The 56th Division

E ATTACK ON THE

orce began to trickle across the Channel, the people of England were tol

e, Picc

Leiceste

, long way

art's rig

-tempered and friendly, always wide awake, observant, and ready for a scrap, above all never down-hearted, led the way from the very beginning of the war. It is w

* *

ng in following the fortunes of London

sique, with maybe smart tongues and clothes, but without the necessary stamina for hardy soldiers. It would be difficult to say on what ground suc

in raising Volunteers as distinct from the Militia, though the distinction was not always too clear. St. George's, Hanover Square-Pimlico-Inns of Court-Bloomsbury-St. James's are names to be found in every record of effort to meet a national d

British Army knows what the Service owes to London. The Londoner has alw

alone. But when war with the Central Powers was declared he did not hesitate-his response was immediate and [Pg 3] unanimous. Territ

a new unit, looking about with wondering eyes at new scenes, and standing, as it were, on the tiptoes of expec

and of the new division was given, arrived at Hallencourt,

J. E. S. Bri

G. Bayley

. Bullock

H. W. Grubb

. Sutton

. Lemon

C. B. Wa

, Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, 169th Brigade-and we find a wail of despair going up from the 169th Brigade: "No rations, fuel, or stationery yet available"-"No divisional organisation exists" (this on the 8

the machinery was not in running order, and its creaking wheels, which occasionally stopped, necessitated the most careful watching and a great deal of work. When an organisation is being made, no one can sa

des were

his Brigade Major and Capt. O. H. Tidbury as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were the

and Major L. L. Wheatley as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were the 1/4th London Regt., the 1/12

Broadbent as Staff Captain. The battalions were the 1/2nd London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers), the 1/5th London Regt. [Pg 5] (Lond

eld Coy. R.E., the 2/1st (London) Field Ambulance were posted to the 167th Brigade. The 1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A., the 2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E., and the 2/2nd London Field A

de. R.F.A. becomin

de. R.F.A. becomin

de. R.F.A. becomin

s of the Royal Engineers become known as the 512th and 513th Field Companies, and were j

1, 2, 3, and 4 Companies, become the 213th, with the 214th, 215th,

teries as X, Y, and Z. They were posted in numerical or alphabetical order to the infantry [Pg 6] brig

ion Cheshire Regt. The veterinary unit was

of machinery formi

g had their first introduction to Gen. Hull. He was a tall, good-looking man with an abrupt manne

d was that the VI Corps, of which his division formed a part, would relieve the XVII French Corps and would move to the area Domart-en-Ponthieu. The move took place on the 27th Februar

l, Corps, or Army schools. And so, during the period of assembly, the units of the 56th Division trained. Some were attached for ten days or [Pg 7] a fortnight to the 14th Division for work in a "forward position" round about Dainville-infantry, artillery, engineers, a

ver a large area, and depends, of course, on a base of supplies. When a person is told of the front taken up by a division, he will look at the map and measure off the width of the front line. "There," he says, "is the division"! But the division covers quite a big area in depth

division in billets during March, will give those with no

eadquarters

llery Headquart

E. Headquarte

Regt. Gr

Edward's Horse

ists' Coy. G

zer Bde. Wamlin

unition Column

Divisional Tr

ivisional Tr

ry Section

inary Sectio

ompany

nce Dump

nteen and Sho

hools Give

nfantry

adquarters

Trench Mortar Ba

don Regt.

n Regt.

sex Regt.

sex Regt.

Bde. R.F.A.

Field Coy.

Train

Field Ambulan

nfantry

eadquarte

Mortar Batter

ortar Battery

on Regt.

don Regt.

on Regt.

Regt. Vil

Bde. R.F.A.

eld Coy. R.E.

y. Train

ng Battalion

Field Ambulan

nfantry

uarters Ho

ench Mortar Batterie

on Regt.

on Regt.

on Regt.

