The 56th Division

ANCE TO

T 1918-BATTLE O

theatre, with a curtain dropping for fifteen minutes while the actors rested an

n, and, as is usual in such times of stress, the weak-hearted were always ready to endow the enemy with miraculous powers of assembling, of covering himself with a cloak of invisibility. The

it would be about the centre of the British line, where his preparations were

ig as being that he could, under urgent necessity, give ground there to a limited extent, but a break-through in the centre, about Vimy, "would mean the realisation of the enemy's plans, which had been foiled by our defence of Arras on the 28th March, namely, the capture of

ior to the 21st March, and there were indications that the enemy was completing thes

mbardment was reopened with the greatest intensity. At 7 o'clock, again helped by a thick fog, the enemy attacked the left brigade of the Portuguese 2nd Division and b

Merville and the Forêt de Nieppe, but the enemy penetrated beyond [Pg 245] Bailleul,

nd of April. But we must note that on the 14t

hey were joined by the 8th Division, which had been in some of the hardest fighting on the Somme. These divisions constituted the IX Corps and were included in the Sixth French Army. The German attack fell on the IX Corps and the French Corps on their left, w

ginning of July, however, Marshal Foch believed that the enemy was about to attack east and west of Rheims, and he moved the whole of his French troops (eight divisions) from Fl

July, and, after making progress and [Pg 246] crossing the

ry-Soissons front, and in this used the four British divisions he had held in reserve,

successes throughout the months of March, April, May, and July in mind, the actions of the 56th Division during those months are perhaps the most significant and, in our opinion, the most gallant work they performed. There was no set battle. And a set battle is in some ways the easiest kind of attack for the infantry. The operations through those months were of a minor character, cal

he 8th April the 56th Division had relieved the 1st Canadian Division and Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. During the week of so-called rest, brigades were called upon to provide anything betwee

rpe, had been lost on the 28th, and the line now ran through Fampoux, on the north of the river, in front of Feuchy to Bois des B?ufs, to the east of Tilloy, and so to Neuville Vitasse. Bois des B?ufs was about the

ggressive policy. Many small encounters took place in No Man's Land

Pg 248] left, with one platoon and two bombing sections. The enemy were taken completely by surprise. One warrant officer and three other ranks were captured, together with nine machine guns and a Grenatenwerfer. The enemy line was held throughout the day, but the hostile artillery fir

d a combination of these appear to have presented to the artillery observers a cluster of lights such as our S.O.S. ro

f the 65th Infantry

he 15th Division the sector north of the Arras-Cambr

ere found and proved to be of the 28th Infantry Regt., 185th Division. But the next night two prisoners were captured by a patrol on the extreme

he had scarcely time to look round, knew no one in the division, and his position might be described as most unenviable; at the battle of Cambrai he was called upon to carry out a most difficult task; a

ry command of the division, until

ourg line was roused to its highest pitch when, after a quiet ten days' study of the line, the General ordered a whole series of

our prisoners and a machine gun. They established the important fact that the 16th Ba

. The next night a somewhat ambitious raid was made on a wide front of either side of the Tilloy-Wancourt road. On the le

raiders entered the enemy lines. They found it packed with men north of the road. The 1st Londons claimed to ha

1 prisoner, and 1 machine gun. The left party counted the damage they inflicted as no less than 60 killed. The artillery had also done fearful execution. Although many of the enemy were seen running away, the total casualties inflicted

ualties of the raiding parties were 2 officers killed and 2 wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 49 woun

rprising patrol which rushed an enemy post and c

ken prisoners. The Germans did not show much fight on this occasion, but in most cases emerged from dug-outs with no rifles or

ft of the line, near Broken Mill, and secured two p

of the Cambrai road. They advanced under cover of smoke and killed about 24 of the enemy and captured 1 mac

t night a platoon of the 1st Londons and a platoon of the 8th Middlesex entered the enemy lines on the left and inflicted casualties, but failed to

soon as the raiders reached the gun-pits the garrison, led by an officer, attempted to come out of the dug-out. The officer was promptly [Pg 252] shot, though he missed the leading man of the Queen's Westminsters by a hair's-breadth, and a charge of the explos

ions had good cause to remember the 56th Division. But it is an exceedingly fine record, and

ivision on the 15th July, and the division

d we must quote from Brig

y marked and their observation posts selected, also their lines of retreat if necessary. Continual training in moving warfare was also carried out by means of skeleton drill with full staff. A polo ground was used near Dainville and play went on twice a week until the enemy elected to shell the ground, when it [Pg 253] had to be stopped. During this period the artillery supported many successful raids by our infantry and the Canadians on our right.... The 'Bow Bells' established themselves

lane bombs, the division started on the 31st July to relieve portions of the 1st Canadian Division in the Tilloy and Vitasse sections of the

ion on the 4th showing that the 185th German Division had been relieved by the 39th Division.

