to Napoleon's masses. Let us take Wagram, where his mass was not repulsed. Out of twenty-two thousand men, three thousand to fifteen hundred reached the position. Certainly the position was not carried by them, but by the material and moral effect of a battery of one hundred pieces, cavalry, etc., etc. Were the ninet

and the surveillance of officers and comrades more difficult. In a battalion in closed column, this kind of temporary desertion is enormous; one-half of the men drop out on the way. The first platoon is mingled with the f

ully described in the battle of Caesar agai

p columns could there be than the

s-Supports-Re

finite tactics. Essentially it knows

s, or they march to the front as a flock of sheep of which three-fourths seek cover enroute, if the fire is heavy. The first method, although better than the second, is bad unless iron discipline and studied and practical methods of fighting insure main

o effective, a unit which closes up in order

ation; otherwise it is no more effective th

cannot be controlled. Often he cannot even be directed. Consequently it is necessary to begin an action at the late

s war. Wrong, wrong. To solve this problem, instead of scattering to the winds, let us increase the number

ers that composed the army, were not held near at hand, in formation. They fought badly. T

Saxe shows the strength of the tendency to

means. People were fond of them, and are yet. The Prussians for all their leaning toward parade, mathematics, etc., ended by adopting the best methods. The Prussians of Jena were

or skirmishers in large units, well supported. Our men have such a strong tendency to place the

ee that this talk of skirmishers in large bodies is nothing else but an euphemism for absolute disorder. An attempt has been made to fit the theory to the fact. Yet the use of skirmishers in large bodies

to secure destructive effect, and a good disposition of troops in formation as supports and reserves, so as to finish by moral effect the action of the advanced troops. The proper combination varies with the enemy, his morale and the terrain. On the other hand, the thin line can have good orde

ck, formation (not the formation of the drill ground but that adopted by those rallying to the chief, those marching with him,) no longer exists. This is because of the inherent disorder of every forward march under fire. The b

enced at the wings. Therefore, said experience, let us re?nforce the wings, and the battalion was placed between two picked companies. But it was found that the combat methods had been transformed. The elite companies were then reassembled into picked corps and the battalion, weaker than ever, no longer had re?nforced wings. P

Guard, it is true. But, outside of the picked corps, what was the French army then? Drove

dvantage belongs to the defense which is completed b

dy says that this renders impossible the charges of cavalry against infantry which has not been completely thrown

column, with large intervals and covered by a thick line of skirmishers, when the artillery has prepared the terrain, is very well. Peo

not commanded by an imbecile, as it sometimes is, it will avoid that particular conversation the arguments of which would break it up, although they may not be directed precisely i

n men come towards me; they are at four hundred meters; with the ancient arm, I have time to kill but two before they reach me; with rapid fire, I have time to kill

ropping out always exists, but it is less extensive with an open order, the men running more risks of being recognize

arge, because it will continue to fire. (Bugeaud's method of firing during the advance is good.) What is needed, then, is skirmishe

e him in a position to act immediately, individually. Then, wha

ike the Roman army. But to-day, who of us can explain page for page, the use of anything ordered by our tactical regulations except the school of the skirmisher? "Forward," "retreat," and "by the flank," are the only practical movements under fire. But the others should

more men will be put out of commission in less time. While the arm becomes more deadly, man does not change, his morale remains capable of certain efforts and the demands upon it become stronger. Morale is overtaxed; it reaches more r

ency of the troops not engaged, held in hand, capable of movement in any direction and acting as a great menace of new danger to the adversary, already shaken by the destructive action of the skirmishers. The same is true to-day. But the greater force of

d a very practical movement of going into battle, by platoons, which advance to the battle line in echelon, and can fire, even if they are taken in the very act of the movement. There is always the same dangerous tendency toward mass action even for a battalion in

et under such battle conditions formations are proposed which send skirmishers six hundred paces in advance of battalions and which give the battalion commander the mission of watching and directing (with six companies of one hundred and