n Regt. M

e. R.F.A. Bo

rain Houv

ld Ambulance

upply Column

ition Sub-Park

march without boots, a gun can neither shoot nor advance with a broken spring, a motor lorry will not bring up a single tin of "bully beef" if its axle breaks, and all

vance! They contribute to every action

an the size of it, the maximum British effort was 99 infantry, 6 cavalry,

ch did exist. Capt. Newnham notes in the 169th Brigade diary under date 17th April: "Brigade Machine Gun Coy. formed. Capt. J. R. Pyper, 4th London, to command, and Capt. J. B. Baber, Queen's Westminsters, second in command. Company formed from exi

good except for an outbreak o

he VII Corps, and the rest of the division followed on the

Elkington, took over artillery positions from t

* *

ined, and were now to be launched in the big operations of 1916. It would be as well at this point to note the genera

ew as expressed by Gen. von Falkenh

completely overthrown, but their offensive powers have been so shattered that she can [Pg 11] never revive in anything like her old strength. The armies of Serbia can be considered as destroyed. Italy has no doubt rea

ought in many circumstances ... the chief among them cannot be passed o

on a war of exhaustion." He puts the winter of 1917 as the latest date when a food crisis and "the social and political crisis that always follow them, among the members of our alliance," will occur, and asks, or rather states, that En

n England on land? Invasion is impossib

doubts about England's invulnerability which have already been aroused among the Mediterranean peoples and in the Mohammedan world. Defeats in the East could do us palpable harm among our allies. We can in no case expect to do anything of decisive effect on the course of the war, as the protagonists of an Alexander march to India or

can be struck on land, we cannot close our eyes to the fact

able point in her armour, he is forced to turn his eyes to the West. And in the West he does not like the look of the Bri

s sound and who is not seriously inferior in numbers. The defender has usually succeeded in closing the gaps. The salients thus made, enormously exposed to the effects of [Pg 13] flanki

rom the Continent, "England may be trusted not to give up even then," and France would not have been very seriously

to smash up the "tools." But no weapon is to be discarded, and so unr

the United States may take up a hostile attitude. She cannot intervene decisively in the war in time to enable her to make England fight on when that country sees the spectre of hunger an

s opinion, and he thinks there will soon be internal troubles. Russia is also ruled out because he does not see an

military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking-point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand.... Within our reach behind the French sector of the Western Front there are objectiv

he Germans always did), but he was placed in very serious difficulties by the successful attack of Brussiloff on the Austrians in June, so that he also undervalued the strength of Russia. For this misfortune, however, the Germans blame the Austrians, condemning them for their offensive against the Italians in May, which was undertaken against German advice and made the Brussiloff adventure possib

ouglas Haig sums up the early situation v

ged and severe. The results have been worthy of the highest traditions of the French Army and of great service to the cause of the Allies. The efforts made

the only assistance asked for by our Allies was of an indirect nature-viz., the relief of the Fr

progress. Sir Douglas Haig desired to postpone the attack as long as possible, because both the British Army and the supply of ammunition were growing steadily, and time would enabl

heavy blows on Germany and her allies, while Germany was seeking, by a concentration on France at Verdun, to gain a decision in

Henry Rawlinson, on a front stretching from Maricourt, on the right, to Serre, on the left; while farther no

o be dug-assault trenches, assembly trenches, communication trenches, trenches for telephone wires-dugouts had to be constructed for sheltering troops, for dressing-stations, for storing food, water, and engineering m

stores within reach of the fighting troops. Roads had to be constructed, and in some places causeways had to be built over marshy

passed and repassed in never-ending streams; the roads were congested with motor and wagon traffic; paths across the open country could be traced by the shadowy silhouettes of men in single file. And the horizon flickered with the flash of guns as with summer lightning, while shells passed overhead with a long-drawn, ghostly wail, or fell with a sharp swish and a

would be the wailing passage and so continuous the crash of bursting shells. This might last all through the night as an organised "shoot," or would come suddenly, without warning, a swift artillery attack on roads, working parties, or [Pg 18] billets-what was afterwards known as "haras

the preparation for

* *

nder preparation for the British effort. The 167th Brigade took over the front-line system held by the 145th Brigade, 48th Division, on the 4th May. The 168th Br

eld by the 3rd London Regt., and was beaten off with the loss of one officer and one N.C.O. killed. These proved to be

e 169th Brigade and two battalions of the 168th Brigade. In support was Brig.-Gen. Nugent, with his headquarters at [Pg 19] Souastre, having under his command his own f

paration for a very r

o be undertaken by the Third Army, and the task fell to the VII Corps (Gen. Snow), holding the front in question. F

impossible to shorten this distance, but, with one exception, the several ways of doing it must result in heavy casualties; the enemy would be bound to see what was afoot, and would try by every means i

ed to dig it in one night! It meant that at least three thousand yards of trench must be constructed in a few hours, a task of appalling magnitude; and it must be remembered that every effort w

his disposal, over and above the five battalions of his "group," one compa

concerned, and the brigade staff made most careful reconnaissance, patrolling every night, noting landmarks, getting acquainted with that silent, eerie tract separating the two lines of combatants. Conversations through