d by rail to Izel-les-Hameau area. On the 18th the 168th Brigade was relieved by the 46

ld attack Orange Hill and Chapel Hill, and the 56th Division was to

the 168th to Lignereuil. At mid-day on the 21st the 56th Division was transferred from the XVII Corps to the VI

* *

ring this period Sir

the 15th July, and the striking success of the Allied counter-offensive sou

troops from the United States in France, but the English divisions had been largely made up to strength. Between May and June ten English divisions had been reduced to cadres-seven of these were reconstituted during July and August. And German General Headquarters had been forced to ta

s for a local offensive. The objectives on the British front were the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens railway by a

his mind, and we know that it was Ludendorff's plan. There is an indication that Sir Douglas Haig was urging a counter-stroke in the north. "These different operations," he says, "had already been the subject of correspondence

re the Australian Corps, and on the left the III Corps. The attack of the First French Army was timed to take place an hour later between Moreuil and the British right. By

of the German Army in the history

ted our line south of the Somme on a wide front. Early the following morning General von Cramon rang me up from Baden. He informed me that my report had caused great alarm in Vienna. I could not leave him in any doubt as to the s

Western Front was great. The Emperor Charles announced

ig was faced with the old positions of the opening of the battle of the Somme in 1916. But th

e [Pg 257] area between the Rivers Somme and Scarp

rther reason for my decision was that the ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly damaged by shell-fire, and was suitable for the use of Tanks. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a so

in the days of the old Somme fighting had lain well behind the enemy's lines. In consequence we were here either astride or to the east of the intricate s

used to get troops and guns into position on this front, and to bring forward the left of the Fourth Army between the Somme and the Ancre. The principal attack would be delivered on the 23rd August by the Third Army and the divisions of the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder of t

* *

IV Corps was engaged, with the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions, and the VI Corps, with the 2nd and Guards Divisions. On the 23rd a

movement of troops. A state of brain and nerve tension prevailed. There was, too, a change of plan, which

back to the Avesnes-le-Comte area on the 21st, and on the same day the 168th Brigade marched from the Mazières area to Lignereuil. The 56th Division now came under the VI Corps (Haldane), and Gen. Hull at once visited Corps Hea

ecided upon. He did not get back to Bavincourt until 10.30 a.m., when he held a conference and explained the operations to all concerned. Officers

de, with the 1st London Regt. attached, moved to the assembly area, a march of another four and a half miles, ready to attack on the left of the Guards Division. In the midst of all this movement and with onl

s no better off

f Hamelincourt to just north of Boiry [Pg 260] Becquerelle. The Divisional Artillery, for purposes of the initial attack, consisted of six brigades R.F.A., as follows: (a) Guards Divisional Artillery, (b) 57th, (c) 56th. On the 21st August these brigades were as follows: (a) in action on the front, (b) in reserve near St. Pol, (c) in reserve at Simencourt and Berneville. Reconnaissance was carried out during the morning of the 22nd, and at 8 p.m. that evening the brigades moved off to occupy the positions selected

t gr

uards Divisional Artillery, in

re g

7th Divisional Artillery, in acti

t g

6th Divisional Artillery, in acti

erned, the strength of the barrage was

ery group-two brigades

running from the high ground by Adinfer Wood, passes to the north of Boisleux-St. Marc and Boiry Becquerelle. The southern branch, running across

river to the north of Boyelles, and which afforded the enemy a concealed position on that portion of the front. The general run of the valley was across the direction of the 56th Division attack, and Croi

e two villages of Boyelles and Boiry Becquerelle; and the brigade would then push out a fringe of pos

n so progress was slow, and such light as there was did not help officers, when they had placed their men in position, to see very much of what sort of a place it was

the London Scottish on the left advanced to the assault twelve minutes later. The Tanks cleared the way for the Kensingtons very effectively, only a few small parties of the enemy showing much fight. The battalion, however, was worried by machine-gun fire

dropped suddenly from the German line and was helped by a sunken road, so that there was plenty of shelter from the barrage. The left of the 4th Londons was held up in front of this place. For some reason no Tank attacked the forward Marc system, and until a platoon

ut here four Tanks came on the scene, and again the garrison surrendered with eleven machine guns.