te direction. They give the immediate command of the skirmishers in each battalion to the battalion commander who must at the same time lead his skirmishers and his battalion. This expedient is more practical than the other. It abandons all thought of an impossible general control and places the special direction in the right hands. But the leadership is too distant, the battalion commander has to attend to the participation of his battalion in the line, or in the ensemble of other battalions of the brigade or division, and the particular performance of his skirmishers. The

troops of the second line entirel

man. He will have difficulty in maintaining and directing these four companies under the operation of increasingly powerful modern appliances. He will have difficulty in watching them, in modern combat, with the greater interval between the men in line that

oment of an attack, should you lighten the moral anxiety of the foe by ceasing his destruction, by calling back your skirmishers? If the enemy keeps his own skirmisher

execute any maneuver for they are not capable of any, except perhaps, that of falling back and establishing a counter-current which might drag you along. In these moments, everything hangs by a thread. Is it because your skirmishers would prevent you from delivering fire? Do you, then, believe in firing, especially in firing under the pressure of approaching danger, before the enemy? If he is wise, certainly he marches preceded by skirmishers, who kill men in your ranks and who have the confidence of a first success, of

talion, with the present arms especially, is the beginning of disorder, the moment where the battalion begins to escape from its

om the front never succeeds? So be it! Let us attack from the flank. But a flank is always more or l

rapid, calm firing is possi

ps who have no need of the moral support of a second rank behind them, one ra

th the Germans. We are not fitted for that sort of game. If they adopt fire at command, it is just one more reason for our finding

small groups and become confused. The more s

rom position at a supreme moment, ought not to be directly behind the first. The men ought to be echeloned behind the first. There will always be firing from position on any fron

ngaged. If it seems rational, let colonels engage in action, with the battalions of their regiment in two lines. One battalion acts as skirmishers; the other battalion waits, formed ready to aid the first. If you do not wish s

the ammunition supply. As skirmishers are exhausted quickly, engage entire battalions as skirmishers, assisted by entire battalions as supports or reserves. This is a necessary measure to insure

ition, by skirmishers, without the least interval between the skirmishers of different battalions. W

large intervals begin the fight, the killing. While your advance companies move ahead, the battalion commander follows with his formed companies, defilading them as much as possible. He lets them march. If the skirmishers fight at the halt, he supervises them. If the commanding officer wishes to re?nforce his line, if he wants to face an enemy who attempts to advance into an interval, if he

rs. With the present method of re?nforcing skirmishers-I am speaking of the practical method of the battlefield, not of theory-a company, starting from behind the skirmishers engaged, without a place in which to deploy, does not find anything better to do than to mingle with the skirmishers. Here it dou

ain space in which to advance. Suppose you are on a plain, for in a maneuver one starts from the flat terrain. In extending the new company it will re?nforce the wings of the others, the men naturally supporting the flanks of their comrades. The individual intervals will lessen in order to make room fo

to pass through an interval! To-day, the fighting is done ten times farther away, and the intervals between battalions are not weak j

structed French troops. With instruction and unity there would be

try. For this it is necessary to form a single line. Formations have purely moral effect. Whoever counts on their material, effective actio

eye. With the run comes confusion. Many stop, the fewer as the run is shorter. They lie down on the way and will rejoin only if the attack succeeds, if they join at all. If by running too long the men are obliged to stop in order to breathe and rest, the dash is broken, shattered. At the advance, very few will start. T

ge is regulated, and have a rearguard in each battalion of non-commissioned officers, of most reliable officers, in order to gather together, to follow close upon the charge, at a walk, and to collect all those who have lain down so as not to march or because they were out of bre

anxiety of waiting, face to face with the terrible destruction and mutilation of modern weapons. If antiquity had need of solid troops as supports, we have a greater need of them. Death in ancient combat was not as horrible as

storming of a position can be sure of seeing it retaken

s, the supporting troops ought to be of the same company, the same battalion, the same brigade,

ction when the enemy has used his own, ought to be applied downwards. Eac

rale remains the same. The tests of morale, being more violent than previously, ought to be shorter, because the power of morale ha

quare. Instead of lying down, they rush blindly to their refuge which they rende

the flank, and conducted, supported by the non-commissioned officers placed in a fifth rank, in the interior of the rectangle, powerful in its compactness and its fire, cannot be dislodged by cavalry. However, thi

ough such a formation seem to prevent flight, the very impetus of the charge, if led resolutely, will break the deployment before the shock arrives. It is clear that if the charge is badly conducted, whether the infant