C, and D. The only difficulty was the junction between B and C, bu

d, and during the following days the whole of the arrangements were rehear

and ready for instant action. All known machine-gun emplacements were carefully registered, and arrangements were made with the Brigadier-General commanding the Corps heavy

ineers followed, quiet and certain in all that they did, and marked out the line with string and pegs. On the left they got to work speedily: the pegs were about nine inches long and made from small round stakes from which t

e oversight; and then German patrols were encountered. The latter occurrence was a contingency which had always been reckoned with. A game of hide and seek ensued, but meanwhile time passe

, and the remainder carried shovels which had been carefully sharpened. Each man had three sandbags, one being

he trench-trench ladders had also been provided by the engineers in case the steps should be im

ops holding the line, and, at the appointed time, the head of each battalion was at the selected

groups, had orders to use rifle fire as sparingly as possible, but

short intervals. And half an hour after the digging parties had left the trench, wiring and carrying p

rom the covering parties, reinforced with Lewis guns; they had rations, water, and shovels to improve their positions, and were

planes from approaching our lines, but our airmen photographed the new line themsel

the front-line trench and wire, digging support lines and two other communicati

asualties were 8 killed and 55 wounded. A little luck had waited on audacity, but the success of the whole operation was undoubtedly due to the intelligence and keenness of the men. They had nothing much to help them. Gen. Hull had, indeed, ordered two or three wagons, loaded with empty shell-cas

one day's [Pg 24] ration; the taping, digging, and wiring men had no equipment, but carried a ri

, deepened, revetted, emplacements had to be made for machine guns and trench mortars, stores for ammunition of all so

* *

n artilleryman, were considering the problem of attack.

ance of our present line and good observation of the German positions between Gommecourt

rd good artillery positions and cover from vi

the Hébuterne-Puisieux Road, which defilades the area, nort

, which, to a certain extent, d

t) through K5a and b to the Rossignol Wood along the so

-east and south of Gommecourt, and affords concealment, both for battery positions in the valley to

ich runs the Puisieux-Gommecourt Road, a line of

ways another hill behind it." Which was true enough. But it is as well to remember that the high ground to the left as far as Blairville

an line Gen

wired at all unless there is sunken wire on the road. All three lines are visible from our present position except the second and third lines behind the strong point K11c and d. The northern fl

from the south-east corner of Gommecourt along the ridge in 5Ka, b, and c, to

sting paper on the propo

be to establish itself on the line 16 Pop

tack from the north and t

ure a footing on the ridge E29

e from the south-east corner of Gommecourt Wood and then, unde

is one point which I wish to urge: that no advance through the village or

mbardment will very seriously affect the moral of the garrison of the village and park, and I consider that the knowledge that they were cut off from escap

.e. to secure the Quadrilateral in the first assault. T

s achieved after a certain lim

isions failing to achieve their objective, the detachmen

th these arguments, and do not think t

500 yards behind the German front line without serious loss or difficulty. In the present case I am proposing an advance, at one point on each divisional front, of only 800 yards, in the case

vent of one or other attack failing the detac

on failing to reach E29c, I should consider it my duty to put in tro

ion by visual signalling with my present trench system, so that they can hardly be considered isolated, and the risk,

r it would be feasible to organise and launch an attack from the newly-captured trenches. Any delay would enable the enemy to put his barrage in front of our front-line system, as if

t his machine, also that every day meant to him added strength. But meanwhile the Entente Powers were being pressed in another direction. The Austrians had attacked the Italians with

Brussiloff's army, "after a relatively short artillery preparation ... got up from their trenches and simply marched forward." Falkenhayn has a delightful observation on the whole business: "A 'reconn

s were still very strong in numbers, and there was no slacking off of their efforts on Verdun. They were able to help the Austrians to check th

las Haig

the strain continued to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of war, it was eventually agreed between Gen. Joffre

ve the press

tres of war by stopping any further transf

e strength of the f

ation of plan forced by the enemy, it was not to be compared with the abandonment by the Germans of their offensive-which Falkenhayn says he had pr

ll a long way from the enemy. The Queen's Westminster Rifles succeeded in advancing a small sector of the line by

r, too, wa

from which it will be seen that the decision to attempt the

will be carried out by the 168th and 169t

nch, about K11d13, along Farm, Fame and Elbe, Felon, to a point in Fell fifty yards nor