a smart enveloping movement, closing on the village from the flanks, and eventually gettin

bjective was th

ht. The brigade was to gain touch with the Guards at Bank Copse on the east side of the railway curve into St. Leger. But

the opposition and joined the Guards, with whom they attacked the railway bank to the west of Bank Copse. The remainder of the battalion was apparently fighting in small groups and was much scattered. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. R. S.

very light. There was opposition from five enemy machine guns, but these were outflanked and overcome. The line

end of Boyelles Reserve. For one hour the London Scottish worked slowly to get round this position, but before they closed in the

ivision. The Kensingtons had had the worst time, but they captured in all

impossible to reconnoitre the ground, and the approach march was made in exceptionally hot weather. There had been no preparation of the front prior to the attack, and signal communications were poor. Visual signalling was o

in the assembly areas. Their greater speed enabled them to catch up the infantry, and by working forward and

on, were controlled by Lieut.-Col. Jervis, who was with the Brigade Headquarters, a

n by the number of prisoners, 663, and the 59 mach

, about Thiepval (which had caused us such efforts to win in 1916), were in a precarious position. The attack was

e a large and important unit in any operations, was being swamped by the numbers set in motion. One of five or six is such a muc

which relieved the Kensingtons and 4th London Regiment. The 169th Brigade moved to the B

he 52nd Division on the northern boundary. The second objective was Fooley Reserve-Hill Switch-Cross Switch, with the object of enveloping Croisilles from t

inutes, followed by the infantry. The whole of the brigade, of course, attacked-the 8th Middlesex being on the right, the 7th Middle

took the form of "patchy" machine-gun fire and rifle fire. Small parties of men kept working forward and could be seen, with Tanks, in a

Division was ordered to make preparations to meet a counter-attack. The 169th Brigade was ordered forward behind Boyelles, and the 167th Brigade was told to occupy Croisilles "by peaceful penetra

the village, two companies in Summit Trench and that end of Leger Reserve, and one company in Boyelles Reserve. The 7th Middlesex had two companies in Summit Trench, with patrols in f

Gen. Hull ordered the Brigade to attack and establish itself in the Hindenburg Support Line between Hump Lan

roisilles were not successful, and at zero hour, 7.30

ch rendered it useless. Croisilles Trench had been reached by troops, but found to be only 2 feet deep at the most, and quite useless as a reorganising point for further adva

l had to point out that the resistance was not only very strong, as he had proved that day, but that the Hindenburg system was very heavily wired. Tanks would have dealt with this wire had they been available. T

, went out, and their reports coincided with that of the Guards Division on the right, that Croisilles was full of machine guns. Also the 52nd [Pg 269] Di

in front of the main line, but the village itself was too strongly

on with a view of attacking and enveloping Croisill

lles Trench and Fooley Reserve. Roughly the XVII Corps faced the Hindenburg Line, which swung round the left flank of the 56th Division, and on this flank the 52nd Division were to advance on the Hindenburg Line in conjunction with the

d the machine guns in Croisilles poured a devastating hail of bullets on the assaulting troops. But to the north the Canadian Corps had been successful an

om the Cojeul River to Henin Hill clear of the enemy, and t

2nd Londons. On taking over, the 2nd Londons attempted to clear the situation on the left by a "stealth

was successful in reaching Farmers' Avenue and Sensée Avenue, while, on the left, the 52nd Division reached Fontaine Croisilles and established themselves to the east of that village. A glance at the map will show how the Hindenburg Line was being rolled up, how desperate was the case of the Ge

back on Leger Reserve, and left a gap on the right of the Queen's Westminsters, which was filled by two platoons of the latter regiment. Farther to the south troops were fighting on the S

m which had been captured by the 52nd Division, and move along it towards the Sensée River, where they would start the attack. The 2nd Londons meanwhile cleared their front of some small pa

the west of Croisilles, and the 168th Brigade moved in position to support the 169th in the attack along the Hindenburg Line. Also, th

s given as Queen's Lane-Jove Lane; the secon

n fire. In the morning of the 28th, however, an aeroplane reported the village empty, but at 8.30 a.m. patrols of the 8th Middlesex fou