Fir

o use small intrenchments, covering battalions. As old as powder. Such shelter is an ex

of flame. You will be convinced that, under such conditions, even simple horizontal firing is a fiction. In a second, there will be wild firing o

et the official adoption of fire by rank insures relapsing into useless firing at

s bewildered, will see more clearly, will be better watched (which may seem strange to you), and will consequently deliver a better fire than formerly. Besides, they will expend six times less ammunition. That is the vit

ly thing required; the second rank can fire only into the air. It is useless to fire with our bulky knapsacks interfering so that our men raise the elbow higher than the shoulder. Learn what the field pack can be from

the one behind it. One kind of fire is practicable and efficient, t

s majesty being to prescribe only what can be executed in front of the enemy, he orders that in firing, the first man is never to put his k

ingular. What ignorance in his marshals not to have explained such wounds! Chief Surgeon Larrey, by observation of the wounds, alone exonerated our soldiers of the accusation of self-inflicted wounds. The observation would have been made sooner, had the wounds heretofore been numerous. That they had not been can be explained only by the fact that while the young soldiers of 1813 kept instinctively close in ranks, up to tha

one see clearly, then, at a signal, let them all fire at once. Who is going to stand against such people? But did they aim in those days? Not so accurately, possibly, but they knew how to shoot waist-high, to shoot at the feet. They knew how to do it. I do not say they did it. If they had done so, there would not have been any need of reminding them of it so often. Note

creates calmn

ains are capable of tranquilly commanding

orces the firing. He is ordered to shoot almost before he aims for fear he will shoot without command. Yet he ought to feel that when he is aiming, his finger on the trigger, his shot does not belong to him, but rather to the officer who ought to

he perfection of its execution would depend on the coolness of the command

lry. Did they use it? They fired before the command, an

In closed ranks, the two lines touching elbows, a man who falls throws ten men into complete confusion. There is no room for those who drop and, however few fall, the resulting disorder immediately makes of the two ranks a series of small milling groups. If the troops are young, they

. Closed ranks permit it hardly in the first rank, whose ears are troubled by the shots from the men behind. When a man has to fire four or five shots a minute, one line is certainly more solid than two, because, while the firing is less by half, it is more than twice as likely to be horizontal fire as in the two-rank form

d, he prefers being relatively isolated, with space around him. Breech-loading rifles breed queer ideas. Generals are found who say that rapid firing will bring back fire at command,

icers were right. They revived the recommendations of Cromwell, because they knew that in combat the soldier naturally fires too high because he does not aim, and because the shape of the rifle, when it is brought to the shoulder, tends to keep the muzzle higher than the breech. Whether that is the reason or s

s had five thousand men disabled, t

the muzzle be heavy, is more deadl

Camps. Nig

it ought to be kept in that order. Only in column is it possible to maintain the battle order. It is nec

ion for a short distance. On account of heat, the closed column is intolerable, like

. The half-divisions not in the first line are brought up, the arms at the order, and they can f

alry of Epaminondas overran not only the cavalry but the infantry that was behind it. The infantry of Epaminondas, coming in the wake of his cavalry finished the work. Turning to the right, the left of Epaminondas then took in the flank the Lacedaemonian line. Menaced also in front by the approaching

is never any opening up, with subsequent closing on the far si

hen the halt seems necessary for discipline in the line. The right responds and if the place has been judged correctly an orderly format

an emergency; without this precaution, considerable time may be

parties in advance; send them

to the convoy, and the chief baggage-master o

are endless owing to overloaded mules and stragglers. If furnished money to buy a mule the officer uses it economically because it is his. If mules are individually furnished to officers instead o

for calling officers of that arm inapt, when battalions although established in position are not absolutely on the same line, with absolutely equal intervals. Ten moves are made to a

or absolute reliability. There are some men whose knowledge of terrain is wonderful, with an unerring eye for distance, who can find their way through places at night which they have visited only in the day time. Utilizing such material for a system of guides it wou