armyard, Fa

be, between

renches of Fell a

of a fire trench facing south-east to connect the right

ade in the first phase will be to capture the line of German trenches from the left of the 168th Br

ough Ems to the C

out th

th-east corner of

rigade attack will take place i

he artillery lifts will be timed on the assumption that the infantry will reach Ems (between Etch and Fill

t of the [Pg 31] securing of the cross-trenches at K5a78 (where Indus crosses Fill and Fillet

will be carr

unds S

proof

ers

and current

three s

ube h

ire-cutters, bi

Brigade are practically embod

the disposal of the Brigadier-General command

ll be under the orders of the Divisional Gas Officer. Approximately 1,200 men will be required fo

se instructions, were carried

tinued until the last moment. But meanwhile another element was introduced-that of destructive preparation. It is scarcely necessary to

reserve in Bucquoy, and 2 companies at Ablainzeville. Their artillery consisted of 5 batteries of heavy artillery and 12 batteries of field artillery. These batteries were divided

ault by smashing up not only the wire and trench system, but billets and gun positions behind the German lines

hern group, under Lieut.-Col. Macdowell, and a wire-cutting group under Lieut.-Col. Prech

hern

unders (until zero d

y 4·5 ho

zero to the

hern

es of 18-

y 4·5 ho

zero to the

Wire-cut

ounders until zero

y 4·5 ho

attery will be at the call o

of the infantry by the discharge of a smoke cloud. It was hoped to introduce some element of surprise by occasional discharges of smoke during the preparatory bombardment, and so the C

hey will coincide with the intense artillery bombardment of the enemy trenches. These bombardments will commence thir

no di

no di

10.15 a.m.

5.45 a.m. t

7.15 a.m. t

6th and 56th Divisional fronts its duration will be as arranged by [Pg 34

k was postponed for two days, so that, instead of having

the month of May, and the division had suffered in casualties to the extent of 402; for the month of June casualties leapt up to 801. The end of June was a prolonged crash of guns. Only for one

5-inch fired on V day 3,200 rounds, on W day 2,200 rounds, on X day 3,100 rounds, and on Y day 5,300 rounds (which was repeated on the two extra days) at the front-line trenches and strong point

mewhat spoilt by the premature bursting of a smoke shell an hour before the appointed time. This misfortune caused the enemy to put down a barrage on our front-line and communication trenches, which prevented t

h the enemy wire was reported as satisfactorily cut in front of their first and second lines

tering down of defences. 2/Lieut. P. Henri, of the 3rd London Regt., raided the front line. He found the Germans working feverishly to repair their trench, and succeeded in cap

d some strands of barbed wire had been put up. Up to the last moment the German

htel's wire-cutting group pounded away at the wire. The trench mortar batteries added their quota, though they were chased from pillar to po

* *

ch might otherwise have been used against the left flank of the Fourth Army at Serre. To achieve thi

brigades then practised the assault on a replica of the German defence system near Halloy. In the early mo

e Royal Engineers sent a section of the 2/1st London Field Coy. with the 169t

of these battalions of the 168th Brigade may be briefly described as a half-wheel to the right. They had to capture the strong point round abo

ir task, they had to make a left wheel and hold the line of the edge of Gommecourt Park, establishing strong points. The Queen's Westminster Rifles would

ng reached at 7.20 and lasting for ten minutes. At this moment smoke was discharged from the left of our line near Z hedge, and in five minutes

lling their own line. This gallant regiment succeeded in gaining practically the whole of its objectives, but they were never very comfortable. Owing to the smoke the two left companies lost direction, the flank company being drawn off in the d

ere soon in trouble, and two companies of the 1/4th London Regt. were sent forward to reinforce them. Together these two uni

a's Rifles, on the other hand, were meeting with fierce resistance, and were short of the Cemetery. The Queen's Westminster Rifles, advancing in rear, soon b

l intensity, and from Gommecourt Park, which was apparently packed with men in deep dugouts, came strong bombing attacks. The London Rifle B

ception of the Quadrilateral. But the troops in the [Pg 39] German lines were now held there firmly by the enemy barrage; they were cut off from all communication by runners, and from all reinforcements. On the right the Kensingtons had failed in an attempt to reinforce the London Scottish. Captain Tagart, of the former regiment, had led his company o

the Quadrilateral was empty of troops of either side. The artillery observers, however, reported seeing

lbred says in his report, "As no officer who got as far as this (first line) ever returned, it is difficult to know in detail what happened." The three captains, Cockerill,