. The Queen's Westminsters, who led the attack, started from the line Nelly Avenue. The Germans on the right, in Guardian Reserve, held out, and the 167th Brigade found sufficient of the enemy to hold them up on the railway so

bly was seriously impeded by the 52nd Division, who, at that moment, were also assembling to attack on the following day. Col. Savill, who was commanding the Queen's Westminsters, says that his men arrived "dead beat" at Nelly Avenue and Burg Support, having been on the move all night. He gives as the cause of the loss [Pg 273] of direction the heavy machine-gun fire which h

esson is once more demonstrated. To the difficult task imposed upon them must be added the further embarrassment of never having seen the ground. True that the attack did not start until 12.30 p.m., but it was extremely difficult

n the trenches of the Hindenburg System. Before any man?uvre of the sort could be undertaken, these bel

fourth company being in support on the right and Battalion Headquarters on the left. The left [Pg 274]

s, and assembled in King's Avenue. The two left companies followed the Que

ry soon encountered the enemy. He was joined by the headquarters of the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. It was thought tha

fs and a few scattered men of the Queen's Westminsters in the centre, and two companies of the 2nd London Regt. (not a hundred men) on the left. The right, which was the strongest part

gade through Croisilles, still held Guardian [Pg 275] Reserve. "Guardian Reserve," writes Brig.-Gen. Coke, "was a thorn in the side of the brigade until 6 p.m." Not only was the advance severely harassed from this place, but no track for carrying am

ion all through the afternoon and night of the 28th August was most complicated, the 2nd London, London Rifle Brigade, 4th London, and Kensingt

prepared to move into Pelican Avenue with the object of attacking Bullecourt early in the morning of the 29th. But, owing to the

court. They had suffered a number of casualties, and the remaining captain of the Queen's Westminsters had returned wounded during the afternoon, and had reported to the 169

were in Pelican Avenue, with the Kensingtons on the right and the London Sco

companies, with the exception of the 2nd London Regt., had not returned. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack with two companies, having in close support 4

t Station Redoubt; but the London Scottish made good progress on the left, and by 2.15 p.m. were through Bullecourt. The weak 169th Brigade made progress as f

nd so the line remained with the London Scottish bulged out round Bullecourt, and the Kensingtons bringing the right flank back to [Pg 277] Station Redoubt,

hole of the divisional front, and the

of Bullecourt to the line Pelican Lane and Pelican Avenue. At the same time the 3rd Division on the right was driven out of Ecoust, and

lecourt received such strong support from the Station Redoubt that all efforts failed

re ordered to take Bullecourt and the Station Redoubt, relieving the 167th Brigade on that portion of the front. A company of the latter brigade would the

t the brigade [Pg 278] advanced under a creeping barrage, with the London Scottish

up in front of Bullecourt; and on the left the 7th Middlesex were unable to capture the factory. A company of the Kensingtons was sent up on the left, and by 10.15 a

Tank Avenue and Support. All field guns and the heavy artillery was concentrated on this target,

om the flanks was carried on round the village. By the time it was dark only th

, and marched out of the line to rest about Boy

s, 1,047 o

s and 1 8-in

ns and over 50

es of the di

s and 2,381

attles of Alber

of Albert & t

division, and as a consequence the 56th Divisional front had been covered by the 57th Divisional Artillery on the right and their own artillery on the left. At this time the 13th and 22nd Brigades of the Royal

in Summit Trench. On this same day the 232nd Army Brigade R.F.A. was transferred to the 56th Division, and formed an independent group with S.O.S. lines superimposed. After

3rd Divisions, and eventually withdrew from the line on the 5th S

to be li

ninel; and the Battle of the Scarpe 1918 the dates 26th-30th August and boundaries Noreuil (exclusive)-St. Leger [Pg 280] (exclusive)-Boisleux-au-Mont-Roclincourt-Bailleul-Oppy. The ground from the right of Boyelles (about the station) to