, and many were hit.... The losses were heavy before reaching the bank at the Gommecourt-Nameless Farm road. At this point our three compan

then reorganised a bombing party, bombed the enemy out of Fellow and reached the Cemetery. To do this they had to run over the open and drop into Fellow. Another party tried at the same time to bomb their way up Etch, but found it was too strongly held by the enemy. Meanwhile, 2/Lieut. Upton had stuck u

egt., whose name unfortunately is not mentioned [we believe it was 2/Lieut. G. S. Arthur], this party force

the Quadrilateral, where strong enemy bombing parties met them, and the Cheshire lieutenant ordered

n third line. Signals were picked up by the artillery observers calling for bombs. As early as 10 a.m. two parties of London Scottish, eac

was in Fall on the right. More desperate attempts were made to reinforce the hard-pressed troops. Capt. P. A. J. Handyside, of the 2nd London Regt., led his comp

pted the same feat with his company, and met with a like

k three hours after the rest of his battalion had been ordered to fall back on Ferret, the German first line. But, although the two flanks held, the [Pg 42] troo

o could get there was

as not unreasonable for the men of the 56th Division to hope, while they were being hardly pressed

dshire Regt. on the right and the 6th North Staffordshire Regt. on the left, had Gommecourt Wood in front of them. The 139th Briga

y it for this reason. They filed out through gaps in their wire, and if any succeeded in reaching the German front line it was for a period of minutes only. The North Staffords fared no better, though

erwoods got away t

h waves suffered severely in crossing from machine-gun fire. The majority of the first and second waves passed over the first-line trenches, but there is no evidence to show what happened to them there, for not a man of the battalions that reached the German second line has returned. The remaining waves ... found that the enemy, who must have taken refuge in deep dugouts, had now come up and manned the parapet in parties. The Germans were noticed to be practically all bomb

utenant of the [Pg 44] Cheshires, reached the Quadrilateral. But the Germans were then masters of the situation on the north of the salient and, freed from all anxiety in that quarter, could turn their whole attention to the 56th Division. Up to this time fighting had been hard, but slow progress had been made, and with even moderate succes

o reorganise assaulting waves from the carrying parties, and at 3.30 in the afternoon it seemed probable that an attack would materialise, b

167th Brigade relieved the 168th o

onclusions on th

retain the ground was a shortage of

the machine-gun fire from the flanks, which prev

readth of No

ing [Pg 45] grenades and S.A.A. from men who

ink this was due to the limited number of guns available, and also to the small calibre of the majority employed (60-pounders, 4·7 g

ce our attack was launched, the Germans

o have increased the number of his batteries.... The effect of the bombardment on the German trenches was very great ...

emy time to recognise the points selected for the attack, and possibly t

er than any of the previous bombardments. I am in favour of having as many false attacks

er [Pg 46] in the day German bombers advanced with great boldness, being assisted by men who advanced over the open. Our men appear to have had no difficulty in dealing with enemy bombers at first-it was only when bombs were scarce that the enemy succeeded in pushing us back. The co

devotion by the artillery. The artillery observers took great risks, and the conduct of one of Lieut.-Col. Prechtel's wire-cutting batteries is well worthy of

crossing No Man's Land, and to deal with those troops who had lodged them

n: Title or

ommecour

ne is the old

n: GOMMECOU

URT, JU

vent him from moving troops. The prisoners captured were 141 from units of the 52nd Reserve Division, and 37 from [Pg 47] the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, so that no movement of troops had occurred on that front, and we know that the n

gains of the assaulting troops could not be maintained. After five days' fierce fighting, the enemy's first system of defence farther south had been penetrated t

tack on the Gommecourt Salient, is

* *

257 other ranks had come out. The Rangers had sent in 23 officers and 780 other ranks-6 officers and 280 other ranks came out. The Queen Victoria's Rifles came out with 22 officers and 160 o

n the wounded. His own stretcher-bearers came out, on seeing which ours also went out. Thi

t was known as the R Line, the original line when the 56th Division arrived in the sector. And the front held by the division was gradually increased. From the 3rd July onwards the division took over the line to th

ourth Army, which was again attacking in the south. On this night a patrol of the Queen'

attempted raids, but the enemy were found to

relieved by the 17th Division, and marched first to Doullens, then to Fromer-le-Grand, then to S